Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, The Far East, Volume IV
793.94 Commission/310
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 1.]
Sir: During the recent stay in Tokyo of the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry in the Far East, I have had a number of conferences with Major-General Frank R. McCoy, the American member of the Commission. Before proceeding with the conversations I informed General McCoy that I would report the gist of his remarks to the Department and asked him if his conversations with me would in the slightest degree embarrass him. He assured me that they would not embarrass him if kept in strict confidence; that it had been the practice throughout of the members of the Commission to maintain the closest contacts with the diplomatic and consular officers of their countries, and that they had obtained a large part of their information [Page 150] from these officers. He felt, therefore, that there could be nothing embarrassing to him or incompatible with his position as a member of the Commission in discussing the general situation with me. He added that his colleagues on the Commission were by mutual consent talking freely with their respective Embassies in Tokyo.
I gather from his remarks that the Commission has reached some definite conclusions which may be summarized as follows: the blowing up of part of the South Manchuria Railway on September 18th was simply a pretext for action by the Japanese Army, as were later incidents, all carefully planned by the Japanese in advance; the Japanese have undoubtedly had some provocation for action in Manchuria, but their claim that the Japanese Army acted only in self-defence cannot be admitted; their claim that the establishment of Manchukuo is an instance of the self-determination of a people is unsound and cannot be admitted; Manchukuo was and is entirely dependent upon the Japanese Army for its establishment and continued existence and has received no real support from the Chinese population of this region; the claim that the Japanese in the Manchukuo Government are loyal to Manchukuo rather than to Japan is open to much doubt; the present status of Manchuria is apt to prove to be a source of future wars rather than a guarantee of peace in the Orient; Manchukuo will, in fact, become a festering sore and a case of Irredentism far worse than that of Alsace-Lorraine; the pacification of Manchuria is likely to be a long task which will require the presence of large bodies of Japanese troops for some years, as the Manchukuo troops are not loyal to the new government; Japan has not used, as it should have used, the machinery provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the peace treaties for the keeping of the peace and has done much to destroy faith in the peace structure.
I do not know, and probably the Commission has not yet decided, what will be included in the Commission’s final report, nor what concrete recommendations will be made. I have reason to believe, however, that some if not all of the foregoing points will be included in the final report or in the reports of the experts attached to the Commission.
The opinions of the members of the Commission were conveyed to the Japanese authorities (principally to Count Uchida, the Foreign Minister, and General Araki, the Minister of War) during the recent visit of the Commission to Tokyo. The replies of the Japanese officials consisted of restatements of the declared Japanese government policy, namely, that the Japanese policy toward Manchuria is unalterably fixed and that no discussion is possible.
I understand that the Commissioners have been unusually in accord [Page 151] and that their findings and recommendations are likely to be unanimous.
I enclose herewith memoranda of my three conversations with General McCoy and copies of memoranda of interviews96 between the Commission and various officials.
Respectfully yours,
Memorandum of Conversation Between the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) and Major General Frank R. McCoy
| Also present: | Dr. G. H. Blakeslee, E. R. Dickover, and W. T. Turner. |
Gen. McCoy: Regarding the Open Door in Manchuria. The Young Marshal, when he was in power in Manchuria, was favorable to American business men, who therefore obtained a great deal of the government business. Now the Japanese firms are getting the business and the American firms, like Andersen, Meyer and Company, might as well shut up shop. American motors and oil firms, however, are exceptions. They like the Japanese to be in charge, because it means quick and sure payment for supplies which the Japanese must buy from them.
Our talks with General Araki were well summed up in the Japan Advertiser of July 11th. But there was one notable difference in Araki’s attitude. On our previous visit to Japan, Araki was blithe, debonair, and self-confident. On our last visit to him he was different—he is now the responsible minister of state. He no longer talks freely, illustrating his talk with stories and fables. He now talks only from notes, supplied him by his assistants, and uses care in phrasing. All the spirit seems to have gone from him, and he looks care-worn. Things are apparently not going well. There was one difference in what Araki said, from the press reports. His attitude when we were here before was that Westerners cannot possibly understand the Far East. Now he says that he hopes that our visit will clarify our minds and that we will be able to realize the actualities of the situation; that however we report to the League, he begs us to realize Japan’s difficulties. He now appears to be intimating that there is some chance of a compromise. Formerly, Araki gave no impression that any compromise was possible, but Yoshizawa (former Foreign Minister) did give that impression. He gave us, on our visit here in the middle of March, full and frank information. We [Page 152] explained to him that the Commission was not here to act as judges but to try to find some solution of the problem which would be satisfactory to both sides. So we asked Yoshizawa to tell us exactly what Japan wanted in Manchuria. He said that Japan wants the treaties with China, including the secret protocol, to be acknowledged by China. He also said that the most significant thing about Japan’s attitude toward Manchuria is sentimental and historical. The Japanese people are sentimental about Manchuria. The present generation consists of the sons and daughters of men killed on the battlefields of Manchuria, and consequently sentiment enters into their thoughts. This factor must be considered and is most important. About the treaties, Yoshizawa said that there was no responsible government in China with which to negotiate. The central government was hopeless and the local men in Manchuria passed the buck back to Nanking. The red Kuomintang party was back of all the trouble. This party is anti-foreign, not only anti-Japanese.
Ambassador: But could not Japan have referred its troubles to the other powers, under the Nine-Power Treaty?
Gen. McCoy: We asked Yoshizawa about that, but he said that things developed too quickly. The Foreign Office was caught unprepared by the Army’s actions. The Foreign Office, according to the impression which we received, was out of sympathy with the War Department and did not know what it would do next. Yoshizawa made no direct reflection on the War Office but gave us the impression that the Foreign Office was caught by surprise. In this connection, I might tell you that George Bronson Rea and Kinney, the two propagandists for Japan, told me that Baron Shidehara had planned a conference last October on the China and Manchuria questions. He intended to bring in various men—the President of the South Manchuria Railway, the Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory and various others making investigations in China and Manchuria, to confer with the object of putting the whole matter up to the League.
As the former Minister to China, Yoshizawa was in a position to speak with authority on China. He said that China was like a huge jelly-fish and was filled with communistic troubles. The Japanese Government, by the way, is now putting out pamphlets containing much of what Yoshizawa told us. There are several of them—one on the Chinese Central Government, one on the communist movements there, and one on the anti-Japanese boycott. I presume that the pamphlets are put out by the Japanese Government—they were handed to us by Yoshida, the Japanese Assessor to the Commission.
To return to Yoshizawa and the treaties. These have all been published except the secret protocol to the Treaty of 1905. You may remember [Page 153] that a copy of that protocol was given to Huntington Wilson, but the copy given him was not complete. Yoshizawa furnished us with a photostat copy of the protocol. Nanking also did this and we are having the two translated, checked, and studied.
Ambassador: Did you ask about the 21 Points?
Gen. McCoy: Yes. Yoshizawa said that the 21 demands were forced on Japan by conditions in China and were in reality engineered by Yuan Shi Kai, who worked behind the scenes, and who was trying to save face for the Government. The Nishihara Loans were the meat in the cocoanut there. Yoshizawa did not answer all of our questions when we were here; some he answered later in writing and we received the answers when we were in Harbin. In the meantime he had become very hard-boiled and concise, and answered most of our questions with a direct “No”. For instance, we had asked him if Japan would withdraw its troops from Manchuria if sufficient security could be found by other means. His answer was “No”. In regard to the establishment of Manchukuo, Yoshizawa seemed embarrassed. Once again the military seemed to be going ahead without informing the Foreign Office.
All indications throughout our stay in Manchuria pointed to a continued conflict between the two parties, the military and the Foreign Office.
We were in Shanghai during the armistice negotiations. Then we went to Nanking and conferred with all the ministers of the Chinese Government. We had seen them before, in Shanghai, but started our real conferences with them in Nanking. The Chinese throughout tried to link the Manchuria and Shanghai affairs, but Japan always tried to keep them separate. The general impression which we obtained in Nanking was that a real government was gradually emerging in China and that the reds would have been stamped out had not the Japanese disturbed matters by their Manchurian campaign.
All the Chinese Ministers of State were present at our conferences, but Wang Ching-wei, the Chief of the Executive Yuan, did all of the talking. Chiang Kai-shek stayed in the background and let the civil authorities talk. He even gave them precedence in leaving the room. There was evidently an endeavor to give the impression that the civil authorities, rather than the military, were in power in China.
Both the Japanese and Chinese presented beautiful, finished cases, each giving its side of the dispute, but the two briefs are incompatible. The Chinese case was absolutely perfect, as far as the façade was concerned.
In China everything in the Government seemed to be normal and the various ministries were all functioning. They did not seem to take the Manchurian affair very seriously; certainly not as seriously [Page 154] as the Japanese, who always take things seriously. The Chinese seem to think that Manchuria is unalterably Chinese and that eventually, in a hundred or five hundred years, the matter would be straightened out, to China’s advantage. Time, apparently, was no object in the dispute. In any argument, the Chinese always tend to go back and back in history, to the Han Dynasty. They are steeped in ancient history, and their thoughts consequently work in centuries. But the nationalist spirit in China is becoming very real, and the Manchurian and Shanghai affairs did much to assist this spirit.
Ambassador: Does this nationalistic feeling embrace Canton?
Gen. McCoy: Yes. There is a very strong party there that wants to present a united front to Japan. All factions in China are together against Japan on the Manchurian question. The Chinese officials are venal and inclined to compromise to avoid trouble. Small incidents make one pessimistic regarding China, but one should look for thirty years and observe the progress. The United States Government’s policy in regard to China is correct. The treaties regarding China are good treaties and should be adhered to. Our policy of playing for time until the problem is worked out and a real government emerges is a good one.
Then we went to Peking and talked with the Young Marshal and the émigrés—Manchurians who went down to Peking and Tientsin after the Japanese occupation. The Young Marshal gave us the impression of being much more intelligent than we could have expected in so young a man. He talks more like an American than an Oriental. He told us of his efforts to give Manchuria a really good government, efforts which were frustrated by the old cliques. However, our impression was that the old governments in Manchuria, including those of Chang Tso-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang, were undoubtedly personal and corrupt. The Young Marshal was sick with typhoid in Peking last summer when the trouble broke out, and he feels that if he had been well he could have avoided the trouble. The immediate cause of the Japanese outbreak was the usual Chinese pin-pricking in Manchuria. Such as the Nakamura case. This was settled just prior to the outbreak, but the Young Marshal realized that the case, with other things, would give the Japanese a pretext, and he wanted to avoid giving them any pretext. Therefore from the hospital in Peking he gave orders that his subordinates were to be careful to give the Japanese no pretext on which to move, and, if the Japanese did move, they were to offer no resistance. The Young Marshal had been negotiating with the Japanese directly, not through Nanking, in August of 1931. He had been getting together with Shidehara and thinks that he had reached a perfect understanding with him, when the military took the bit in their teeth.
[Page 155]Chang told us about his father’s funeral. Japan sent two envoys to the funeral, both named Hayashi, which confused us for a time. One was Baron Hayashi, of the Imperial Household Department, representing the Emperor, and the other was Mr. Hayashi, the Consul General at Mukden, representing the Japanese Government. Baron Hayashi told the Young Marshal that he should not fly the Nanking flag or have any closer relations with Nanking than did the Old Marshal. The other Hayashi repeated this advice but made it stronger. He stated that if the Young Marshal took Japan’s advice, financial and other assistance would be given by Japan; if not, Japan would take appropriate measures—a phrase which we constantly encountered in our investigations.
Dickover: Did you ask Chang about the death of his father?
Gen. McCoy: Yes. Chang started to tell us but became too nervous and had to stop. My investigations indicate that the assassination was a mixed Japanese-Chinese affair. The actual bombing was probably done by Chinese, but the affair was planned by Major Doihara, with his satellites, including Komai; Pao, the Mayor of Mukden; and the two Chinese generals later shot by the Young Marshal.
Memorandum of Conversation Between the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) and Major General Frank R. McCoy
| Also present: | Dr. G. H. Blakeslee, E. L. Neville, E. R. Dickover, and W. T. Turner. |
Gen. McCoy: In regard to the rumor current among the foreigners living in China coast ports to the effect that the Chinese 19th Route Army was planning to attack Shanghai and was stopped by the Japanese, I have looked carefully into the matter and found that orders had already been given to the 19th Army to move and preparations had been under way when the Japanese attacked and stopped the evacuation. There was a natural fear among the foreigners arising from the presence near the city of such a large body of men.
In closing my remarks the other day, I noticed that I created some surprise among you by stating that the Japanese were justified in their actions in Manchuria. I meant that they were justified from their own point of view. They had been subject for some time to the pin-pricking tactics of the Chinese—and you know that the Chinese can be very irritating. Even their best friends must admit that. I said that the former governments in Manchuria were corrupt military governments which obstructed the Japanese. The Young Marshal was a military dictator, surrounded by a group of smaller military dictators. [Page 156] He had very little control and all his attempts to give Manchuria a better government were countered by these small dictators. He maintained his position only because the other dictators also wanted his position, were jealous of each other, and rather than see one of them in the position, preferred to keep a young man whom they could control in the position.
Today I will proceed to our investigations in Manchuria, but first I wish to explain some newspaper articles purporting to give my views. They were all false, as I never gave the newspaper men an official interview. I was once reported in Tokyo as having said that Colonel Stimson was only a common politician, or words to that effect. This was entirely false. It was a misunderstanding in a talk which I had with Colonel Furujo. You know how they try to talk without really understanding much of the conversation. Colonel Furujo had said that Colonel Stimson was against the Japanese, and I was defending him. I said that he was a representative of the American people and was expressing their opinion—not his own personal opinion. Somehow this was twisted into the remark I was supposed to have made. None of the so-called interviews with me were true. On the whole, however, I must admit that the Japanese press has treated the Commission very well. They have had a very sympathetic attitude.
To go on to our investigations. When we finished with Peking we had acquired a good background of both the Japanese and the Chinese sides. Both Araki and Yoshizawa in Japan had given us their views as to Japan’s intentions in Manchuria. I have here memoranda of our conversations with them, which I cannot give you but which I can show you. There is also a memorandum given us by Uchida in Dairen, when he was president of the South Manchuria Railway. By the way, Uchida has now been told twice that his two major premises—that of Japan’s military movements in Manchuria being self-defensive and that of self-determination of Manchukuo—are unsound. We told him so in Dairen and recently in Tokyo. He has no misunderstanding of the Commission’s views on these two points.
During all of the time that we were in China the Japanese Assessor to the Commission, Mr. Yoshida tried to get us to travel around to out-of-the-way places, with the object of proving to us that there was no real government in China. We had no time to do this but we accomplished something along these lines by dividing the party, sending groups off to different places. For instance, we sent Astor and Young to Szechwan by air. The Chinese did not want us, apparently, to go anywhere except to Nanking and Peking, but we wanted to go to Hankow, the real heart of China, especially because it is surrounded [Page 157] rounded by Red movements. So we went to Hankow. We covered a lot of ground altogether which gave us more confidence in our decisions. We not only covered China well, but we checked everything with our Ministers and our consular officers. We did the same thing in Manchuria and carried out our inquiry to our satisfaction. In Manchuria, we made Mukden the center and from there went to Changchun, Korea [Kirin?] and Harbin. While in Manchuria we saw officially no one who represented China. The Chinese sympathizers were either threatened or subdued, or felt that they were. We saw officially only people who had the cards stacked. The missionaries were a great source of information—the Catholic missionaries who reported to General Claudel, the British missionaries who saw Lord Lytton, and the American missionaries who came to me. They knew the public sentiment, which was of great importance.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
At Mukden we spent most of our time with Japanese officials. We saw General Honjo day after day. He answered our questions frankly after the first day, when he was somewhat embarrassed by our questions. The trouble arose from the fact that his story did not agree with the story of September 18th incidents as given in a pamphlet which had been distributed to us by the Japanese Assessor. They had to make a lot of corrections in the pamphlet.
As a military man, I would say that the Japanese put over a good General Staff performance in Manchuria. They were very friendly, hospitable and courteous to us, and let us hear anyone who had anything at all to do with the September 18th incident. We talked to the commanding officers, the lieutenants, and all others, even down to the privates and the track workers who repaired the tracks after the explosion. Their stories did not always tally, but that was an indication that they were telling the truth. If the Commission had nothing else but the Japanese official accounts—no outside evidence whatever—we would be convinced that the blowing up of the railway was only a pretext. They convicted themselves by their own evidence. We are convinced that the Japanese Army planned the whole thing. First they tried the Nakamura case, but that did not work as a pretext. So they blew up the railway. We have been convinced from the Japanese statement alone that no Chinese planned that incident. Then one incident followed another, as planned in advance by the Japanese,—the Nonni River bridge, etc.,—building up a beautiful case of self-defence for the Japanese Army. Everyone in the Commission is convinced of this from the Japanese’ own story. As for the blowing up of the railway, we could not go before a court and swear that the Japanese did it because we cannot say exactly what happened, but we are convinced that it was a pretext.
[Page 158]The Japanese themselves believe that their story is entirely convincing; in fact, they believe their story themselves. For example, when we went through Chinchow we were met by the staff of the Japanese regiment there, who insisted that we go up to their headquarters barracks, although we were not interested. They had a table in front of a formal iron gate, with a group of officers around it. We were lined up and an officer, in a grave voice and almost sobbing, told us this story. On the table were two iron chrysanthemums, with sixteen petals—the Japanese Imperial crest. The chrysanthemums had been taken off the gate, which was the gate to a school, and were exhibited as an example of how China has insulted Japan. It seems that the chrysanthemums had been placed at the bottom of the gates, so that as the students passed in and out of the gates, they kicked the chrysanthemums. Also on the main gate was a picture of the rising sun of Japan, painted over the two sides of the gates, so that when one was opened the rising sun was broken in two. Now the Japanese got us off the train to show us this nonsense as a striking instance calling for Japanese armed action!
We came back from Manchuria convinced on all points which we wished to investigate, with the possible exception of some minor details. After hearing the Japanese story, it seems that their whole case is based, first, on the justification of their attacks on the ground of self-defence, to get around the Kellogg Pact, and, second, on the premise that the movement for independence was a spontaneous action of the Chinese people in Manchuria, to avoid trouble with the Covenant of the League of Nations and with the Nine-Power Treaty.
Our trip has been vastly interesting. It was hard work, but I was never bored for one minute. We interviewed practically all the influential leaders—Honjo, Doihara (who is the nigger in the woodpile in Manchuria and who gave us a very significant talk) and the other Japanese advisers. One of the Japanese advisers gave us a plan of the organization of the Manchukuo government. At the head of the list of the men in each section was a Japanese name. After these names were asterisks, pointing to a note below that these were Japanese advisers. This was changed during our visit and we were informed that these men were not Japanese Government officials but were employed by the Manchukuo government as directors of policy and not as advisers. No appointment can be made without their consent. They are experts employed by the Manchukuo government to help them. In all our conferences with the Manchukuo officials the Japanese advisers surrounded them. The old Premier was most pathetic. He did not know what it was all about. He was Pu Yi’s teacher of writing—and is now Premier. Komai is a most pugnacious and determined-looking man. All the Manchukuo officials except the Premier whom we interviewed formally informed us indirectly, [Page 159] later, that what they had said in public did not represent their true feelings—quite the contrary!
Ambassador: You said that the Japanese General Staff put on a masterly show for you?
Gen. McCoy: Masterly in that it conveyed an exactly opposite impression from that intended!
We believe that there is no self-determination in Manchuria. The Chinese are terribly stirred up. Of course, the coolies do not care, except when they come in contact with the Japanese officials or with the bandits, but the representative Chinese are almost unanimously against the new government which they regard as the puppet of Japan. Certain selfish Chinese interests are in favor of the new government because they think that they will have a better chance of profits under the Japanese rule, as in Kwantung and Korea. The Manchus and Mongols are in favor of Manchukuo, but that is because they are against the Chinese. They were never loyal to the Chinese government and welcome the return of Pu Yi, of the old Manchu dynasty. However, they are only a fringe on the great mass of the Chinese population and cannot be considered in the general problem. We believe that things in Manchuria will get worse instead of better and that there will be more and more opposition to the new government, from China and Russia. Instead of bringing international peace, we think that the situation will be prolific of future wars.
Dr. Blakeslee has talked with scholars, missionaries and business men, whom I was too busy to see personally. He can tell you more of the feeling.
Dr. Blakeslee: The great proportion of the Manchukuo officials, even those nominally loyal to the new government, would be glad to go over to a genuine Chinese government. They are not really loyal to the new government.
Gen. McCoy: Honjo himself told us that they cannot depend for a minute on the loyalty of the Manchukuo troops, numbering about 80,000. They are all right for guard duty, but if they are ordered against the bandits or rebels—so-called bandits—they are liable to go over to the other side, with their ammunition.
Ambassador: You said the other day that my long telegram to the Department,97 repeated to Peking, about the pros and cons of Japanese recognition of Manchukuo had been helpful to you and the Minister. In that telegram I said that if Japan recognized Manchukuo some of the Japanese troops could be withdrawn or paid for by the Manchukuo regime, thus reducing expenses. Colonel McIlroy later disagreed with this point. What do you think?
[Page 160]Gen. McCoy: Colonel McIlroy was right. We asked Gen. Honjo about that. At first he said that they would be able to withdraw the troops by September 1st. Later he told us that it will be two years before they can withdraw. At Mukden in May he told us that he was much concerned about the situation; that his troops were inadequate and that he needed reinforcements. Later he said that he had asked for more troops. This is because of the disloyalty of the Manchukuo troops. Also because of Russia. Two weeks later he said that arrangements had been made which removed the anxiety. Presumably he was talking about some arrangement with Eussia.
Dickover: Could you tell us anything about the loyalty of the Japanese in the Manchukuo government to Japan? We have been hearing that they are more loyal to Manchukuo than to Tokyo.
Gen. McCoy: I was confident that they were playing the game with the Japanese government. General Honjo put them in there. Komai was in the Japanese Foreign Office and went over to Honjo last September as adviser. He has worked with Doihara and Honjo for twenty-five years. Ohashi was a Japanese consul for twenty-five years (Note.—actually less than fifteen years) and resigned to become an adviser in the Manchukuo Foreign Office. It is the same with all the Japanese in the Manchukuo government. They have all been connected with Manchuria in some way. But they insist that they are not playing the game of the Japanese Government. Ohashi states that he is a revolutionist and that he wants to overthrow the moneybags and politics in Japan as well as in Manchuria. He says that he will take no dictation from Tokyo. He sees a Utopia in Manchuria, and gave up his pension and chance of promotion to take a job in the Manchukuo at half the salary, in order to help create a paradise. But I am suspicious. He is too insistent. He cannot change his background of officialdom. I may be cynical, but Ohashi was too insistent. He has, however, convinced Mr. Haas and some other members of the staff of the Commission.
Ambassador: Any of your colleagues?
Gen. McCoy: No. The members of the Commission are also cynical, but some members of the staff believe him.
Blakeslee: General McCoy and I agree surprisingly well on all points. On this point we agree in principle but there is a difference in degree. We all agree that the Japanese Army created and supports Manchukuo. I thought, as does General McCoy, that the Japanese in the Manchukuo Government were mere puppets. But the experts attached to the Commission have gradually changed their views. These young Japanese in Manchuria seem at times to take pleasure [Page 161] in countering the Japanese plans. A measure of discretion has been given to these officials, and in minor matters they sometimes take the opposite standpoint to the Japanese diplomatic and even military ideas. To illustrate, Honjo gave permission for Wellington Koo to go into Manchukuo, and we thought that everything was fixed. We were mistaken. Ohashi said Koo could not enter. There were protracted negotiations between Secretary Haas and Ohashi, and Koo was finally permitted to enter on an exchange of letters. It was all very good acting or a real difference of opinion.
Then the Commission wanted to see General Ma. The Japanese Assessor with the Commission and the Army said that we could and arrangements were being made. The matter was taken up with Ohashi, who blew up and absolutely refused. The easier interpretation is that there was a real difference of opinion between the two Japanese groups. Then we wanted to take two Chinese, one a woman stenographer, from Mukden to Shanhaikwan. The Assessor and other Japanese assured us that there would be no objection. But Changchun refused because the inclusion of these two Chinese would exceed the number—five or six—of Chinese who were permitted to accompany the Commission. Yoshida and the other Japanese were obviously irritated at this refusal.
In my experience the Japanese are often irritated at the cantankerousness of the Manchukuo crowd of Japanese. They complain that the officials there are not amenable to suggestions from Tokyo. Zumoto told me that the officials in Tokyo do not think much of the Japanese in Manchukuo; that they are a poor lot and rebellious; that they must be cleaned out some day and better men put in. On a showdown the Japanese Government could put them out. In such case why does not the Japanese Army put them out now? Because the Japanese in Manchukuo represent to some extent the Fascist groups in Japan and ousting them would arouse opposition here. It is not worthwhile to discharge them.
The attitude of the foreign business men toward the new government was the most discouraging point which we encountered. The attitude of the American business men whom I saw seemed to depend upon whether or not they could make any money out of Manchukuo. It was a most unfortunate attitude. This is a moral issue.… American business men on the whole gave me the impression of having more sympathy with Manchukuo than any of the other groups which we interviewed.
Memorandum of Conversation Between the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) and Major General Frank R. McCoy
| Also present: | E. R. Dickover, Mr. Parsons. |
Gen. McCoy: I gave you a memorandum of the Commission’s first talk with Count Uchida, the Foreign Minister. There was no doubt in our minds as to Japan’s attitude after that first talk but the members of the Commission discussed the matter and decided to see Uchida again and be sure that we had everything perfectly clear.
At our second interview (July 14th) with Uchida, Lord Lytton said in substance: “We are not going to take up much of your time. All is perfectly clear as to the intention of the Japanese Government but we felt that as the League representatives we should approach you again, as things were not quite clear on two points. First is the use of the League machinery for keeping the peace. Both you and General Araki have told us that Japan had already fought two wars in Manchuria, and that still the results were not such as safety to Japan required. Now, the greatest powers in the world had fought the Great War, and the League and the machinery for keeping the peace were the big results. I feel that the Japanese Government should realize what it would mean to the governments of the world to have this machinery ignored; it would make the people lose faith in the League and the machinery. The Japanese Government has not used the machinery for the establishment of which it signed the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Japanese Government has stated throughout that it is fully conscious of its obligations under the various covenants and treaties, but still it went ahead in violation of what others thought were its obligations. Secondly, you say that China has broken the treaties with Japan, but now Japan is doing this very thing. Surely the other eight powers of the Nine-power Treaty should be consulted before you act (on the recognition question). Japan should not make any vital decision until it has fully considered this treaty. If every country operated on what it considered its vital interests without consulting the treaties, it would destroy everything which has been built up since the Great War.”
Lord Lytton was very effective. He talks in beautiful English and made a really moving statement.
Uchida fumbled badly in reply and simply repeated the standard patter of the government policy—sacred right of self-defense, Manchuria being Japan’s life line, and so on. Lord Lytton started to speak again, but the Foreign Minister broke in and said that it was [Page 163] no use arguing, that the Japanese Government was fully decided on its policy, and that it is going to live up to the treaties, but that it does not think that it is breaking the treaties.
Then I said—not to the Minister but to Lytton—that I fully concurred in his statements, but that I would like to develop another subject. The League Commission was not only trying to solve the present trouble, but was trying to look ahead in order to develop something which would prevent future wars in the Far East. I said that I thought that it would be helpful if he told Count Uchida what we considered would cause future wars and what would prevent them. Japan’s policy has not yet been successful in keeping peace in the Far East, and we are sure that Japan’s present policy will bring more wars. I said that I thought it was our duty to tell Uchida this.
Lord Lytton then asked Uchida if he would bring the two points to the attention of his colleagues (in the Cabinet). Uchida said that he would not bring them to the attention of his colleagues, as Japan’s policy was fully decided. What we really asked him to do was to delay matters for a while until things could settle down.
Ambassador: We have the impression here that in time there is likely to be a complete change in the sentiment toward the Army in Japan. Was that what you had in mind?
Gen. McCoy: Such a change in sentiment is likely according to precedents in this country. That is why we asked him to stave off the matter. Lytton also made it plain that the Commission was a creation of Japan—that they had asked for it. He pointed out that it would look bad if they committed themselves irrevocably before the Commission had made its report. Uchida also fumbled the reply to that.
Ambassador: Then there is not the shadow of a doubt in the minds of the Japanese officials regarding the tenor of the report of the Commission?
Gen. McCoy: No. But I have much sympathy with the Japanese. The Chinese … have not played the game with the Japanese, and Manchuria has not played the game. Of course, they were under pressure from Japan all the time, and they adopted any policy to stave them off. In recent years the Chinese have had a most irritating policy in Manchuria, which I can understand after hearing the stories of the minor things which happened. The Japanese with complaints, which eventually always had to be taken up diplomatically, were passed on from one person to another, from Mukden to Nanking and from Nanking to Mukden. It was enough to drive anyone crazy. It happened not only to the Japanese but to all foreigners. [Page 164] The Japanese had a good case but they went about it in the wrong way.
Ambassador: If the Japanese had presented their troubles in accordance with the provisions of the treaties, they would undoubtedly have received a sympathetic hearing. There is much genuine friendship for Japan in the United States.
Gen. McCoy: Exactly. But the Japanese claim that they had the same right to interfere in China that we have in South America, Cuba and Nicaragua. They are always bringing up the Nicaragua case. But the cases are not parallel. First, our interference took place some years ago. Times have changed. Then we were not committed not to do it—we were rather committed to do it. Also we were always asked by both sides to the dispute to intervene and we always got out when the job was finished. Japan was not asked to do what she did. There is no analogy.
Ambassador: Did they bring up this question officially?
Gen. McCoy: No. Unofficially, in our private conversations. The Japanese always say that we cannot understand the Far East. But they themselves do not understand the Orient. They certainly have not made a success in China. They say that they will develop Manchuria, bring peace and order and make it a good country in which to live. They point to what they have done in Kwantung. But conditions are different. Manchuria is unalterably Chinese. If Manchuria was isolated, cut off from the rest of Asia, Japan might do it, but lying cheek by jowl with 400,000,000 Chinese, the thing is impossible. Manchuria will be like Alsace-Lorraine, a festering sore. It will result in wars with China and Russia, unless the world can prevent them. Instances are now occurring which will lead to war. For example, we asked Uchida what Manchukuo consisted of. We also asked the same question of Manchukuo. At first they could not answer, but recently Uchida produced a map showing that Manchukuo consisted of the Four Eastern Provinces, including Jehol and Inner Mongolia. Now, the Chinese still hold Jehol. When they learn that Manchukuo claims it, it will make them rave. That alone will lead to war. Then the Japanese army garrisons down along the railway to Shanhaikwan are surrounded by Chinese volunteer armies, and the Japanese are very nervous over the situation. It will not take much of a pretext to make them move—probably on Tientsin and Peking, where Chang is. There are the seeds of infinite trouble.
Ambassador: In regard to this national movement in China. Is there any possibility of them getting together and building up a really efficient army?
Gen. McCoy: No, not for a long time. There is no confidence among the people. For instance, Young Chang’s troops are well [Page 165] turned out—they look better than the Japanese troops—but they have no confidence in their officers. They all expect their Generals to sell out at any time. An army like that cannot fight the Japanese. But the Chinese have tremendous powers of passive resistance. If the Japanese tried to invade China, they would run up against the same thing that invaders of Russia have always found. They could take the ports but could not go into the interior. China is still the world’s greatest puzzle. I have been studying it for thirty years. During that time I have noticed a considerable increase in the national spirit. It is sketchy but it is there. Johnson, the American Minister to China, thinks that it will take two or three hundred years for China to get together. I do not agree with him. I think that it is progressing faster than that.
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