825.01/145
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (White)
The Chilean Ambassador, Señor Cruchaga, called and said that in all the years he had been here and had been dealing with us he had never asked for recognition of a Chilean Government, but that he was going to do so now. He had not asked for recognition of the Dávila, Grove or Blanche Governments because he had not felt that they were legal. Now, however, there is a Government which is perfectly legal and constitutional. The Chilean Constitution provides that in the absence of the President members of his Cabinet in the order of precedence will succeed to the office as Vice President; that in the absence of Cabinet officers, the President of the Senate, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court will act as Vice President and within ten days call elections which are to be held within sixty days. He said that when Blanche resigned his whole Cabinet resigned with him; that the Senate and Chamber of Deputies had been dissolved, and that therefore it devolved upon the Chief Justice to succeed to office, and this he has done. This makes the Government perfectly legal and constitutional and Señor Cruchaga thought it should be recognized by us. He said that he had just received a letter from his brother-in-law, who is Minister for Foreign Affairs, enclosing a copy of a letter from Mr. Culbertson to the Minister for Foreign Affairs dated October 5 in which Mr. Culbertson said that he informally acknowledged Mr. Matte’s communication of October 4 informing him of recent political developments [Page 496] and stated that this letter of Matte’s had been transmitted to this Government. The letter was addressed to Sr. Don Jorge Matte, La Moneda, Santiago, without any title. Mr. Matte thought this very unusual and incorrect in view of the constitutionality of the Government and asked Mr. Cruchaga to take the matter up with me. Mr. Cruchaga read me Mr. Matte’s letter in the above sense. He said that he had not been instructed to ask for recognition but nevertheless he was doing so. (It is to be noted that Mr. Matte’s letter, while not specifically instructing Mr. Cruchaga to ask for recognition, certainly does so by implication through complaining of Mr. Culbertson’s personal letter).
The Ambassador said that recent regimes in Chile had come in as a result of a coup d’état. The first Dávila junta came in through a coup d’état; the Grove junta came in through a coup d’état; the second Dávila regime came in through a coup d’état, and the Blanche regime also came in through a coup d’état. I observed that the Blanche regime also went out of office by a coup d’état to which Señor Cruchaga at once assented. I said that if the Blanche Government went out by a coup d’état it seemed incontestable that the present regime came in by a coup d’état. The Ambassador was somewhat taken back by this and after a moment’s hesitation smiled and said yes, he supposed the present regime did come in by a coup d’état but that it was necessary to throw out the usurping unconstitutional Government by a coup d’état in order to bring in a constitutional Government.
I told the Ambassador that I wanted to make clear, at the outset, that we are not bargaining in any way whatsoever regarding recognition. We will be guided in this case, as we have in the past, notably in 1930 in the case of the Ibañez Government in Chile, the Uriburu Government in Argentina, the Vargas Government in Brazil, and the first Sánchez Cerro Government in Peru,56 by the usual principles of international law and practice; namely, we will want to be satisfied as to the stability of this regime and concerning its respect for its international obligations.
On the question of stability, I pointed out that from the time Montero was overthrown on June 4 to the taking over of the Government by the present regime on October 4, that is to say in a period of four months, there had been five Governments in Chile. This does not speak well for the stability of conditions in Chile. I asked the Ambassador how we could know that the present regime would stay in office any [Page 497] longer than the ones which have recently preceded it. The Ambassador said that he was unable to give me an answer to that question; that of course there is no way of being certain on this point. He said, however, that the people of the country are tired of revolutions and military movements and that they are unanimously behind the present Government, and that the army and navy are also solidly supporting it. All want to get back to a civilian, constitutional Government. I asked what evidence there is that the authorities throughout the country, such as the Intendentes of the various provinces, et cetera, are obeying the instructions of this Government and supporting it; that the people as a whole acquiesce in it, and that there are no subversive movements under way against it or armed opposition to it.
As to the question of respect for international obligations I said that it was usual to get such a statement from a Government coming into office through a coup d’état as the present Government certainly did. It came into office by virtue of an uprising of the military authorities at Antofagasta, which caused the overthrow of the Blanche Government. The first Dávila junta and the succeeding ones had made very categoric statements as to the policy they would pursue. These statements were announced by a socialistic regime based on principles contrary to those usual in the relations of one state to another. It had therefore been necessary for us to go very slowly in granting recognition to those Governments to see just what they intended to do in the way of respect for their international obligations, including the treatment of foreigners resident or doing business in their territory. The present regime has made no statement on this subject and, in view of the many regimes which have been in office and the position they have taken, I told him that I thought we would want to know exactly what the intentions of this regime are in the matter. I said that if this Government considers itself to be the legitimate successor of the last constitutional Government it undoubtedly does not hold the same views as the recent regimes and would repudiate their policies. In the absence of any statement to this effect, however, we can not know that they are not just carrying on the policy of their immediate predecessors in office.
The Ambassador said that he was not making any inquiry of me but was merely asking himself questions which he did not expect me to answer. It occurred to him that should the army and the navy make statements supporting the present Government, as well as the Intendentes throughout the country,—I interrupted the Ambassador to say again that we were not bargaining regarding recognition and that I was not laying down any conditions to be fulfilled for us to consider that there is stability in Chile and that the present regime [Page 498] is acquiesced in by the majority of the people. I said that I would not consider it proper for us to do so. On the question of stability we would be guided by the reports from our Embassy in Santiago. However, we do want to know where we stand regarding Chile’s respect for her international obligations and American property interests in Chile. The history of the last few months in Chile makes this most necessary as he must recognize. The Ambassador said that he did recognize this and that he would take the matter up with his brother-in-law to see what could be done.
The Ambassador hoped that if satisfactory assurances could be given we would recognize promptly. I told him that I wanted to be sure he understood our position and would not be misled or would not mislead his people in Chile regarding anything I might say: The present Government has only been in office eight days and that is a very short time in which to judge stability. I also pointed out that elections are called for on the thirtieth of this month and that the way in which these are conducted will of course have considerable bearing on the question of stability. If the people acquiesce in this Government and go to the polls, that speaks for itself. If all the parties are satisfied and the defeated candidates feel that they are fairly treated and acquiesce in the result of the elections, that is still further evidence of stability and an advance toward a constitutional Government. Mr. Cruchaga said that he could understand our wanting to wait for the elections before recognizing his Government but he hoped that we would not wait until the installation of the new Government in December before doing so. I told him that everything depended on the circumstances and developments and that anything I said should not be interpreted to mean that we were definitely determined not to recognize the new Government until after the elections—we might possibly recognize it before the elections; we might recognize it after the elections but before the installation of the new Government, or we might wait until after that event.
The Ambassador again referred to Ambassador Culbertson’s letter of October fifth and said that it had caused a good deal of surprise to the present Chilean regime which considers itself a constitutional Government. They thought his personal and informal letter was most unusual in the circumstances. I told the Ambassador that I could not agree with him; I said I did not see anything else that Ambassador Culbertson could have done. I thought his letter was perfectly correct under the circumstances. There has been a series of Governments in Chile over the last few months which we have not been able to recognize. I said I could understand the present authorities in Chile desiring to be considered as constitutional but that he [Page 499] must look at it from the point of view of foreign Governments also and in the light of what has taken place in Chile in the last few months. In view of this it was eminently proper for Ambassador Culbertson, when the new Government came in as a result of a coup d’état, to send a personal note of acknowledgment to Mr. Matte and to say that he was transmitting Mr. Matte’s note to this Government. To send a formal acknowledgment might be considered as recognition of the new regime, which it was naturally Mr. Culbertson’s wish not to do until he was so instructed by this Government. The Ambassador then said that what he had told me regarding this letter was a purely personal and private matter which he had discussed with me as an individual and not as Assistant Secretary of State, and that he did not wish to pursue it any further.
After talking with Mr. E. C. Wilson, I called up Ambassador Cruchaga and, with reference to our conversation earlier this afternoon, told him that since our talk I had had brought to my attention a circumstance which I wanted to call to his attention. He had told me that the present regime in Chile considers itself to be a constitutional Government because the Chief Justice had succeeded, in the absence of a President, to the office of Vice President. Mr. Cruchaga had said that the regimes in office in the last four months had been unconstitutional and I wanted to point out that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court had held the same view and had resigned because he considered the Government to be unconstitutional, and that the Chief Justice who had now succeeded to office as Vice President was appointed Chief Justice by Señor Dávila, the head of an unconstitutional regime. I asked how Señor Oyanedel could under these circumstances be considered as the constitutional successor or the constitutional President. I said that the Constitution provides for the Minister of the Interior as the ranking Cabinet officer to succeed also and that when Señor Dávila went out of office the second time through a coup d’état his Minister of the Interior, General Blanche, had succeeded. I said that that regime might also have alleged that it was a constitutional one but no such attempt had been made by it. I asked Mr. Cruchaga if he had any light to throw on the situation. He said that this had not occurred to him before but it brought up a “very interesting point” and one which he had not yet considered but which he would think over.
- See sections entitled “Revolution in Chile,” Foreign Relations, 1931, vol. i, pp. 901 ff.; “Revolution in Argentina,” ibid., 1930, vol. i, pp. 378 ff.; “Revolution in Brazil,” ibid., pp. 432 ff.; and “Revolution in Peru,” ibid., vol. iii, pp. 720 ff.↩