Office of the Historian

500.A15 a 1/448: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]
Geneva, July 18, 1927—12 p.m.
[Received July 19—3:15 a.m.]

107. My No. 106, July 18, 11 p.m. We are now so near to basis of discussion that it may readily be reached provided that either:

1.
The British were to renounce their demand for small-type cruisers and their insistence upon restricting the 8-inch gun; or,
2.
The Americans were to withdraw demand for liberty of armament, which we do not believe you have any intention of doing. It is our opinion that the British delegation in Geneva is so influenced by Admiralty tenets that it is unable duly to consider the broader suggestions which are not sponsored by some ulterior motive. Therefore, it is thought you may care to consider discussing this problem with the British Ambassador in a very informal and personal way, pointing out to Sir Esme the insistence of the British in thrusting upon the United States a class of cruiser for which our country has practically no use in their endeavor to abolish the 8-inch gun and the resentment that will be engendered in the United States by such a maneuver; that due to previous construction it is plainly to be seen that the British will continue to have a superior strength in cruisers during the existence of the treaty under discussion; that should the United States consent to withdraw her demands concerning the 8-inch gun the British superiority would be definitely increased by reason of the fact that Great Britain has 49 merchant ships and our inferiority would be most evidently accentuated by a strict limitation as to ships concerned. Should the British Government recognize freely our right to decide the type of armament required by us, which in any case would be exercised only in regard to a small part of the tonnage allocated to us, the British Ambassador could judge for himself whether, under ordinary circumstances and without irritation of an artificial nature, the United States would be likely to build a sufficient number of 8-inch-gun cruisers to give Great Britain any serious concern. The disruption of the Conference over this issue, on the other hand, could not fail to give rise to a popular demand for the building of cruisers armed with 8-inch guns to such an extent as to be disagreeable to us and to constitute the contrary of what the British seek to bring about. We naturally could give no undertaking regarding the future actions of Congress in case of agreement, but the British Ambassador should realize that the most sensible manner of dealing with us in the premises is to avoid raising any question as to our freedom in matters of armament which would result only in marked resentment accentuated by the knowledge that, since the Japanese share our views, the British are alone in seeking to limit us to 6-inch guns.

If you approve of this, the effect of such action might be increased if you could telegraph Houghton the substance of the conversation for confirmation to Chamberlain and to me so that I might inform Bridgeman in the premises.

Gibson