711.94/2039
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
I accompanied the new Japanese Ambassador13 to the President’s office and sat through the conference between the President and the Ambassador. The President received the Ambassador in a marked spirit of cordiality and personal friendliness. He referred in pleasing language to their association some twenty-odd years ago, and remarked that he proposed to call him Admiral and consider him as Admiral, rather than as Ambassador. He said that they were friends and they could at all times talk candidly as friends about the relations and related affairs of the two countries.
The President then said that of course it is manifest that the present relations between the two countries are not good; that they are in fact getting worse, or to use a well-known expression, they are “deteriorating”; that the press of Japan—and he said the press of our country might not be an exception—expresses views and circulates reports which are calculated to arouse feeling in this country of 130,000,000 population; that some of the Japanese statesmen talk along similar lines, and that altogether the American people are quite seriously concerned about the Japanese situation. The President affirmed two or three times the view that the American people, while not bitter as yet, are thoroughly and seriously concerned and to a more or less increasing extent, at the course of Japan.
He then referred to the movements of Japan southward down to Indochina and the Spratly Islands and other localities in that area,14 as having given this country very serious concern. He said that the entry of Japan into the Tripartite agreement15 is likewise giving this country the same serious concern, especially from the viewpoint that Japan is supposed to have divested herself of her sovereign authority to deal with the question of peace and war and to leave it to the Tripartite signatories led by Germany. The President went over this the second time with increased emphasis as to the heavy signs of concern it had created among the American people. He then said that while the American people are peace-minded and peace-loving and peace-observing, and are not unduly wrought up at present, it [Page 388] would be extremely easy for some incident like the sinking of the Maine or the destruction and sinking of the Panay16 to cause an overnight uprising, in a more or less explosive sense, of American sentiment against the authors, regardless of the exact facts or details as to the cause …
The President more than once referred with gratification to the fact that the present Ambassador is here and that the two of them could in the friendliest and frankest manner talk out to the best advantage of both countries ways and means of dealing with such inflammable circumstances and with methods to avoid them. He then said that in view of all these serious conditions which are becoming increasingly worse and which seriously call for attention, it occurred to him that the Japanese Ambassador might find it advisable and agreeable as he, the President, does, to sit down with the Secretary of State and other State Department officials and review and reexamine the important phases of the relations between the two countries, at least during the past four or five years, and frankly discuss all of their phases and ascertain just when and how points of divergence developed and their effects, and bring the whole situation in these respects up to date in order to see if our relations could not be improved. The President said there is plenty of room in the Pacific area for everybody, and he repeated this statement with emphasis. The Ambassador showed no signs of dissent, but somewhat the contrary. The President elaborated a little in order to emphasize this suggestion. The Ambassador bowed and indicated his assent, just as he bowed in an apparently wholehearted and agreeable manner when the President referred to the dangerous situation between the two countries—the Panay incident and the Tripartite agreement. One would have thought from his demeanor and manifestations that the Ambassador was in entire harmony with each point the President brought out, including the reexamination of the record of relations between the two countries.
The President finally said it would not do this country any good nor Japan any good, but both of them harm, to get into a war. The Ambassador gave his prompt assent to this.
The Ambassador, having passed in his formal address and the President having laid his reply and address aside, proceeded to speak with every appearance of earnestness about preserving peaceful relations between the two countries. He referred to the military group in control as “Chauvinistic” and he used another similar word to characterize this element without mentioning it by name, but referring to it as presenting the chief difficulty and chief obstacle to the pursuit [Page 389] of the course which the Ambassador and those of his views would be disposed to follow, which course was presumably one that would be acceptable to this country. The Ambassador said that every part of his being would be behind his best possible efforts to promote and preserve peaceful and agreeable relations and a better understanding between the two countries. He left the impression that his Government was in harmony with his purpose thus so earnestly expressed. He made no reference to the points the President brought out, but spoke briefly in a general way about the existence of unsatisfactory relations; the need for their improvement and his every disposition to say and do anything possible to that end.