867.4016/732½
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the British Ambassador (Geddes), November 13, 1922
The British Ambassador called pursuant to appointment. The Secretary said that he had not yet heard in answer to his request [Page 956] for information from Admiral Bristol as to the present situation in Constantinople and Anatolia with respect to the deportations of Greeks and Armenians, and the effect of the protest already made.
The Secretary said he had been carefully considering the situation; that he understood there were about a million three hundred thousand Christians left in Anatolia; that these were scattered throughout Anatolia; that they had been largely removed from the villages in the West and were found more to the Center and to the East; that being a scattered population in towns and on farms and on the highways en route to the coast cities, it would be quite impossible for any force that could be gathered actually to save them; that in the event of war they would probably be the first to perish; that no force could be put into Anatolia that could really rescue such a scattered population. The Secretary said that there was a different situation in Constantinople. The Secretary said that he understood that the British had about ten to fifteen thousand troops in Chanek and about five thousand holding the approaches from Ismid; that he understood General Harington had said some time ago that by concentrating these forces he could police Constantinople, but that he could not police Constantinople and hold the approaches at the same time. The Secretary said he understood that there were about fifty thousand Turks in Constantinople more or less armed; that in this situation it would be very difficult to put any force there which could command the situation. The Secretary pointed out that our present military forces were too meager to permit of sending of any detachment that would be adequate in a war against the Turks; that such a force could only be raised by the consent of Congress and would require a very deep feeling throughout the country—probably another draft and a special military organization to meet the exigency. The Secretary said that he could not tell what would be the effect of the commission of atrocities on the part of the Turks; that there might be over night a tremendous American sentiment created, but there was nothing to indicate it at the moment. The Secretary said that he had discussed the matter with the President and the President was very much opposed to anything in the nature of an empty threat; that it would be much worse in the near future for all interests concerned if we joined in a threat which we did not make good, and that we were not in a position at the moment to make good a threat of force. The Secretary pointed out that ships might lay off Constantinople and threaten bombardment. This could add to the destruction, but could not prevent it. He pointed out that the great danger in Constantinople was not of a well organized military invasion with a massacring of the population but a state of panic produced by rumors and an uprising in the [Page 957] city itself which would be taken advantage of in the burning and looting and destruction of lives and property without it being possible to ascribe it to a definite military movement, or to fix responsibility in a clear way upon the Turkish command. The Secretary pointed out that if this happened the thing would be done and would be irretrievable.
The Ambassador said that the only thing that could prevent it, in his judgment, was that the four Powers should unite in informing the Turks that if anything of the sort occurred vengeance would be exacted. The Secretary said he supposed he meant an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and proceedings of reprisal. The Ambassador said that that was what he meant, and that the Turk must appreciate that if this was done he must suffer the penalty.
The Secretary pointed out that this meant a threat of war against the Turk, which was the only way by which he would suffer the penalty if he committed these atrocities, and that exactly presented the difficulty, for this Government was not in a position to threaten a war of vengeance against the Turks which would be a war of indefinite extent against an aroused Moslem population threatening the entire Near East.
The Ambassador said it was his hope and confident expectation if the Allies took a stand together the Turk would be afraid to proceed. The one thing that could be done was to fill the Turk with fear. The Secretary noted that, saying that he must repeat that this Government was very desirous of using diplomatic pressure to the utmost, and that he was not satisfied that this would be ineffective; that he had not yet heard from Admiral Bristol and could not believe that the Turks would proceed to wholesale atrocities. The Secretary repeated that the difficulty was that there might be a panic in Constantinople and something like the condition at Smyrna, and that there might be a similar situation after such an ultimatum and then the Allied Powers would be bound to wreak vengeance according to their ultimatum, although they were in no position to prevent what had occurred. The Secretary said that there were two courses; one was an appeal to sanity and the other an appeal to fear; that if Kemal was in control and was not driven by mad men there ought to be success in the appeal to judgment because the Turk had nothing to gain by offending the sentiment of the civilized world. Still, if there were mad men in control it was by no means clear that threats would not excite them the more. The Secretary said he understood that what the Ambassador really wanted was a joint ultimatum to the Turks couched in such phrase as to inspire a fear, because of threat of actual war. The Secretary said he was not in a position to join in such a threat for the reasons he had already stated.
[Page 958]The Secretary repeated that he could not tell what a day might bring forth and that there might be such action or reports from Constantinople as would create a tremendous sentiment, a crusading spirit in America, but that he had no such sentiment to deal with at present and he simply had the inescapable fact that the Executive in this cause had no authority to commit the nation to war. The Ambassador said that he understood the limitations of our forces, and that possibly we had underestimated the extent of the British forces; that he would know after the elections in Great Britain what attitude Great Britain was likely to take. The Ambassador said he realized that very little could be done with the existing land forces at the command of the United States Government, but that we had an excellent fleet, and he wanted to know whether we would be willing to cooperate with our fleet and the use of our marines. The Secretary asked—‘Cooperate in what?’ The Ambassador said in supporting the British and the Allies. The Secretary again asked—‘Supporting them in what particular enterprise?’ He said that we were desirous of cooperating in the protection of lives and property, but he understood that the Ambassador desired a pledge of assistance in war, which would be a war of unknown duration which would be substantially a war of vengeance. The Ambassador said that he hoped that the action suggested would avert such a war. The Secretary pointed out that the hope of averting it rested in a very definite and concrete threat of such a war with a promise on the part of this Government of its cooperation, and that if we gave that promise we should have to make it good, as the Allies would rely upon it. The Secretary said that while our military forces were small this country still had its great capacity for military endeavor and could within a short time equip a force to meet any situation, and that generally it would do more than it promised to do but that it required the determination of the American people expressed through Congress to accomplish these results and the Executive at this time could not make a pledge of military cooperation in such a war.