Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, General, Volume I

500.A15A4/1817: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Marriner) to the Secretary of State

Paris, April 16, 1933—8 p.m.
[Received April 18—8:40 a.m.³¹]

163. From Norman Davis. With reference to our conversations in Washington relative to the so-called question of security, I have, after considerable thought and extensive discussions with my associates here, reached definite conclusions as to the position we should take but obviously I have not been able to consult with the delegates in the United States.

As you are aware the primary obstacle to real progress in disarmament has been the inability to agree upon measures of security. For years France has insisted that she cannot afford to effect any substantial reduction in her armaments and thus diminish the security which her armaments now furnish without commitments from other powers, and particularly England and the United States, to assist her in case of attack. This we have definitely refused to consider and they now accept the fact that we will make no such commitment. Accordingly thought in Europe has now evolved to the extent of formulating a plan whereby,

(a), the European states would agree upon measures for mutual assistance to a state in Europe which may be the victim of an aggressor and,

(b), non-European states would undertake,

1, to confer in the case of a violation or threat of violation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact,³²

2, to determine if possible in such consultation what state is the aggressor and,

3, in the event that an aggressor is found not to interfere with the collective action which the European states may elect to apply against the aggressor.

In other words such an agreement for us would mean that we would merely codify the implications of the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact and the precedents established under it. Aside from any contractual obligation it is our moral duty and in our interests to confer with a view of preserving peace and if, as a result of an investigation of a breach of peace, we should concur in the judgment that a particular power has been the aggressor we could not without stultifying ourselves invoke the rights of neutrality so as to interfere with collective action which might be taken against such power by other nations.

In dealing with this question of security it is becoming increasingly evident that it is especially European or regional since the nations in Europe are primarily concerned and the nations outside deeply but less directly concerned. With regard to a violation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact in any part of the world outside Europe it is evident that no collective punitive action will be taken without the concurrence of the United States and in fact the others will wait for our lead. This as has been demonstrated is true whether or not we instigate or follow a decision of the Council of the League of Nations.

Part I of the MacDonald disarmament plan was intended to cover the security phase of the problem; it is so worded as to contain a specific obligation to confer but a rather indefinite commitment as to the purposes of such consultation and the action which might be determined upon as a result thereof. It is, however, loosely drafted and so indefinite in its implications as to lead to misunderstanding and greater risks than if we carefully restrict and define our obligations. Furthermore we do not believe the French will accept it. The French have always maintained that as far as they are concerned the measure of disarmament will be in direct ratio to the measure of security. It is theoretically possible, therefore, to write additional article of very restricted objectives embodying only an agreement to consult in the part dealing with security but the very limited scope of the treaty would make it totally inacceptable to Germany. Thus it would appear to be in our own interest to assist in bringing about a condition in which a treaty is possible for continental Europe and which can bring a real measure of appeasement. Especially is this true if as I believe the maximum obligation we would assume would be merely that of non-interference in given circumstances.

In my opinion the machinery which might be set up for collective punitive action or for mutual assistance in the event of the outbreak of war in Europe would probably break down if such punitive action should be directed against any major power and the courageous course would be to lay more emphasis on measures to prevent war and particularly to increase the power of defence and weaken that of offense rather than to rely so much on punitive measures to be taken against a nation that starts a war. One of the principles on which we are constantly insisting and which is daily gaining ground is that the best security would be to diminish the power of attack and augment the power of defense. While the soundness of this principle is recognized those states which are potentially weaker than their neighbors in industrial resources and population claim that the adoption of the principle must be accompanied with strict supervision of the neighbors’ activities and above all by a threat of collective action which would deter the neighbor from a violation of his obligations. We should, however, recognize that if the European powers can get any comfort through setting up the machinery for collective action limited to the Continent there is no sound reason why we should stand in the way so long as we can cooperate without becoming involved ourselves and furthermore diminish the probability of a European war or of our being drawn into it.

French policy is, of course, dictated primarily by fear of Germany. For years they were persuaded that they could keep Germany down and dominate Europe by their own force and that of their alliances. For the past year, however, especially since their last elections, their leaders have come to a realization that the French people are becoming restive under the burden of armaments and that neither their armaments nor their alliances give them adequate permanent security and that indeed they are becoming in themselves a source of resentment, uneasiness and political instability. Although still under the fear of Germany, a fear the more acute because of the war state of mind and the recent developments in that country, French leaders are casting about for a way to reduce their armaments, lessen the liabilities of their alliances by giving some appeasement to Germany and, at the same time, build up machinery for the organization of peace and for collective action if Germany runs amuck. Not the least of the difficulties of the French Government in this situation is the problem of allaying the apprehensions of the French people. If they can tell them that effective steps have been taken for the organization of peace in Europe the French people may be satisfied that they can safely accept substantial measures of disarmament by progressive stages. To this end the policy which I am suggesting will be a valuable contribution.

I recognize that article 16 of the League Covenant³³ purports to provide for collective punitive action where member states are involved in an act of aggression and that it might be urged that we should adopt the same policy of non-insistence upon neutral rights if any collective action is taken under article 16 in parts of the world other than continental Europe. This, however, is a theoretical rather than a practical objection to the policy I have outlined. As I have suggested no collective action will be taken outside of continental Europe unless we are in agreement. The crux of the question we have before us is the maintenance of European peace and it is only here that a really sincere effort is being made to provide for the organization of peace and collective action. As a practical matter I see no reason why we should not limit our undertaking to non-interference with collective action resulting from a continental European agreement assuming, of course, that we concur as to the party responsible for the breach of the peace and at the same time retain complete freedom of action in any situations arising elsewhere.

I have not attempted to put our views in the form of a draft for a treaty but have set forth our ideas extensively in a separate cable, 164, April 16, 9 p.m.,³⁴ the questions really boil down to this.

1. Assuming a general disarmament treaty which represents a substantial achievement are we prepared in connection therewith to agree to consult in case of a threat to the peace.

2. Assuming that in connection with such a disarmament treaty the continental European powers agree among themselves upon special measures for maintaining or guaranteeing peace in continental Europe and for determining and taking collective action against a Continental state responsible for a breach of peace (or of the Briand-Kellogg Pact) are we prepared to agree to refrain from any action, and to withhold protection from our citizens if engaged in “action, which would tend to defeat the collective action which the European states may have decided upon; such action on our part to be predicated upon our independent decision that the state in question has in fact been responsible for the breach of the peace?

Since part I of the British plan regarding security will be the first question brought up in Geneva on the reconvening of the Conference it is necessary for my guidance to know if the President and you concur in principle to the adoption of such a policy as that outlined and I shall appreciate as early a reply as possible. If you concur in such a general policy I feel that we should consider most carefully when and how it is best to make our position known, determining whether it should be announced at the appropriate time by the President or be held back and disclosed only in the course of our proceedings in such a way as to be used to the best advantage in our negotiations or whether to adopt a combination of both. In any case until definite procedure is decided upon it is important that the effect should not be weakened by premature disclosure. [Davis.]

Marriner

31. Telegram in seven sections.
32. Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signeil at Paris, August 27, 1928, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.
33. Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1923, vol. iii, p. 3336.
34. Infra.