761.94/781
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 8.]
Sir:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The consensus among foreign observers in Moscow is that the negotiations have not been inspired by transparent sincerity on either side; have, indeed, been “Asiatic”. The Soviet expression of willingness in May 1933 to dispose of its share of the Chinese Eastern Railway was presumably dictated by tactical considerations; by the desire to appease a menacing situation and to establish moral superiority vis-à-vis Japan.
[Page 262]The fact that the Japanese Government permitted the negotiations to be interrupted, when the discrepancy in the price had become relatively so small, is generally attributed to Japanese conviction that the railroad has been largely deprived of any real value by competitive railway construction; by the cynical belief that ladders are not necessary for ripe plums.
In respect of the potentialities of the present situation, I can only report my entire disbelief in any possibility, under present circumstances, that the U. S. S. R. would intervene in Manchuria in defence of the Chinese Eastern Railway by force of arms.
However prepared the Red Army may be to defend the Maritime Provinces from Japanese conquest, it would seem highly improbable that the Soviet Government would resort to war in connection with the present dispute. The Soviet Government, it may be recalled, has previously characterized the Chinese Eastern Railway as an imperial and capitalistic project in violation of Chinese sovereignty. The value of the railway has depreciated enormously, particularly its eastern branch. That Russia has not altogether abandoned the hope of eventually reestablishing Soviet influence in Manchuria may perhaps be assumed; and, in any attempt to regain her position there, the maintenance of rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway, even though inchoate, might be tactically advantageous, but certainly not worth the risk of war. Therefore, it is perhaps safe to surmise that Soviet readiness to make concessions in respect of the conditions of sale has been inspired largely by the desire to avoid a conflict with Japan at the present time, and, too, by realities as they affect the railroad.
The sincerity of the present Soviet policy of peace is based, of course, on motives of self interest. A conflict in the east would create dangers from the west; and the proposed Eastern Locarno is not yet in existence. Moreover, war, whether it ended in victory or defeat, would doubtlessly result in domestic political repercussions which the Kremlin would perhaps prefer to avoid. Last but not least, Soviet energy is centered chiefly in completing the Herculean task of agricultural collectivization and in carrying through the second Five Year Plan.
However, the tenor of the press and the text of the note of protest of August 22 indicate a stiffened policy towards Japan; a change which is not only designed to have an effect on the Japanese mind but also to arouse public opinion in the Soviet Union where only recently the term “fatherland”, the ideal of patriotism, and the other attributes of nationalism have appeared for the first time since the revolution.
As for Japanese intentions, I am unable to report anything new. The Soviet attitude, as observed in Moscow, would seem to indicate that there is no apprehension of Japanese aggression against the Soviet [Page 263] Union in the near future; hope is felt that the note should clarify the situation and that negotiations may shortly be renewed—perhaps this time with success.
Since writing the foregoing, a member of my staff has had occasion to see both Mr. Krestinsky,84 who, in the absence of Mr. Litvinov, is in chargé of the Narkomindel, and Mr. Mikhailski, an outstanding Soviet authority on foreign affairs.
Mr. Krestinsky declared that the note of August 22 had, of course, “aggravated” relations with Japan. He felt that it was impossible as yet to foresee the outcome. The Soviet Government had already noted with some concern that further arrests had been made. Perhaps, though, there had not been time since the delivery of the note for the Japanese to alter their policy in Manchuria. However, there was no danger of hostilities. He did not, however, convey the impression of being altogether sure that there might not be a coup de main against the railway.
Mr. Mikhailski described the note as the most energetic step since the publication by the Soviet Government of the alleged secret documents. Then, the Japanese became far less recalcitrant; it was hoped that the present note of protest would have an equally salutary effect. In any event, the note should provoke a “show down”.
Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy
- Nikolai Krestinsky, Soviet First Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.↩