Office of the Historian

500.A15A4 General Committee/346: Telegram

The American Delegate (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, May 10, 1933—9 a.m.
[Received May 10—9 a.m.]

634. My 633, May 9, 6 p.m. Yesterday afternoon and evening Nadolny called on Eden who told me late last night the following:

1.
Nadolny took the position that what Germany was asked to do in effectives was a further concession over and above the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and that therefore Germany had to have “compensation” in the matter of material over and above what was offered in the British plan.
2.
As to material Nadolny insists that Germany should have not only all types permitted to other powers but that they should realize, by each eloned [by echeloned] reduction on the part of the other powers and each eloned [and echeloned] advances on the part of Germany, equality in quantity of material with the major powers by the termination of the convention. For instance, Germany, according [Page 134] to Nadolny, should have the right to build 155 mm. guns thus at the end of the convention possessing new guns of this caliber while all others are old. The airplane figures should reach equality at the end of the period of the convention.
3.
As far as the navy is concerned Nadolny’s demands were not so far reaching since he stated that they regarded the navy chapter of the British plan as a mere stopgap until the naval conference of 1935.
4.
Eden definitely refused to discuss such a proposal or to transmit it to the French or other members of the Conference and told him flatly that it was unacceptable.
5.
Eden and I do not yet know whether this attitude of Nadolny’s is a first step in a clumsy endeavor to bargain or whether it represents a position on which Germany will finally stand.
6.
Scarcely had Eden reached home from my house when another telephone call to Eden came from Nadolny requesting an interview this morning. I shall keep you informed during the day.
7.
This matter is ultra confidential. Eden has told no one but me. We feel that it is of the first importance to ascertain just what are Germany’s real Intentions and that this should be explored as fully as possible before the French have knowledge of Nadolny’s present attitude.

Davis advised.

Wilson