893.00/4359: Telegram
The Minister in China (Schurman) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:11 p.m.]
213. Morning of 10th received following telegram from Colonel Martin: “Recommend that marines here on duty be relieved as the emergency has passed.”
After protracted conference with Hutchins,34 Cheney,35 Philoon,36 Ruddock,37 Peck,38 in which we reached unanimous conclusion, I told [Page 701] Martin over the telephone that I could not adopt his recommendation, that I would take the responsibility of instructing him to keep marines longer for the reason that although first phase of danger to Tientsin had passed I considered we needed all the American troops we had here to fulfill our international obligation to guard railway in American sector and to protect American lives and property and to assure safety in case of resumption of hostilities; also sent radio to Admiral Strauss on the 10th as follows: “In view of reports from Tientsin I consider it not advisable to withdraw marines from Tientsin at the present time.”
Afternoon 10th British Minister came to me with telegrams from American officer at Tangshan dated 8th and 9th to Colonel Martin who had requested British Consul General Tientsin to communicate them to me over British wire. Telegram 8th declared: “Chang does not want to fight but will if not given time enough for orderly retreat.” Telegram 9th stated regarding American sector: “Too many bridges, cannot guard them all with my force and think it is too late to send more for this duty but protection of life and property of foreigners warrants all men you can send me.” Telegram 9th concludes: “Recommend strong concerted action by foreign ministers insisting that Wu halt advance and Chang withdraw outside of wall.” This recommendation Colonel Martin approved in separate telegram 10th.
British Minister also brought identic telegram to him and me sent by our consuls general Tientsin May 10, 3 p.m. in which they “strongly recommend strong pressure be made by foreign ministers to insist on Chang’s halt and believe it would now be successful.” Conversations had been held with both Wu and Chang.
My British colleague and I rejected this recommendation for the following reasons:
- 1.
- Such intervention seemed unnecessary on the ground of humanity.
- 2.
- If railway occupied, one and probably both parties would hereafter blame us foreigners.
- 3.
- If intervention occurred to stop civil strife it might hereafter involve intervention in Government.
Two hours after we had reached the conclusion above stated we received the President’s mandate depriving Chang of all offices, see my 212, May 10, 10 p.m. which confirmed us in the soundness of our conclusion.
Consul general at Tientsin reports that there has been some criticism that America is not doing its full international duty in the present emergency. I telegraphed to Martin May 6, 11 p.m. to cooperate to the utmost with other commandants and aid them to protect their nationals subject to our primary duty to guard railway [Page 702] and protect American life and property, the military part I must of course leave to his discretion but I have sent Major Philoon this morning to Tientsin to consult both Fuller39 and Martin and see if anything further can be done and telephone their conclusions to me for final decision. Cable reply received this morning on British wire telegram from Fuller who had seen Wu. Wu stated “he will give Chang opportunity to retire,” and adds “if Chang does not retire fighting inevitable and Wu cannot accept blame for loss of life and property.” Telegram concludes “all stations up to but not including Tangshan now reported occupied by Chihli troops.”
Following received this morning from Mukden: “May 10, 6 p.m. Chang Tso-lin has not returned to Mukden, now at Lanchow [Lwanchow?] collecting tyrannized [sic] remnants not more than 30,000, Tuchun Sun at Changli with 15,000 men, 15,000 additional troops this side Shanhaikuan, 2,000 troops left Mukden yesterday bound for latter place. Chang evidently determined to make stand where he is. No mail service railway Peking to Mukden. Conditions growing worse here. Normal confidence in Chang still continues, no trouble here at present anticipated.[”]
- Comdr. Charles T. Hutchins, naval attaché in China.↩
- Col. Sherwood A. Cheney, military attaché in China.↩
- Maj. Wallace C. Philoon, assistant military attaché in China.↩
- Albert B. Ruddock, secretary of the Legation in China.↩
- Willys R. Peck, Chinese secretary of the Legation in China.↩
- Stuart J. Fuller, consul general at Tientsin.↩