500.A15a3/1357: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Dawes) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:12 p.m.]
47. Reference is made to my 43 of February 18, noon.71 I was called this morning to 10 Downing Street by Prime Minister MacDonald. He commenced by requesting that we treat what he said with the utmost secrecy, since the prospect of an agreement might be destroyed by any disclosures in either the French or the Italian papers of the matter of which he was to speak until Craigie had finished his work at Rome. The Prime Minister stated that Craigie returned yesterday from Paris, and reported the result of his negotiations on naval building with the representatives of the French and Italian Governments to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary72 and the First Lord of the Admiralty.73 The whole scheme was stated by the Prime Minister as being tentative at the moment. He stated that, as he had not yet got the particulars himself, he could not supply me with them, but that as soon as Craigie reported after his visits to Paris and Rome he would give me this information. He stated that, taken as a whole, they are a great improvement on any agreements hitherto proposed, and to the best of the Prime Minister’s belief, are generally on the lines of the information already sent to you. Craigie informed [Page 366] the Prime Minister that the agreement was the very best he could do at the moment, although the Prime Minister stated he did not consider them quite satisfactory.
The Admiralty, according to the Prime Minister, would be willing to accept the proposed terms under protest with one exception. This relates to the French submarine tonnage which, as against our three-power agreement of 52,700 tons, is between 80,000 and 90,000 tons. The difference must, the British Admiralty insists, be made good by the building of destroyers by Great Britain up to a total tonnage of about 200,000, and has requested that this be considered by the Cabinet in relation to article 21 of the treaty.
It was stated by the Prime Minister that he was most unwilling to bring this article into operation, and that he had told his colleagues that he would see me this morning and tell me provisionally what is considered by the Cabinet and himself as the best thing to do. If Craigie informs them that the scheme which he now has in mind is the best that he can get the two Governments to accept, they propose to communicate immediately with the Japanese Ambassador74 and myself, requesting that we should ask our Governments to agree to a meeting, summoned by the Prime Minister as Chairman, of the adjourned Naval Conference. He stated that this would not mean a return of any of the delegates, but that they could give to whoever was most convenient as a representative the necessary instructions. The British Government’s attitude, the French and Italian figures having been presented to the Conference, would then be as follows:
In the first place, the figures could not be accepted by them as altogether consistent with their security; in the second place, the British position, if these two Governments were prepared to make certain declarations regarding their temporary character and also covering other safeguards that would arise (which parenthetically the Prime Minister says he knows would be done), would be this:
In view of the forthcoming Disarmament Conference the British, although in their opinion building on the program submitted would in the ordinary way compel them to invoke article 21 of the Naval Agreement, should not do so; they would trust to further negotiations preparatory to that Conference, thereby enabling Great Britain, France, and Italy to come now to a complete understanding, which could make a five-power treaty out of part 3 of the London Naval Agreement. It was stated by the Prime Minister that his Admiralty was insisting very strenuously that an increase in British destroyers is made necessary in order to maintain equilibrium if the French position as to submarines as outlined in Craigie’s report is accepted. Recourse by the United States also to article 21 in connection with destroyers [Page 367] would also of course be necessitated by this agreement. The situation in regard to submarines was, the Prime Minister stated, deplored by him, but in the interests of a five-power agreement limiting all building, and because the matter would again be considered at the Disarmament Conference, he was willing to face the House of Commons on the question of the concession on submarines, although great difficulty is expected there from a refusal to act under article 21.
I called on Henderson at the Foreign Office after this conference with the Prime Minister. He informed me confidentially that Craigie was not hopeful that he would secure a preliminary Franco-Italian agreement, feeling that “he was about at the end of his rope”. This is submitted simply to give you all relevant information which I can obtain, not as bearing on the importance of the Prime Minister’s statement to me.
This morning Craigie left for Paris; he will proceed directly to Rome if conversations take a favorable turn.