724.3415/2585: Telegram
The Minister in Paraguay (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 5—9:06 a.m.]
166. Your telegram No. 53, December 2, 6 p.m., received yesterday at noon. The main features of its proposal including the line suggested were sent tentatively about 2 weeks ago by Soler here. The President then cabled that on no account could the line be considered. Nevertheless I spent 2 hours with him last night in an endeavor to bring him to change his decision. I regret to say that his reaction to the proposal is one of deep resentment. He stated that it is of such a character that he cannot afford even to lay it before his Cabinet.
His position is as follows: the Ballivián-Vitriones line practically divides the disputed Chaco territory in halves and the proposed retirement of Paraguay to the river and Bolivia to the line leaves Paraguay entirely out of the Chaco and Bolivia in possession of approximately half of it. Moreover as the line runs through two of Bolivia’s chief points of concentration, namely, Fortínes Ballivián and Camacho the plan would leave Bolivia not only occupying half the Chaco but in a strategic position to occupy the whole of it when she has reformed her army under Kundt and is ready to declare the truce at an end on the ground that agreement cannot be reached as to the bases for an arbitration. Paraguay has mobilized at enormous expense and [Page 116] sacrifice and to leave Bolivia in military occupation of half the Chaco would necessitate Paraguay’s maintaining her forces indefinitely which she cannot afford to do. She has no faith in Bolivia’s honesty or intentions or in the ability of the neutral powers to restrain her under any agreement whatsoever from making another overt attack. Paraguay will not cease hostilities or make any agreement for an arbitration except under a specific guarantee and only guarantee which she at present believes would be effective and could be accepted is demilitarization of the entire Chaco and not merely the half of it which borders on Paraguay. In no case would she accept the neutralization of territory awarded to her in an arbitral court by a President of the United States.78
Apparently as a result of Soler’s cables this Government long ago, as reported in my telegram No. 46, July 9, 6 p.m., became convinced that four of the neutrals were lacking in interest and effort. Since that time the feeling has grown that they are merely figureheads, that the United States dictates the Commission’s actions and that she is so greatly under the influence of Bolivian propaganda that she cannot be fair. My conviction remains that this Government will not yield on the point of virtual demilitarization of the entire Chaco whatever the consequences. Since my telegram 145, November 4, 7 p.m., my efforts have been largely directed toward preventing Soler’s recall and the breaking off of the conversations. The matter was discussed yesterday in a somewhat stormy Cabinet meeting in which the President as usual opposed such action not however in the hope that the neutral powers would accomplish anything but on the ground that withdrawal would seem to indicate to the world that Paraguay did not desire a peaceful settlement.
The President tells me that confidential information from other South American capitals indicates that some 120 German officers mainly [from?] Argentina, Brazil and Chile have been selected by Kundt and will proceed to Bolivia at the end of the present rainy season.
- Decision of President Hayes in boundary dispute between Argentina and Paraguay; see Foreign Relations, 1878, p. 711.↩