500.A15 a 1/445: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
105. This morning Bridgeman, Cecil, Ishii, and Saito met with me privately. The conversation was begun by Ishii by referring to previous informal talks between Admiral Field of the British delegation and Admiral Kobayashi of the Japanese delegation. He laid stress on the tentative nature of the previous conversations and said that naturally no definite agreement had been concluded but that the Japanese had cabled Tokyo a complete résumé of what had taken [Page 110] place. Viscount Ishii then gave me a memorandum which contained all the items of their conversation. After looking over the Japanese memorandum, Mr. Bridgeman said that it was an exact résumé of the discussions as he had understood them. Substance of the memorandum follows:
- 1.
- Tonnage totals to be allocated to auxiliary fighting ships
other than undersea craft:
- (a)
- Admiral Kobayashi of Japan made the following suggestions: 484,000 tons for Great Britain, and 315,000 tons for the Japanese Empire.
- (b)
- Admiral Field suggested the following figures: Japan 325,000 tons, and Great Britain 500,000 tons.
- 2.
- One-fourth of the tonnage totals in obsolete vessels shall likewise be retained.
- 3.
- There shall be a limitation in number fixed for cruisers of 10,000 tons: For America and Great Britain 12 each, and for the Japanese Empire 8.
- 4.
- Ships mentioned below shall be retained:
- By the British Empire: The York, and 4 of the Hawkins type of cruiser;
- By the United States: 10 Omaha-type cruisers;
- By Japan: 4 of the Furutaka type.
- 5.
- Problem of building other cruisers mounting 8-inch guns: The Japanese Empire does not intend to lay keels of any more 8-inch-gun ships before January 1, 1937.
- 6.
- There shall be a maximum percentage agreed on to be allocated to cruisers and to destroyers.
- 7.
- Concerning submarines:
- (a)
- According to the statement of Admiral Kobayashi, Japan would need approximately 70,000 tons of submarines.
- (b)
- The figure of 60,000 tons of undersea craft for each of the three countries was proposed by Admiral Field.
This, you will observe, is almost identical with the report in my telegram No. 101 of July 17.69 Ishii, in explaining the memorandum, laid emphasis on the fact that the Japanese had reached the figure of 325,000 tons by adding 10,000 to the former total beyond which they had declared themselves resolved not to go, and by eliminating, on Admiral Field’s suggestion, 10,000 tons of submarines. This change, he believed, would be welcome to the Japanese Finance Ministry since the cost per ton of submarines was far greater than for surface vessels.
I inquired, with reference to point 2, what the age limit of vessels was to be. The American suggestion of 16 years for destroyers and 20 years for cruisers was acceptable to Japan, Ishii replied. Bridgeman appeared uncertain as to this point but Cecil stated that it was his idea that the original Japanese proposal of 12 years for destroyers and 16 years for cruisers had been adopted. (While the matter seems [Page 111] to have been left unsettled it is evident that the British would prefer the Japanese suggestions as to age limits to their own in view of their desire to retain a certain number of ships having reached the age limit.)
The ships named in point 4, it is pointed out, would come within the total limit of 500,000 tons. They were specially mentioned in order to indicate that they would be kept despite their being above the 6,000–ton figure desired by the British as the largest size below 10,000 tons. They would, of course, not be numbered among vessels dealt with in point 3, displacing 10,000 tons.
I was assured that there was no intention to depart from the idea of a treaty which should end in 1936. The Japanese delegation were asked by Cecil whether they attached great importance to parity in submarines mentioned in point 7 (b). Ishii unhesitatingly replied that Japan needed at least 60,000 tons but would raise no difficulty if the United States and Great Britain desired for themselves a larger figure. (Ishii’s calm and lucid declaration leads me to infer that, despite the fact that Admiral Field had suggested it, Japan did not intend to stand out for equality in submarines.)
Concerning point 5, the American delegation stated that they would have opinions to give upon this, as the Japanese situation was different from that of the American in that on the basis of the proposals made the Americans would have available tonnage for 8-inch-gun cruisers whereas the Japanese would have no such tonnage. However, until we had had an opportunity to study the entire memorandum, I thought it wisest to postpone discussion of the question.
The communiqué which I quoted in my telegram No. 104, July 18,70 was drawn up in agreement between us at the end of the Conference and an arrangement was made for a meeting tomorrow morning for further discussion.
This telegram has been repeated to London for Embassy’s information.