893.00/5733: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Mayer) to the Secretary of State

436. 1. Your 269, November 5, 6 p.m. received and instructions carried out.

[Page 392]

2. On November 5, following received from U. S. S. Pope:

“Action contemplated by naval forces at Tsingtau if Wu enters harbor. Naval forces consist of Japanese and American. Wang Hun-chung, an Anfu sympathizer, will not allow Wu’s troops to land without disarmament. The consular body in which the Japanese and American Navies concur consider only way to protect the foreigners is to prevent landing. To this end should he enter he will be required to anchor in the outer harbor and negotiate with Wang on a Japanese cruiser in the presence of commanding officer U. S. S. Pope. Wang stated that he would allow them all provisions and coal they may desire.”

3. Upon receipt of which I sent following to American consul Tsingtau:

“November 5, 4 p.m. Wireless message from U. S. S. Pope outlines certain plans initiated by consular body for protection of foreigners Tsingtau in connection with possible landing Wu’s troops. Having in mind American policy noninterference in Chinese internal affairs I desire you should telegraph at once full particulars and reasons prompting your action.”

4. Admiral Washington informed me last night that consular body Chefoo was informed by Chinese authorities that Wu with three Chinese war vessels under Rear Admiral Wen and five transports carrying 10,000 troops en route Chefoo to force landing and that he was withdrawing U. S. S. Stewart and U. S. S. Pillsbury from Tientsin for service Chefoo.

5. I telegraphed American consul Chefoo as follows:

“November 6, 11 p.m. Following is substance of telegram from Department for instruction American consul Tsingtau repeated for your guidance:

‘When Department informed American consul Tsingtau had agreed with Japanese and British colleagues to advise Wu not to land in the event of his arrival at Tsingtau, Department instructed me to advise consul there immediately that Department could not approve such intervention in Chinese internal affairs.’”

Following received from American consul Tsingtau:

“November 7, 3 a.m. Your November 4, 5 p.m. and November 6, 7 p.m., both received tonight. Plans discussed and adopted in conference with American and Japanese naval authorities. There is no foreign settlement at Tsingtau. Foreigners are scattered throughout entire city. Tsingtau is in possession of a force hostile to Wu. Wu’s landing force at Tsingtau would mean street fighting under existing circumstances seriously jeopardizing American lives and rendering the naval forces available almost meaningless. Under the circumstances it was decided the only effective measure of insuring protection was to advise Wu not to land in the city and to go as far [Page 393] as firing across bows to prevent it, pending negotiations between the Chinese aboard Japanese cruiser. Naval authorities are being advised of State Department’s attitude.”

and

“November 7, 11 a.m. [sic] referring to your telegram of November 7, 6 p.m. [sic], I have notified consuls and naval authorities of the withdrawal of my sanction of the arrangements outlined in my telegram November 7, 3 a.m. Japanese consul general now finds that his Government disapproves arrangement.”

Mayer