838.105/370: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Haiti (Munro)

[Paraphrase]

43. Your 61, June 18, 10 a.m., and 62, June 18, 11 a.m. We have given most careful consideration to this matter and we sympathize with your feelings. We do not feel, however, that the issue presented in the Aarons case is one which would justify jeopardizing the entire Haitianization program. Although the Garde d’Haiti is under American officers, yet it is operating as a Haitian force and as long as it does not interfere with the proper discharge of its duties, it will sometimes be necessary to give consideration to the views of the President regarding it. In this case it boils down to the question of whether Aarons shall be a First Lieutenant or a Captain and while it is unfortunate and may cause a certain amount of resentment among the Haitian officers, this is not a matter in which public opinion would justify taking a stand which would result in virtual military occupancy of Haiti.

[Page 485]

The situation, if the program of Haitianization is carried out as a unilateral act, will be one of virtual military occupation. In the natural course of events it will not be long before American officers will have to be commissioned in the Garde d’Haiti to replace those whose tours of duty are up. It seems safe to expect that if the Haitianization program is carried on without the cooperation of the Government of Haiti, the President of Haiti will refuse to commission any more Americans in the Garde d’Haiti. In that event these men will then have to operate purely on the nomination by the President of the United States and as officers of the Marine Corps. This is a military occupation. Again, there would be no authority to pay Colvin and the other American officials in the non-financial Treaty Services with the indemnities which you said have been tentatively agreed upon by the Government of Haiti. Even if the payments were made by the Financial Adviser, it would be considered in many quarters as a high-handed act, one without justification under the treaty.

Taking all things into consideration, the Department does not feel that the Aarons case is one on which we can take a stand that would jeopardize the Haitianization program. You are authorized, therefore, to make an arrangement with the Government of Haiti to the effect that upon receiving formal explicit assurances in writing that the Treaty provisions regarding the Garde d’Haiti will be respected; that the Colvin case will be settled as indicated in your 61, June 18, 10 a.m.; that the American civilian treaty officials in the Public Works, Sanitary, and Agricultural Services will be indemnified as set forth in your 61; and that the other specific agreements of the Haitianization program already outlined will be respected, you will acquiesce in the refusal of the President of Haiti to commission Lieutenant Aarons.

You state in paragraph number “1.” of your 61, June 18, 10 a.m., that the Government of Haiti would reserve the right to discuss further the plan of Haitianization. In as much as most of the provisions are apparently agreed upon, the Department feels that you might use your acquiescence in the President’s point of view regarding the Aarons case as a bargaining point to offset further discussion of the Haitianization plan.

Stimson