500.A15 a 1/400: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 10—4:39 a.m.]
78. Bridgeman suggested to me that we have a private conversation to discuss political and nontechnical phases of our work with a view to seeing whether we could open any avenues for investigation by technical experts. As I wished to explore every method of discussion I readily agreed; and, accompanied by Dulles, I met privately today with Bridgeman and Cecil, Saito and Ishii.
Cecil suggested as a possible way out of the impasse regarding cruisers that we should study building programs between now and 1931 which would control completed cruiser tonnage as over 1934. Bridgeman indicated that they would be prepared to abandon their projected program of 10,000-ton 8-inch[gun?] vessels and perhaps stop work on one vessel just commenced in the hope that no further vessels of this character would be constructed, that of course we should be accorded the full liberty of constructing 10,000-ton vessels up to the number which they might have completed under present plans by 1934. As I interpret this suggestion the British would complete seven vessels of the 10,000-ton Kent class and three or four vessels of the London class and that their other 10,000-ton cruiser program would [Page 90] be abandoned. Cecil and Bridgeman indicated that their building program, including 1931, could be restricted within 400,000 tons and foresaw the possibility that such a limit might be possible for a treaty which would terminate in 1934. They emphasized that the 1931 Conference would in any event deal with the whole subject and that if we now provided for programs between now and 1931 we would have met the problem particularly confronting us.
I indicated that while I was not in a position to pass on this suggestion our naval experts would study it, and pointed out that in the last analysis building programs must be translated into total tonnages and that we could not profitably discuss anything over 400,000 tons.
Ishii indicated that they were planning eight 10,000-ton vessels but could eliminate one of these vessels not yet laid down in the event that the United States and Great Britain agreed within this period that they would not lay down or complete more than the eleven contemplated by the British.
While the foregoing may offer a way out of the cruiser dilemma it will not represent any very real limitation, although it may represent renunciation on the part of Great Britain of the construction of further 10,000-ton 8-inch [-gun?] vessels and give us freedom to build up to them in this class without restriction as to the future. The British have not at any time indicated a willingness to limit their final total tonnage to less than 465[,000] in 1936 and ultimately to over 550,000 tons.
As I felt that Bridgeman in the Monday plenary session would probably try to throw upon us the onus for impeding the work of the Conference by insistence upon twenty-five 10,000-ton vessels, I told him that the number of such vessels would be subject to negotiation provided that this would render it possible for them to bring their total needs to figures which constituted a real limitation. I emphasized that Great Britain was far in the lead in the construction of 10,000-ton vessels and had set the pace and that it was futile to talk of the reduction in the number of such vessels as long as they either had or were about to acquire a large number of vessels of this character.
I report the foregoing to show the efforts which are being made here to fortify [sic] a way out of the cruiser impasse and I have not abandoned hope that a solution may be reached. The Japanese delegates this afternoon gave no indication as to whether they were prepared to revise upward their total tonnage figures for cruisers so as to make negotiation between the British and Japanese possible.
Captain Egerton of British delegation and Captain Toyoda of Japanese delegation this evening called on Admiral Schofield for informal discussion of cruiser problem. Captain Egerton proposed as a possible solution a building program as to vessels laid down between [Page 91] now and 1931 for each of the three powers as a means of escaping the present apparent impasse. Both he and Captain Toyoda agreed that on the basis of total tonnage limitation or limitation by numbers there was no possibility of reconciling the Japanese and British theses or of reconciling our thesis with the British inasmuch as the British requirements translated into total tonnage reach 465[,000] tons in 1936 and the Japanese approximate maximum tonnage in combined destroyer and cruiser classes for themselves for the same period is 310,000 tons. Both Captain Egerton and Captain Toyoda said that they were stating their views but could not be considered as binding their delegates.