Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/5085½

Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson)⁷⁸

Geneva, April 21, 1932.

Mr. Matsudaira stated that he hoped as soon as convenient to have a conversation about general matters with the Secretary, but that in the meantime there were some urgent details which he would like to discuss with me and have me bring to the attention of the Secretary.

He assumed that I was familiar with the Draft Resolution of the Committee of Nineteen. I assured him I was. He said that he had heard there was some misunderstanding as to Mr. Nagaoka having expressed the opinion that the Mixed Commission might be charged with the duty of declaring when conditions were such that the Japanese retreat might reasonably be expected. He asked me if I had heard this report. I told him that I had heard it but through third parties, as Mr. Nagaoka had not spoken to me. Mr. Matsudaira explained that what Mr. Nagaoka intended to suggest was that the Joint Commission could act on a majority vote, and not to charge it with the duty of making a declaration as to when retreat might reasonably be expected.

He continued by stating that the Japanese Government could not accept Article 11, or certainly the first paragraph thereof, for two reasons,—

(a) because the negotiators on the spot, including the four friendly Powers, who were most familiar with the whole situation, had not reached the conclusion that any such power in the hands of the Commission was necessary or advisable; there was no reason to feel that the Committee of 19 were better able to interpret necessities than the gentlemen in Shanghai;

(b) because constitutionally no Japanese Government could admit the right of anybody but the Emperor to give orders for the movement of troops; neither the civilian Government nor the Minister of War himself can issue such orders.

I replied that while there might be some basis for the contention under (a), I could see none whatever for the point he makes under (b). Nobody was suggesting that an outside force give orders to the Japanese troops; what was suggested was that the Commission merely declare that they themselves have reached the conclusion that the time has come when a retreat might reasonably be expected. I could see no grounds on which anybody could claim a legal infringement of the power of the Emperor by such a proposal.

Mr. Matsudaira stated that the organization of the Committee of Nineteen made negotiation very difficult, as certain small Powers which had no interest on the spot were active in forcing conclusions difficult of acceptance for the Japanese Government. I replied that these small Powers were undoubtedly more concerned about the application of the Covenant of the League and the precedent that might thereby be set, than they were with the actual state of affairs in the Far East, but that he must be under no illusion in regard to their point of view; they were vigorously determined on the integral carrying out of the Pact of the League, and just because they had nothing to risk they were going to be the vigorous force with which he had to contend in this matter. I said that my own opinion was that a request by the Japanese Government for the dropping purely and simply of the first paragraph of Article 11 would put the Japanese in a very embarrassing position, as I thought their request would not be acceded to. I then added that I had heard there was some discussion as to the possibility of the Japanese making a spontaneous and unilateral declaration to the effect that they wished for a declaration from the Joint Commission, or considered that the Joint Commission might declare when in their opinion the state of affairs justified withdrawal, and that the Japanese High Command would be guided by this advice. Mr. Matsudaira felt that this would be very difficult, but added that they were working on this thought. I again urged on him the advisability of not taking a purely negative attitude, but of searching every avenue to find a means of making a positive suggestion to take the place of the first paragraph of Article 11.

Mr. Matsudaira then adverted to the fact that certain newspaper men had asked him whether Mr. Stimson was in touch with Mr. Litvinoff in regard to the Far Eastern situation. I told him that this idea doubtless arose from a report published by the Zirchar Zeitung on the evening of the 22nd, in which the United Press correspondent reports that the Foreign Office spokesman in Tokyo had suggested that Mr. Stimson was getting into touch with Mr. Litvinoff in Geneva. I told him that Mr. Stimson had not got into touch with Mr. Litvinoff, and gave him a note whereby he could find the article in question.

Mr. Matsudaira stated that he had heard that Mr. Nelson Johnson had reported to the Secretary of State that he (Mr. Johnson) thought that the Japanese demands relative to the entry of Chinese forces in the area south and east of Shanghai, were unjustified. Mr. Matsudaira pulled out a map and first talked of the strategic danger to Japanese forces of the entry of Chinese troops in this area. I said that I was not a soldier, but it hardly looked to me as if these fears were justified, since a direct attack on the Japanese forces would involve crossing the International Settlement, which would instantly involve the four friendly Powers; the only other method of attack would be across the river, to the west of Shanghai, to attack the Japanese from the rear, and such a movement surely the Japanese Navy, with its command of the water, could prevent. Mr. Matsudaira then approached the problem from another point of view, showing me on his map the various go-downs and factories of Japanese nationality in this southern area. I asked him who had been policing this territory during the disturbance. He replied that he did not know. I said I didn’t know either, but that I ventured to suggest that it had been policed by the Chinese. If this were the case, and order had been maintained during the stress of heavy fighting, surely it was unduly anxious to feel that special provision for the maintenance of order had to be made in this area when fighting was no longer going on.

Mr. Matsudaira again urged me at the end of the meeting to arrange as soon as the Secretary could conveniently do so, for an interview in which he could discuss the broader aspects of the case.

78. Apparently handed to the Secretary of State in Geneva.