462.00R296/4184a: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Germany (Sackett)

94. The British Ambassador called on me this afternoon with a telegram from his Government. The British Government is at one with the American Government as to the inadvisability of attaching political conditions to the President’s proposal, but believes that there are considerations which must not be overlooked. It would be unfortunate, for example, if the impression became general that the Germans are taking everything and giving nothing. If this impression, which the British Government believes is growing, could be corrected, it might lighten the task of bringing acceptance of the President’s plan, at the same time increasing the benefits of that plan. Germany cannot be expected to make any financial sacrifices, but the British believe that acceptance of the plan would be facilitated if the Germans should make a spontaneous contribution toward the restoration of confidence.

1.
There is wide spread criticism in Europe that the Germans make no military economy, a suspicion revived by the recent emergency decree. Under the present conditions of German economy is the expenditure of building a new battleship justified?
2.
The Customs Union.80 So far as this is concerned, the British [Page 85] are impartial as we are. They feel, however, very strongly that this question is impeding the restoration of confidence in Europe and that if the Germans could be persuaded to drop the plan openly and without any humiliation to themselves as a token of their appreciation for the President’s plan, it would do much toward improving the situation. (You mentioned this yourself in talking with me this morning.) The British feel that the Customs Union was intended as a brilliant success for the Bruening Government and also to afford economic relief, that both these objects have been achieved by the American action. It seems to the British, therefore, that the Customs Union is no longer necessary, but that as a plan it is highly disturbing.
3.
German finances. It is feared in Europe that the German Government may be intending to modify the emergency taxation and that warning along those lines might be useful. The British feel that the Germans should not do anything to diminish the yield. The, apprehension was lessened by Bruening’s broadcast on June 23, but so far as the military department is concerned, including the building of a battleship, there seems to be no retrenchment.

The Ambassador asked me whether the American Government would be willing to take steps along these lines. I told him that it was impossible since if it appeared to Congress that we had attached political conditions to the President’s plan, that the plan would have little chance of success. I said, however, that there was no reason why the British should not put these matters up to the German Government, that they might even base their action on the fact that this Government was fighting hard to put across the plan which would be of great benefit to Germany and that any action the German Government might take to assist would be highly appreciated. I told the Ambassador that I was telegraphing you his conversation, in order that, if the British approached the Germans and they approach you, you would not discourage any action they might wish to take. I do not wish you to approach the Germans on these matters on your own initiative, but feel that the British are probably right in their estimate of the situation.

Castle
  1. See pp. 565 ff.