500.A15 a 1/332: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 27—9:50 p.m.]
36. In a conversation this afternoon, Viscount Ishii informed me that the Japanese Government had changed the instructions originally given its delegation, opposing the reconsideration of the Washington treaty, to the extent that it would not offer any opposition to the British proposals for a further discussion concerning capital ships. However, he said they did not consider this subject should be discussed until an agreement relating to the limitation of auxiliary craft had been reached.
I replied in a frank manner that I regretted very much their decision to acquiesce in reconsidering any portion of the Washington treaty; that should any portion be changed, it might cause complications to arise, as the treaty was a very delicately adjusted mechanism, but I assured him that I appreciated very much his courtesy in giving me the above information. I further added that as he [Page 61] had been so kind as to inform me of his instructions, I felt that I should be equally frank in communicating mine to him. Accordingly, I read to him those portions of our instructions which I considered most pertinent, and stated that these instructions had only been strengthened by those comments on the British proposals which had been received from Washington; that I felt I was so placed that I could tell him quite frankly that the American delegation was not maneuvering with any intention of eventually making concessions of any kind; that the Washington treaty was brought into force by five signatory powers and that the treaty could not be reopened if any one of them was opposed to such action. Further, that there was always the danger that efforts might be made to revise other provisions if any portion of the treaty was changed; that quite a number of people in the United States were of the opinion that our Government had made too many concessions with regard to our naval bases in Guam and the Philippines, and that if the treaty was again being considered, it was very possible that agitation would arise for a reconsideration of these questions; that on principle we were opposed to the revision of any item of the treaty and that we considered that the only wise course to pursue would be to hold the treaty intact until 1931 before considering a revision. Any attempt to reopen the treaty would fail, I said, as we are not willing to consent to such action. Therefore, it would be to no advantage for any of us; and this being so, it would seem better to avoid such a situation. Before departing, Ishii thanked me for the information I had given him, and said he had come to inform me of the instructions received from his Government before telling Bridgeman of them. Altogether our conversation was most frank and cordial.