893.6363 Manchuria/51
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 24.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to a despatch, No. 921, addressed to the Department under date of August 6th by Ambassador Grew from Tokyo80 on the subject of the oil monopoly in “Manchukuo”.81
I desire specifically to comment upon the attitude of the British Ambassador to Japan on the question of recognition of “Manchukuo”. There is of course a good deal of common sense in the British Ambassador’s attitude, for there can be no doubt that the Japanese Government can make it very uncomfortable for American and British merchants in “Manchukuo” unless the United States and British Governments meet Japanese wishes in regard to that area. The extent to which the Japanese, and “Manchukuo” as a protégé of the Japanese Government, can carry this attitude is evidenced by what is going on in connection with the proposed establishment of a sales monopoly for kerosene oil in Manchuria. As I stated in my telegram No. 354 of August 11, 12 noon,82 on this subject, the attitude of the Japanese Government in refusing to intervene with its protégé on behalf of the rights of American citizens leaves the American citizen no recourse but to deal directly with the “Manchukuo” Government and salvage as much as he can from the wreckage which the proposed monopoly will make of his business in Manchuria.
The methods which the Japanese Government and its protégé, the “Manchukuo” Government, are prepared to use are amply illustrated by the way in which they are now dealing with Soviet interests in North Manchuria.
It is interesting to recall that when Japanese forces were approaching the Nonni River in the winter of 1931–32 it appears to have been assumed by every one that the Japanese Government had assured the Soviet Government that Soviet rights in North Manchuria would be [Page 259] respected. The status of Soviet Russia in North Manchuria to-day contrasts greatly with its status prior to 1930 or 31, and it is generally believed that the present situation is due to the fact that the Japanese Government, which has usurped the responsibility of protecting life and property in Manchuria, has failed or been unwilling to give complete protection to Soviet Russian life or property in that area. It seems to me that American merchants residing and doing business in Manchuria may well examine the fate of Soviet Russian interests in North Manchuria if they wish to discover the length to which the Japanese and “Manchukuo” may be prepared to carry things.
As regards the question of recognition, de facto or de jure, it seems to me that the present is no time to take any overt steps in either direction. There is no doubt in my mind that sooner or later the Government will have to take some cognizance of the existence of “Manchukuo”, just as they have taken cognizance of the existence of Egypt. But for the present it seems to me that it is sufficient that” American merchants be encouraged to take such action as they can in negotiating directly with the “Manchukuo” authorities, and that our consular representatives in Manchuria continue to have unofficial relations with the “Manchukuo” authorities in bringing to the attention of those authorities any matter relating to American citizens and their trade and their rights that needs protection. It is doubtful whether American consular authorities, in so bringing these matters to the attention of the local authorities, may appeal to the old treaties with China, but it is believed that under the general rights guaranteed to all peoples under international law it should be possible for the consular authorities to bespeak the protection and the care of American lives and property.
It does not seem to me that at the present time the question of formal recognition, de facto or de jure, arises. I have always been of the opinion that the obvious violation of the Nine-Power Treaty regarding principles and policies relating to China, and the violation of the Kellogg Pact,83 effected by Japan’s action in Manchuria in September, 1931, made it necessary for us as parties to these agreements to speak out in condemnation of that action. I have been of the opinion that to have remained quiet under the circumstances would have been an act of national cowardice. We could have done no less than we did do, and what we did leaves unimpaired our position in regard to the whole status of Manchuria and the status of the treaties involved.
I am of the opinion that the Nine-Power Treaty regarding principles and policies in China was an essential part of the agreements [Page 260] which were arrived at at the Washington Conference. Without this agreement and the settlements which attended it at the Conference, it is unlikely that there could have been any agreement in regard to reduction of naval armaments, the goal which every one desired. To my mind, it therefore follows that a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty is a violation of all the agreements, or, to put it another way: if the Nine-Power Treaty, which was a settlement of present and future relations among the powers in matters respecting China, is to be abandoned or revised, then such abandonment or such revision must be considered in connection with abandonment or revision of the naval treaty. The two things should be considered together. It is important to the United States that they be considered together, for we consented to a reduction of our navy and to an abandonment of our recognized right to build and maintain strong naval bases in the Philippines only after we had obtained agreement among the powers regarding the open door in China and the abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
It has always been my conviction that under the above circumstances we could not have done otherwise than to refuse to recognize the results which Japan attained by violation of the Nine-Power Treaty. Our position in this matter was necessary if for no other purpose than to maintain our record clear until the time comes for a new conference, either in 1936, or, if there is to be another conflict in Asia, at the end of that conflict, when all of these questions will have to be thrashed out once more and we can go into that conference with our position well known to every one.
For these reasons I am of the opinion that no change has occurred in the situation in Manchuria which would warrant our giving up our position and according recognition to the “Manchukuo” Government.
Respectfully yours,