500.A15 a 1/458: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
108. Meeting this morning with Bridgeman, Cecil, Ishii and Saito to continue discussion memorandum quoted in my 105, July 18, 3 p.m. I pointed out that in my opinion the suggestion of 500,000 tons surface craft and the retention in addition thereto of 25 percent over-age vessels was in effect a camouflage method of increasing total tonnage to 625,000 tons; that while latter figure was within range of figures we had reluctantly indicated a willingness to discuss I felt that it might be more candid to give the total tonnage including so-called over-age ships, particularly if the age limit fixed was to be 16 years for cruisers and 12 for destroyers. I said that it might be different if the age limits were 20 and 16 years. Bridgeman said that their suggestion had been on the bases of 16 and 12 years respectively but that these ages might be open to negotiation. Ishii stated that Japanese delegation had felt that for ships constructed prior to Washington Conference and which had gone through the war the figure of 16 and 12 years might be equitable but that for post-Washington ships they would desire age limits to 20 and 16 years respectively. Ishii also indicated that the idea of a separate class of over-age vessels would be convenient for them, [that they?] could accept a reasonable ratio to 500,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain but could not agree to a ratio to 625,000 tons. (Apparently the camouflage facilitates Japanese position as it would not require new construction on their part to reach approximately 300,000 tons of surface craft other than the 10,000-ton cruisers contemplated.)
[Page 118]I pointed out that except for destroyers and certain decrepit armored cruisers we would have nothing that would go into the over-age class but that if we could reach agreement on other questions I would be prepared to discuss a formula for retention of over-age ships but could not commit myself to it at the present juncture.
I then stated that I wished to get down to the real question upon which our whole discussion hinged, namely, the 8-inch gun; that if this question was discussed solely from the technical point of view it was doubtful if a solution could be realized; that the only possible way to reach a solution was through discussing the problem from the point of view of its practical application to the relations of the two countries; that it was nothing more than the question of how we were likely to use a part of our cruiser tonnage and that I wished to present to them the broad political aspects of this question rather than its technicalities.
I made it clear that on the basis of 300,000 tons of cruisers and assuming twelve or more 10,000-ton cruisers were constructed and with retention of Omahas we would have available only 100,000 tons or less for other cruiser construction and that as a practical matter during the life of the treaty it was in my personal opinion problematical whether we would avail ourselves of all of this tonnage in 8-inch-gun cruisers in addition to the construction of a given number of 10,000-ton cruisers.
In view of Japanese situation which on the basis under discussion would permit no new construction of vessels other than specified 10,000-ton vessels the issue was clearly one between the United States and Great Britain and I asked the British delegates to clearly consider our probable course of action in the way of construction of 8-inch [-gun] vessels; first, if we reached friendly agreement and had a treaty; and second, if our negotiations broke down because of British attempt to impose on us a type of vessel which is unsuitable for us.
I said that in my opinion if an attempt were made to deny our liberty of armament within tonnage limitation there was danger they would find they had driven us into an extensive building program.
I made it quite clear that in my opinion treaty which deprived us of our liberty of action with respect to arming the proposed second class of cruisers as we saw fit would not be ratified; that Great Britain had assured cruiser supremacy for many years to come, an overwhelming merchant fleet which could be armed; that we could not be expected to accept restrictions as to arming cruisers and that an attempt to deny us our liberty of action would be the best method of arousing popular resentment and driving us into a big building program.
Cecil seemed to be considerably impressed by this statement, Bridgeman less so. Latter stated that our insistence upon right to build [Page 119] 8-inch [-gun] cruisers would force them to readjust their tonnage levels upward; that they had already made considerable concessions to get down to tonnage levels which we could all discuss and that this had been conditioned upon elimination of 8-inch gun except on specified number of 10,000-ton cruisers.
I asked Bridgeman to look at this whole problem along the lines I had indicated; that the crux of the whole problem was whether they thought we were likely to dispose of 100,000 tons or less of cruisers tonnage in such a way as to threaten the security of the British Empire. If so, we ought to know it. If not, there should be no strong reason for contesting our right to build as we like.
I then reemphasized that in my opinion British insistence was based on fear of a situation which was not likely to arise, namely, a building program of 8-inch-gun vessels which would be source of apprehension to the British Empire, and I again suggested the possibility of some political clause in the treaty which would permit reexamination of the cruiser provision in the event that our construction of 8-inch-gun vessels was a cause of apprehension to either of the other contracting powers. Cecil took up this suggestion and we had a brief discussion as to the form which such an article might take and then adjourned until tomorrow when we will give the matter further consideration.
[Paraphrase.] A stipulation of this nature may conceivably afford an escape from the present difficulty and I shall today or tomorrow cable you a proposed solution in accordance with this idea. Additional instructions from his Government are awaited by Bridgeman and he is not urging an early decision on the matter of 8-inch guns. Sending copy to London. [End paraphrase.]
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