793.94/3644: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 26—2:35 a.m.]
124. Nanking’s January 24, 3 p.m.52
- 1.
- I am replying to Peck as follows:
“Your telegram January 24, 3 p.m. With reference to paragraph 3, you state that the French Minister said that it was evident to him that China, through Wang, was asking the powers to make it possible for China to open negotiations with Japan and that this inquiry was a formal one directed through him to the several Governments mentioned. With the Foreign Minister apparently in Shanghai, and in the face of uncertainty whether he is there to negotiate or whether he has resigned his office, I am at a loss to understand the exact purport of Wang’s conversation with the French Minister unless it is intended to be a communication to the League Council scheduled to meet January 25th. Are you sure that this is not the case?
With reference to paragraph 5, I suggest that you listen to and report any. information of this kind that may come to you but make no commitments one way or the other. British Minister, however, heard nothing in regard to Wang’s conversation with the French Minister. He is instructing Ingram to see you.”
- 2.
- Situation described in Nanking’s paragraph 1 indicates that responsible authorities at Nanking are floundering, due to noncooperation of several factions and inability to determine upon a policy. In any case I do not see why Shanghai incident should necessarily involve entire range of questions between China and Japan as assumed by Wang. Somewhat similar incidents have occurred at other places and have been settled locally by negotiation.
- 3.
- From Peck’s conversations I have received the impression that the Chinese would like to merge the settlement of local issues at Shanghai, involving primarily the question of their responsibility for the protection of Japanese life and property, with the more general controversy regarding Manchuria in the expectation that it may now prove possible in some way to involve the foreign powers in the area of the Settlements where there exists such a well-defined tradition of immunity from outside interference and where such extensive foreign commercial interests are at stake. I have therefore some concern lest the Chinese precipitately adopt a policy predicated upon bringing about in the Shanghai area some form of concrete intervention which they could not expect to effect elsewhere. I furthermore cannot wholly escape the impression that the Chinese are somewhat over-emphasizing the immediate dangers of the domestic situation in the belief that this will prove an effective method of persuading the powers principally interested to some act of mediation which will relieve the Chinese Government of the onus of meeting alone at this time the questions along the China Coast of which the Japanese appear determined to demand settlement.