711.94/2470: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

1839. The Ambassador reports for Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles concerning his call on Foreign Minister Togo this afternoon at the request of the latter as follows:

(1)
The Foreign Minister asked the Ambassador if he was familiar with the Japanese proposal which was presented on November 20 to the Department and if he was informed of the conversation in substance on November 22 when the proposal was discussed during a call on the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador and Saburo Kurusu. In reply the Ambassador stated that the Japanese proposal had been reported to him, though not the conversation of November 22 as yet. Togo then informed the Ambassador that Secretary Hull had said he had been consulting with the representatives of other interested Governments and the item respecting withdrawal from Southern Indochina of Japanese troops was not satisfactory. Togo continued that Japan made the offer out of sincere solicitude to maintain peace in the Pacific and from anxiety for a way to be found out of the existing difficult situation. Togo said Japan could not withdraw its forces at this time from Northern Indochina because they were despatched there to hasten the China affair’s conclusion. The Minister recalled that the United States and Great Britain had instituted the freezing orders because the stationing in Southern Indochina of Japanese troops was looked upon as a threat to British and American security. He remarked that withdrawing Japanese troops to Northern Indochina evidences Japanese desire for the promotion of a successful conclusion of what he called “negotiations” with the United States. Togo said the withdrawal of Japanese troops at present stationed in French Indochina to the northern part is in any event the maximum concession Japan can make.
(2)
The Minister proceeded to comment that one of the serious obstacles to concluding the present negotiations successfully is undeniably the divergence of views of the United States and Japan [Page 763] regarding settlement of the China affair. Togo recalled President Roosevelt’s query sometime ago of the Japanese Ambassador as to what Japan’s attitude would be should General Chiang Kai-shek issue a statement of desire to restore peace with Japan, whereupon the Japanese Government answered that it would be glad for the United States to act as an “introducer” to open the way for direct Japanese-Chinese negotiations. Minister Togo then said if Chiang Kai-shek made a statement as suggested, the Japanese Government’s response would be a statement in similar vein. Japan would be ready thereupon at once to enter into negotiations with China, with the understanding that then the United States would refrain from action prejudicial to restoring peace between China and Japan. Togo stated his inability to appreciate the reasons given by the Secretary of State for not accepting the recent Japanese proposal. Remembering Japan’s sacrifices to date, Togo declared it is not possible successfully to conclude the negotiations without reaching an understanding regarding the cessation by the United States of activities which obstruct a restoration of peace. At this point the Ambassador interrupted the Foreign Minister to say it was not clear to him at what point Japan expects such American activities to cease. Togo replied that he would like President Roosevelt’s suggestion to become a reality. The Foreign Minister wished it to be made clear that Japan expects the cessation of the activities to which he referred as soon as China and Japan begin negotiations, which would occur immediately after General Chiang Kai-shek makes the statement outlined above and after an affirmative response thereto by Japan. Togo said he was unfamiliar with military matters, but it appeared to him that normally hostilities would cease as soon as negotiations were started looking to peace being restored, thereby logically bringing about a situation when it would be unnecessary to have American action which is calculated to aid Chinese military forces.
(3)
Togo informed the Ambassador that he was the one who formulated and became responsible for the Japanese proposal presented on November 20 to the United States Government. This proposal was presented as a manifestation of Japan’s desire for cooperation with the American policy of peace. Togo assured the Ambassador that the same cooperative spirit is to prompt Japan’s future policy, which is to be conducted with growing clarity in pursuit of peaceful aims.
(4)
The Ambassador reports that the only statement he made to the Foreign Minister was to assure him that his observations would be promptly transmitted to the United States Government.
(5)
By way of comment, the Ambassador offers the suggestion that, in case the Japanese Government does not expect suspension of United States aid to China prior to the commencement of Chinese-Japanese [Page 764] peace negotiations, point 4 in the Japanese proposal (i. e., non-interference by the United States in the efforts of Japan to settle the China affair) would appear to be largely to save face.

Grew
  1. Telegram in two sections.