500.A15 a 1/415: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13—1:45 a.m.]
82. With a view to exploring every phase of cruiser difficulty from political as well as from technical angle there has been set up by agreement between the chief delegates an [omission] group to examine the question untrammeled by instructions from the chief delegates.62 This committee composed of Dulles and Smyth for us, Campbell and [Page 99] Egerton for the British Empire, Saburi and Captain Hori for Japan, met last night. Following discussion took place:
British indicated willingness to study cruiser-building programs and, as far as [sic] 10,000-ton vessels, to take as a basis of construction prior to 1931 either 10, 12 or a higher number. If we insisted on the basis of 10, they would scrap 3 on which work was just starting. We indicated we conceived a limitation of building programs as one method of arriving at a definite total tonnage during the life of the treaty and not as an end in itself and asked British to explain how, on any of foregoing bases respecting 10,000-ton vessels, they would come within 400,000 tons in 1936. British explained that they had received new instructions from London to reduce their number of cruisers from 75 to 66 and if necessary to fix a maximum of 6,000 tons for other than 10,000-ton vessels. On this basis and assuming only 10 or 12 new 10,000-ton cruisers constructed, they could accept a total tonnage limitation of about 400,000 tons for 1936. If we desire a larger number of 10,000-ton vessels the total tonnage would be correspondingly raised or it would be necessary to have the treaty end in 1934.
We suggested that real difficulty in our discussions was caused by British effort to force other navies to accept same standard of type as themselves even though conditions vary and we felt that if we could get away from this insistence on their part, rapid progress could be made. We felt that it was most unlikely that any program of construction would be adopted by the United States which Great Britain could consider as a menace even though full liberty were given to the construction of 10,000-ton cruisers within a reasonable total tonnage limitation. It was tentatively suggested that if the British really feared such a contingency it might be possible to cover this by an article contemplating the case of a building program of powers not party to new treaty; such an article might provide that if at any time any of the powers considered their safety threatened by the building programs in 10,000-ton vessels by any of the contracting parties a Conference should be called and if agreement not reached reasonable provision be made for termination of the treaty.
It was stated frankly to the British and Japanese that in our opinion we were now in a position where we might be able to find basis of agreement with either the British or the Japanese but that no one had yet suggested a basis on which those two powers could get together; that naturally we preferred the Japanese basis which corresponded closely to our own.
[Page 100]In the discussion between the British and Japanese which followed, the British seemed surprised at the firm stand the Japanese took on a total tonnage limitation for all surface craft of 450,000 for the United States and Great Britain, and British again reiterated that this was entirely unacceptable to them.
Conversations are being continued today.
Mailed to London.
- The mixed committee, a small committee composed of one naval officer and one civilian from each delegation.↩