793.94 Commission/518
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 9.]
Sir: I have the honor to state that in the course of a conversation with Sir Eric Drummond he again discussed the probable course of events during the consideration of the Sino-Japanese dispute by League bodies in November. What he had to say, however, would indicate that no important change is probable in the program outlined in my despatch No. 341 Political dated September 13, 1932,6 with the exception of those reported in my previous telegrams and more recently in my telegram No. 309 of October 28, 1932, 4 p.m.,6 which was to the effect that the convening of the Council to consider the Lytton Report will probably be deferred until November 21.7 [Page 323] The reason for this change was forecast in my despatch No. 379 Political dated October 20, 1932.
Sir Eric, however, during our conversation took occasion to express his opinion on two aspects of the Sino-Japanese question to which I desire to draw the Department’s attention. The substance of what Sir Eric had to say was as follows.
1. He first brought up the subject of the Nine-Power Treaty and the possibility of convening the parties thereto for a consideration of the Sino-Japanese situation. He said that he was of the opinion that the Nine-Power Treaty had much to recommend it as an instrument governing such a consideration, as it had been, of course, specially formulated with a view to conditions peculiar to the Far East. He also felt that the powers party to the Treaty (although a few of the smaller states had adhered) were from their world position and their Far Eastern interests better fitted to take up this matter than League bodies, including the Committee of Nineteen, which comprised in their membership so many states whose knowledge of China and Japan was relatively limited, who had no interests in the Pacific, and whose approach to the problem was inclined to be based more on theoretical than on practical considerations. He said that he had discussed these aspects of a possible application of the Nine-Power Treaty with the Secretary when he was in Geneva earlier in the year.
Sir Eric stated that he had been turning this matter over in his mind for some time, that he had some ideas as to possible steps to advance such a policy should it be decided on, but that he had as yet evolved no definite plan. He believed that to undertake such a change from the present manner of handling the situation would probably involve considerable delay in the final consideration of the Sino-Japanese affair; but he was not at all sure but that such delay would be advantageous. He envisaged the increasing difficulty Japan was finding in providing financial support for her Manchurian adventure. This he thought would in time bring about a necessary modification of Japan’s aggressive policy. He pictured the Japanese army as “not particularly enjoying itself” in Manchuria with a consequent loss of enthusiasm in Tokio military circles. With respect to the theory that a delay would give Japan still further opportunity to consolidate her position in Manchuria—a contention frequently brought forward—he said that he felt that the Japanese had consolidated themselves already insofar as was possible in that area and that in the light of what Japan had already done he did not see any particular disadvantage in a further delay.
I ventured to recall to Sir Eric that at the time the applicability of the Pact of Paris was discussed by the Council in October 1931, [Page 324] the question had been informally raised as to the inclusion in those discussions of the applicability of the Nine-Power Treaty and that at that time Germany (the only Great Power on the Council not a party to the Treaty) had objected to a consideration by the Council of a Treaty to which she was not a party. Sir Eric said that my recollection was correct; but that during his visit to Berlin (from which he has just returned) he took occasion to sound out the German Foreign Office in the matter of the Nine-Power Treaty and that the responsible Foreign Office officials appeared most favorable to its being invoked and were also inclined to view with favor a meeting of the powers thereto for the purpose discussed. Sir Eric further informed me that the German officials disclosed to him that they had been giving consideration to Germany’s adherence to the Nine-Power Treaty but that such action had been withheld as it had not appeared desirable to make such a move which would have presented the aspect of prejudging the case in advance of the formal consideration of the Lytton Report, and thus be construed as being directed specifically against Japan.
Sir Eric said that it would naturally be very helpful to him could he be informed of Washington’s opinion or policy in respect to this matter. Returning to the question of delay (whether concerned or not concerned with bringing forward the Nine-Power Treaty) Sir Eric said that he was wondering whether Washington’s opinion was the same as his to the effect that a delay in endeavoring to achieve a “final settlement” would not be disadvantageous. He did not see, however, how the Nine-Power Treaty could be implemented in a satisfactory manner without a delay of at least some months. Sir Eric then added that he would, of course, not favor a complete transfer of the question from the League to its consideration under the Treaty, as it would be quite impossible to work out anything satisfactory which would have the aspect of leaving the League to one side or present the picture of a failure of League efforts. It was precisely how the League might fit in to such a program which was the point upon which his thoughts were not yet crystallized.
2. Sir Eric then spoke of the advantages seen in strengthening the position of the Chinese National Government, a question which is also discussed in my despatch No. 392 Political dated October 29, 1932. He stated that a strengthening of the central government of China was in his view one of the most important factors in a settlement of the question. He felt, however, that to introduce the idea that a support of the present Chinese Government would also be a move against communism, would be highly impolitic, although it could, of course, be kept in mind that such an end would indirectly [Page 325] be served. He said that he supposed that support of the Chinese Government meant a financial support; and he was inclined to believe that with adequate funds at its disposal the Chinese National Government could accomplish a great deal toward strengthening its position in China and the restoration of order. He wondered, however, whether this could be accomplished without additional funds at the disposal of that Government. He said that it seemed evident that commercial advantages from a more orderly China would accrue to a number of states, although he had no definite ideas as to how these commercial interests might be brought into the problem of providing funds.
Incidentally Sir Eric also intimated that he had somewhat changed his opinion concerning Japan’s possible separation from the League which I reported in my despatch No. 341 Political of September 13, 1932. While no one could predict what might develop, he felt that Japan’s attitude in this respect was undergoing a change. He added that the idea of Japan’s being “expelled” from the League, although most certainly entertained in some League circles, was not receiving very serious consideration. In general he felt that Japan would be careful not to place herself in a position as a consequence of which she would be forced to withdraw.
In what he had to say Sir Eric is, I think doubtlessly somewhat preoccupied with relieving the League of certain embarrassments under which it is obviously suffering. At the same time, this does not, of course, necessarily mean that he is not entirely sincere in feeling that his suggestions are the best means of bringing the problem to a satisfactory conclusion. The Department may also wish to give consideration to what extent Sir Eric may be reflecting the British attitude.
Respectfully yours,