500.A15 a 1/388: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Houghton) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 8—2:25 p.m.]
157. Department’s No. 151, July 7, 4 p.m. I saw Chamberlain at noon today, making it clear to him that I had come on my personal responsibility since I believed that it was my duty to acquaint him with the unfavorable impression created by the British naval proposals in the United States. I stated that while the change of sentiment there could not be forecast, there was a growing fear lest sacrifices made at Washington with regard to naval bases and ships had been in vain; and said that the belief appeared to be increasing that Great Britain was now endeavoring to return to her dominant position, after having succeeded in limiting the size of battleships, by constructing a quantity of small ships which were suited to her needs but not to ours. I encountered a most sympathetic attitude on the part of Chamberlain, who set forth the causes for the present position taken by Great Britain and stated that the tonnage demanded was based upon careful calculations which had been favorably passed upon by three succeeding governments of different parties. In reply I indicated that while I recognized their duty and right to provide for ships which might be necessary, I felt nevertheless that since the German fleet had virtually disappeared and other nations were unable financially to provide for extensive building programs, it was difficult to see the necessity for so great an increase in British tonnage at this time, especially since treaty stipulations would meet any necessity which might arise by reason of an important building program on the part of any other nation. I then asked Chamberlain whether, under any conceivable circumstances, Great Britain could regard America as an enemy and received a vehement answer in the negative, together with a statement that any war between America and the British Empire would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the latter. In the subsequent discussion of a possible program Chamberlain made the complaint that whenever an offer was advanced by the British to reduce total tonnage the American representatives insisted that the United States would build only cruisers of a large size. He said further that Great Britain had already conceded equality in ratio but was unable to yield in the matter of permitting superiority in large cruisers to be established by the United States. In answering this objection I [Page 85] stated that, while I was unable to speak authoritatively, the assumption that if a low enough total tonnage were agreed upon the adjustment of classes of cruisers should not present any insuperable difficulty seemed to me mere common sense. At the end of our conversation Chamberlain expressed his thanks and indicated that the gravity of the situation was fully appreciated by him and that, while not hopeful, he would at once consult Baldwin and Lord Balfour.55a He added that within a day or two he would see me again. Any further developments will, of course, be fully reported to you.
By reason of my talk with Chamberlain, I am again impressed with the fact that a very mature and carefully worked out plan is being followed by the British delegates at Geneva. Nevertheless, I am certain that what I said about the effect of British proposals on the people of the United States, as well as on the other peoples of the world, did not fail to impress Chamberlain. I believe that should it be possible to keep total tonnage under 400,000 tons it will be regarded in London, and should be regarded by us, as a material concession to the American views. I venture to suggest that our own representatives do nothing meanwhile to weaken the position taken by me.
- Arthur James, Lord Balfour, Lord President of the Council; Lord Balfour was head of the British delegation at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 1921–1922.↩