711.94/25407/35
Memorandum of a Conversation
The Japanese Ambassador called in response to a request made by him on November 10 at the Secretary’s apartment.51 The Secretary referred to the request which had been communicated to him by Mr. Ballantine from the Japanese Minister for a further elaboration of [Page 723] the Secretary’s views in regard to the development of a real friendship between China and Japan, and he said that in response to that request, he had prepared a statement which he then proceeded to hand to the Japanese Ambassador.52
The Secretary then said that the general position of this Government in regard to a Pacific settlement had not changed and he assumed that although a new ministry had been formed in Japan, the position of the Japanese Government had not changed. He had said that with a view to there being no misunderstanding, we had drawn up a recapitulation of statements which the Japanese had given us in regard to their position, and we would appreciate it if the Japanese Government could confirm that our assumption was correct. The Secretary then handed the Japanese Ambassador the statement which we had prepared on this subject.53
The Ambassador said that his new Government desired him to emphasize the desire of the Japanese Government to expedite a settlement because the internal situation in Japan was difficult, people becoming impatient and a session of the Diet impending. He therefore hoped that within a week or ten days some agreement could be reached. The Secretary commented that we were working as rapidly as possible on the matters which the Japanese Ambassador had presented to the President on November 10 and suggested that it was our view that as soon as we reached a good basis in our exploratory conversations, we could approach the Chinese Government and sound out their attitude. In regard to commercial policy, the Secretary said that there were points in the Japanese Government’s proposal which we did not fully understand, and we assumed that what the Japanese Government had in mind was the same as what we had in mind, namely, to have Japan, Great Britain and other countries get together on a basis of equality and fair treatment. The Secretary went on to say that he expected much difficulty in explaining to the people here the Tripartite alliance situation. The Ambassador replied that Japan’s obligation under the Tripartite alliance was limited, that it was not an offensive and defensive alliance, and that during the time of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Great Britain remained neutral during the war between Japan and Russia.
The Secretary said he would like help in order to enable him to explain Japan’s relationship to the Axis powers, for even though we understood clearly the Ambassador’s attitude and that of the present Japanese Cabinet, there must be considered the possibility of another Government coming into power in Japan. The Secretary went on to point out the increasing gravity of the situation in Europe and [Page 724] the growing distress of European populations, which raised the question how long could Hitler keep those populations crushed down. For this reason, he said, the time was approaching for preparing for a post-war program, a matter in which he felt that the Japanese Government must be interested. He suggested that Japan would want to play a part in a constructive program to meet the after-the-war situation, and that for this reason Japan would probably not want to be tied in with Hitler. He noted that we are trying to keep out of trouble and to that end are making efforts to unite peaceful forces to avert disaster for ourselves.
The Ambassador commented that he anticipated that as time went on Japan would be less and less affected by the Axis ties, just as the importance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance waned after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war.
The Secretary commented that so many statements had been made about the Tripartite Pact that it should be made clear if we are going to start the world on the right course that we are going ahead on a basis of peace.
The Ambassador said in reply that if the proposed agreement were made and applied there would be no question of the use of force by Japan to gain access to materials and markets which she desired.
The Secretary commented that the matter of the Tripartite Pact relationship ought not to be a problem with Japan if we could work out our proposed agreement in other ways.
The Ambassador asked whether it was the Secretary’s idea that the United States would leave to Japan and China to work out their peace terms by themselves. The Secretary replied that we had not yet talked the subject over with the Chinese or the British or Dutch, but we have told them that if we get matters beyond an exploratory stage we should be glad to talk with them. He added that we first want to have something substantial to present to them and that he had said that if we reach a stage of negotiations we will talk with the other Governments and will then talk again with Japan.
The Japanese Minister referred to the two documents which the Secretary had handed the Ambassador and which both the Ambassador and the Minister had just read. With regard to the document relating to mutual conciliation between China and Japan, he asked what the Secretary had in mind as to how the exchange of pledges would come about, as, for example, whether it would be as a result [of] our bringing the Japanese and Chinese together. The Secretary replied that when two neighbors have not been on speaking terms, sometimes they make up as a result of an initiative taken by one or the other and sometimes they are brought together by a mutual friend. One cannot plan always in advance what each of [Page 725] a number of persons will in succession do or say. He said he felt that the main thing now was to dispose of basic matters in regard to the provisions of a peace settlement and that questions of procedure could thereafter be more satisfactorily settled. These points were gone over two or three times, as the Japanese appeared to find difficulty in understanding them, possibly because of a preconception that the Secretary’s suggestion contained more than appeared on its face.
With regard to the second document which related to the question of the present Japanese Government’s general position on the question of peace, the Minister said that we had referred to the Japanese Government’s statement of August 28, whereas the Japanese Government had indicated that it desired to use their September 25 document as the basis for discussions. He said that, with reference to our statement that in conversation with the Under Secretary he had expressed the willingness of the Japanese Government to omit the qualifying phrases contained in the assurances which we had quoted from the August 25 statement, this was a misunderstanding on our part. He said that he was not referring to the August 28 statement but to the September 25 statement and that what he had said to the Under Secretary was that there might have been some unfortunate phraseology in translation which could be improved after comparison with the original Japanese text. He asked whether we would withdraw what we had said in that connection.
The Secretary said he would be glad to do so, and was glad to have the Minister call attention to any misunderstanding.
The Ambassador said that if the proposed agreement was held in abeyance and the United States continued to aid Chiang Kai-shek while Japan was negotiating with Chiang the Chinese would be certain to keep negotiations dragging for an interminable period.
The Secretary said that if we got the China matter started to move it would soon gain momentum, for if Japan should propose terms which seem reasonably fair everybody would want to get aboard. He felt sure that ways could be found for safeguarding each other’s rights by agreement.
The Ambassador commented that if we failed to reach an agreement simply over an unwillingness on the part of China to agree to the Japanese proposals in regard to troops, the situation would then be one in which China held the key to future relations between Japan and the United States which might result in war.
The Secretary replied that whether we exercised our good offices or whether Japan approached China directly we felt that the nature of the settlement which Japan reached with China was one which should be in harmony with the proposed Pacific settlement as a whole. One [Page 726] of the principles, he said, upon which we were proceeding was noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, and the permanent retention of troops of one country in another country was inconsistent with that principle.
The Ambassador disclaimed any desire on the part of Japan to station troops in China permanently.
The Secretary said he felt that the same consideration applied to the retention of Japanese troops in China indefinitely. The Ambassador disclaimed any desire to keep troops in China indefinitely, but he did not offer anything definite on this point.
The Japanese Minister repeated what the Ambassador had earlier said about the desire of the Japanese Government to hear from us as soon as possible in regard to the Japanese proposals. The Secretary replied that we were working as hard as we could on the matter, and after consulting with Mr. Ballantine, said that we hoped we could have something for them day after tomorrow (November 14).