393.11/844
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
Peking, July 2,
1928.
[Received August 4.]
No. 1557
Sir: I have the honor to enclose, as of
possible interest to the Department, copies of a self-explanatory
exchange of correspondence with the Consul General at Tientsin and with
the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, concerning
the protection of American citizens at Peitaiho.
In spite of the warnings issued to Americans against going to that
resort, a number of families are already there. It is also ascertained
that the Kailan Mining Administration has been operating, and will
continue to operate, steamers between Tientsin and Chinwangtao, as well
as a special tender service across the bay to Peitaiho, by which
[Page 243]
means more Americans are
constantly proceeding. Further, the Fu Shing Steamship Company
(Japanese) advertises a semi-weekly steamer service each way between
Tientsin and Peitaiho direct, and that it will augment this service as
the traffic warrants. Since Americans already at the Beach are writing
to their friends that the resort is quiet and well protected by a police
force, which asserts that it will be able to maintain order under any
circumstances, it is reasonable to anticipate that as the weather
becomes increasingly hot the number of Americans at Peitaiho will
rapidly increase, and by the middle of July will amount to several
hundred persons.
I have [etc.]
[Enclosure 1]
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic
Fleet (Bristol)
Peking, June 13,
1928—4 p.m.
Following is being sent to the American Consul at Tientsin:
“June 13, 3 p.m. The Legation understands that there are a
considerable number of Americans at Peitaiho who have
proceeded there in spite of advices to the contrary. In view
of the likelihood of their being molested by retreating
disorganized soldiery, some of whom may be unable [to]
proceed beyond Shanhaikuan, do you consider that Americans
should be advised to evacuate? Unless you consider it
unnecessary, it is suggested that you communicate with
Commander-in-Chief, stating that presence of a naval vessel
either at Chinwangtao or off Peitaiho might have a
restraining effect. Legation is informed that British
gunboat Foxglove is proceeding to
Peitaiho. Are you in communication with Peitaiho?”
[Enclosure 2]
The Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet
(Bristol) to the Minister in
China (MacMurray)
[June 15,
1928—4:15 p.m.]
0015. Referring to the American Minister’s 1913–1600 and Third
Brigade’s 8613–2037. In spite of advices to the contrary it is noted
that a considerable number of Americans have proceeded to Peitaiho.
As they have thus acted against advices I request that they be
informed that the Commander-in-Chief can assume no responsibility
for their protection. As Peitaiho is not a port, naval vessel cannot
lie off there and excepting in calm weather it is improbable that a
landing party could be made in case of necessity. The presence of a
naval vessel at Chinwangtao is not any proper protection for our
nationals at Peitaiho especially against plundering bands and
disorganized
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retreating
soldiers. As the situation is entirely different from that of last
summer the same measures as were then adopted are not at all
appropriate now. When visiting Chinwangtao the Commander of the
Light Cruiser Division will convey this same information to
Americans at Peitaiho while informing them that if the situation
demands it they will be given protection if they proceed to
Chinwangtao or will be evacuated from that port if necessary. Keep
me advised as to the situation. If you consider it a necessity will
keep one naval vessel at Chinwangtao. 1615.
[Enclosure 3]
The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic
Fleet (Bristol)
[Peking,] June 19,
1928—3:15 p.m.
Your 0015–1615. Consul General at Tientsin reports that he has no
communication with Peitaiho, and that he does not know the
conditions there or the number of Americans there. He believes that
any urgent advice to abandon Peitaiho should be given only after
conditions in that area have been ascertained by the Naval Commander
in that vicinity. In the circumstances, I should appreciate your
cooperation in having the Naval Commander at Chinwangtao make an
investigation of conditions at Peitaiho, and recommend what, if any,
measures are feasible with a view to minimizing the danger to
Americans and to American property there in the light of the fact
that you cannot assume any responsibility for their protection at
that place.
With reference to your inquiry, it seems to me necessary to keep a
naval vessel at Chinwangtao at the present time.
[Enclosure 4]
The Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet
(Bristol) to the Minister in
China (MacMurray)
[June 20,
1928—7:10 p.m.]
Referring to your June 19, 3 [3:15] p.m. With
the understanding that you and I arrived at in our personal
conference at Peking, I am pleased to keep a naval vessel at
Chinwangtao. I am at a loss to understand the statement of the
Consul General at Tientsin that he is not in communication with
Peitaiho. It is requested that he be informed that any naval vessel
which may be at Chinwangtao and the 3rd Brigade are always at his
disposal for radio communication and further if it is at all
possible our people will to the best
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of their ability undertake to deliver any of
his messages to Peitaiho from Chinwangtao.
In my 0015–1615 it was not recommended that Americans be advised to
abandon Peitaiho but [I] did request that as they had proceed[ed]
there contrary to the advices of both yourself and of the Consul
General at Tientsin, I could not assume any responsibility for their
protection at Peitaiho. It is very important, in my mind, that our
Americans be made to understand, as I explained to you, that the
location of Peitaiho is such that this fleet cannot guarantee
protection to their lives at that place and that under no
circumstances will attempt to safeguard property at that place. I
recommend strongly that our nationals should not be allowed to have
any mistaken ideas on this point. Furthermore, if they are under the
impression that a ship lying at anchor two or three miles off
Chinwangtao or Peitaiho is going to protect them against marauding
bands or deserters or against bandits their minds should be
disabused of such ideas immediately. Orders have been issued for the
necessary investigation of the Peitaiho-Chinwangtao area and I will
of course inform you continually of developments.
