462.00R296/4063: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:06 p.m.]
93. Referring to your 89, June 22, 5 p.m., I have just delivered your message to Curtius, whose first reaction was one of considerable perturbation as to whether the suggestion of direct conversations between France and Germany should be interpreted as meaning that it is up to Germany to begin negotiations with France at once in order to prevail upon her to signify her acceptance of the Hoover proposal, or whether, on the contrary, it means that Germany, once the French have agreed to the proposal in principle, should take up with them the manifold technical points to be settled directly. Curtius hoped that it meant the latter, since he felt that otherwise he might have had some misunderstanding of the Hoover proposal, which he understood involved a definite acceptance in principle by all the major creditor powers as a condition precedent to its further fruition.
I replied, while avoiding a more direct answer, that the President was certainly not modifying the terms of his proposal, and this seemed satisfactory to Curtius.
Referring more specifically to the message itself, Curtius told me that he had convoked a press conference of German journalists as early as Sunday night, and had urged them to refrain from suggesting that any common front of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany against France or any other power existed and had asked them, on the contrary, to play up the idea that Germany recognized that it was essential to settle amicably with France the many points which remain to be decided before the President’s proposition could be put into effect. Curtius hoped, therefore, that the press reports mentioned in your telegram did not have their source in Germany and added that he and Bruening were well aware of the need for assisting French psychology. [Page 51] It was their intention to do what they could to make it easier for France to adopt the President’s suggestion.