793.94/3948: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Forbes) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:09 p.m.]
39. The Foreign Minister met the British, French Ambassador[s] and myself at 6 o’clock this evening.
In regard to point number 1,15 he said that the Japanese forces will cease hostile acts if it is assured the Chinese forces will immediately and completely stop their menacing and disturbing activities. If on the contrary the Chinese, including both the regular and plain-clothes soldiers, persist in such activities, the Japanese Government must reserve full freedom of action for its military forces.
In regard to number 2, he said that, in view of the unreliability of the Chinese in the past and of the gravity of the present situation, the Japanese Government finds it impossible to renounce the mobilization or preparation for hostilities.
In regard to number 3, he said the Japanese Government has no objection to their consular officers and commander of their forces entering into negotiations for an agreement concerning the separation of the respective forces and the establishment, if necessary, of a neutral zone in the district of Chapei. (Note: This also, it was explained later, was meant to answer number 4.)
In regard to number 5, he said that, while it is to be presumed all outstanding controversies between Japanese and Chinese included the Manchurian question, the Japanese Government regards this matter as entirely separate from the Shanghai affair and that moreover it is covered by the resolution of December 10 last and that furthermore it is a settled policy of the Japanese Government not to accept the assistance of neutral observers or participants in the settlement of questions concerning Manchuria. For these reasons the conditions in paragraph number 5 of the powers’ note are not acceptable to the Japanese Government.
[Page 181]The foregoing is substantially a translation of the note which he handed to me as a reply to that contained in Department’s 34, February 1, 3 p.m. It was not accompanied by an English translation. The translation made in the Embassy checks with it.
Asked whether it was the intention of the Japanese Government to send land troops, Mr. Yoshizawa replied that to meet the extreme seriousness of the situation in Shanghai the Japanese Government was preparing to send land troops; he said the seriousness of the situation was due to a little more than 2,000 marines facing Chinese troops 10,000 in number and that in the neighborhood there were 20,000, and that even these are being reenforced. Moreover the marines are continually being menaced by plain-clothes soldiers numbering nearly 3,000; some of these manage to filter into the Settlement. He said the Japanese were in a precarious position. If all these land troops are sent it will number at least 12,000 in addition to the marines now there. These, the Foreign Minister said, were for the sole purpose of protecting their own nationals and property.
Commenting on the reply, it was pointed out to the Foreign Minister that it was most disappointing in tone; that he had not accepted one single point of the five. This seemed to surprise him a little. He seemed to think that his Government had accepted numbers 3 and 4. It was pointed out to him that their expressing no objection to their officers’ entering into negotiations was not an acceptance. And he was asked if we could read into these words “an acceptance in principle” of these points; to this he replied that we could and that it was intended in that sense. He was then asked whether they also accepted in principle the policing of the region by neutrals; and he said that would have to be left to be discussed locally: he preferred not to commit himself. It was pointed out to him that in the points we sent that the neutral zone was to be created between the Japanese and Chinese troops at all points in the Shanghai area, whereas in his so-called “acceptance” he limited it to the neighborhood of Chapei; his answer to that was that that was the only point at issue, but intimated that were contacts established at other points that it could be made to apply there. He did not make it clear why it was not so worded. The French Ambassador put the direct question: That if it were true, as reported, that the Chinese had accepted all of the five points, whether the Japanese still would despatch troops. Mr. Yoshizawa said they would because the condition of the Japanese marines and the residents was deplorable and that they were getting constant telegrams demanding protection and help and felt that it was necessary that they should be sent: he said nothing would justify their not doing it. He reiterated that they were not being sent to make war on the Chinese Army, but purely for protective reasons. He said that if [Page 182] the Chinese would not assume the offensive or indulge in any further activities of their troops and of their plain-clothes soldiers, then his Government might reconsider sending as many men as now planned. But he repeated the fact that they felt the Chinese representations and promises could not be relied upon.
The British Ambassador then told him that the tone of the reply was distinctly disappointing. And I supported this by saying that I believed my Government would be grievously disappointed at the failure of the Japanese Government to respond more cordially to the suggested solution. The French Ambassador on behalf of his Government supported these expressions.
The Foreign Minister then said in view of the seriousness of the situation what else could he do? At which I took him aside and told him that if he had accepted as we had been told the Chinese had done there would not be any serious situation. He repeated that he was unable to do that.
As a last word as we were leaving he requested us to inform our Governments that the Japanese Government was willing to consider any further suggestions which our Governments might desire to present. He practically asked for new suggestions, which seems the only hopeful note of the interview.
I took up the matter of your telegram 37 with Nagai,16 who advised me that the marines had been withdrawn this morning from all other sectors. He expressed great regret that any excesses or improprieties had been committed, stated he would look into the facts which he would ascertain immediately and see that appropriate action was taken.
I shall send later the gist of a conversation I had with one of my colleagues.