711.00/814
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State
The very pertinent remarks which you made yesterday with regard to the mystery which shrouds what is passing in Russia these days, on the complete uncertainty of what course Russian policy may take, on the difficulty there in getting in touch with those really in control, as well as on the importance which all this mystery and uncertainty may have on major developments at this critical time, were such as to crystallize my own thoughts which have been along this line.
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It seems that we are making it clear that we are increasing our armaments in the measure necessary to protect ourselves and our rights and interests in a disordered world in which they are so definitely threatened. I think we must go further and explore certain situations with which we may be faced in case it should come to armed conflict which can no longer be held as out of the question no matter how much we wish to avoid it. The immediate point which I wish to make is that Soviet Russia is a very important factor in the situation. Although we have a very competent Chargé d’Affaires2 there and a very considerable establishment, we are, through no fault of their own but because of known conditions there, not receiving any real information concerning the situation in that country nor concerning its present or probable future policy. Our officers have only the most inadequate and ineffective contact with the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office seems to have no influence on policy and apparently little direct touch with those who are making policy. While this is true in the other dictatorships as well as in Russia, it is more true there. We at least know what the objectives and in a measure the [Page 505] policies of Berlin and Rome are. We do not know this of Moscow. The English have sent Halifax to Berlin to endeavor to determine more definitely German objectives and policy when we well know what they are. No similar effort seems to have been made by England or France to establish this direct contact or to exchange information with Stalin and his immediate associates in Russia. As in the other dictatorships these are the only ones who can speak with authority.
As in my opinion we are vitally concerned, I think it is of first importance that someone for our Government should have the opportunity of speaking of these fundamental things with Stalin and others. We know how ignorant they are of what is really happening in the world just as we are of what is taking place in Russia. We know that nothing we say here or elsewhere to a Soviet Ambassador gets to the fountain head except in a most attenuated form. All this it seems to me is of increasingly primary importance. I venture to suggest that someone should go for us to Russia, quietly and unostentatiously, who would under very specific instructions from the President and the Secretary get in touch with Stalin and his immediate associates. On account of the language difficulty on both sides, it would be important that one of our most competent officers in Russian be present no matter what interpreter or intermediary may be present on the Russian side. The presence of such a competent officer in Russian on our side is absolutely essential if such a conference should have value. I do not venture here to take up what we might say but I do wish to go on record as believing that we should seriously consider a step in this direction now as a part of that initiative and formulation of clear definite policy which I think we should not delay.
While we know so little of Russia—it is dangerous to do any thinking that does not take fully into account the force that may be there and how it may be used. G. S. M.
- Loy W. Henderson.↩