500.A15A4 General Committee/629: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:40 p.m.]
109. My 104, September 22, 8 p.m.60 On Tuesday the Head of the Government talked separately with the British and French Ambassadors. On yesterday I talked to each of them about their conversations.
Signor Mussolini told the British Ambassador61 he considered most serious the situation developed as a result of the German attitude vis-à-vis the disarmament proposals. He said it was the more serious because it was necessary to deal with those whom he characterized as a dreamer in the person of Hitler and a former inmate of a lunatic asylum in the person of Goering; that they were quite irresponsible; that they could not be scared or bluffed into acquiescence because of their abnormal mentality nor could they be importuned into acceptance of the specific conditions because they lacked any fear of consequences. Mussolini is very much concerned over the impasse which he has foreseen and in seeking a way out continues to propose some compromise for a practicable solution which specifically would allow Germany to have observation airplanes and antiaircraft guns in proportional quantities together with rifles and side arms all manufactured of course under inspection of a commission. In this way a situation could be avoided which Mussolini considers might soon develop into an outbreak of hostilities the extent of which can not be foretold though there is no present prospect that either the British or Italians would be drawn in. The Chief of the Government is satisfied that Germany will proceed to arm with or without permission and that in the latter case France and Poland will act even though the former has not agreed with Italy on sanctions to be applied.
[Page 254]The British Ambassador stated that the French had much information from Jewish exile sources to the effect that Germany had been manufacturing many guns and other armament and that the British Government felt it would take Poland at least 2 months of heavy fighting to reach Berlin in the face of the present German equipment.
A few hours later I talked with the French Ambassador.62 As regards sanctions the French Ambassador said that Italy and France were practically agreed but not definitely so and that neither of them quite agreed yet with the British on that point. He also said that on the point of the trial period the position of Mussolini was that the French proposal was too favorable to Germany in that while it denied to Germany any rights for real armament during the first 4-year period at the end of that period it permitted Germany to arm up to the maximum scale; whereas France agreed to dispose of her excess armament at the end of that period. Mussolini felt that Germany should be held in greater control and that it would be a mistake for the other governments to agree now to dispense with all of their superior armament at the end of 4 years; that it would be very much more practical to allow Germany some privileges as of the present but under strict supervision and see how she acted and at the end of the 4-year period it could be better judged whether Germany was to be trusted to the extent that she might have additional armament and that then the other governments could decide further whether it would be wise to dispense with their superior weapons.
The French Ambassador also said that Mussolini said Germany would not go to war; that this generation had made one war and would not bring on another; that the Germans were more afraid of France than the French were of Germany; and that Hitler would certainly remain in power because a government which was so organized and equipped could not be overthrown by ordinary political movements. It appears that the British and French Ambassadors are not in accord in their report of their conversations with Mussolini on this particular point.
I today saw the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs63 by appointment. He said that the Italian Government viewed the present moment as one of very great delicacy and that they could only look to the future with considerable fear if Germany persisted in her demands; that the Italian Ambassador at Berlin64 had an engagement today with Hitler himself and would then present to the German authorities the Italian thought that England, France, and Italy as well, could not accept the German position. He emphasized the [Page 255] fact that Italy was just as opposed to the material armament of Germany as either the governments of France or Great Britain. However he said that they thought Germany ought to have some measure of armament and that the Germans were irreconcilable not only as regards the amount of armament desired but as regards the length of time to elapse before beginning to arm. Germany will not agree to the two periods of 4 years each as proposed under the present modification of the MacDonald plan but insists upon one period of 5 years and to the right in principle to equality at the beginning of that 5-year period. Suvich also said that the French were satisfied that Germany could not recede from her position because Germany already had manufactured arms and that it might be very embarrassing for her to accept a commission of inspection and to have that commission find already existing in Germany armor [arms?] in greater quantity than provided by her agreements. He also said that the Italian Government did not believe that Germany had a great amount of armament even though they felt that it was an excess of the quantity allowed and that Germany had made preparations in laboratories for other kinds of warfare.
Suvich said he thought there was no hope of agreement on next Monday on which day the General Conference is to convene and that he thought it a mistake to proceed with the General Conference unless there was some possibility of agreement. Consequently the Italian Government were inclined to the belief that it would be better to postpone the meeting of the General Conference for another month during which time conversations could be held which might lead to an agreement. He said that he was an optimist and that he still hoped that they would be able to get Germany to accept some modification to which the others might be induced to agree but that he must confess that the present moment was very dark.
Cipher mailed Davis, Geneva.