793.94/6793
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 6.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 2972 of September 13, 1934,95 and previous despatches with regard to Japanese policy toward China and to comment on the seeming inability of the Japanese authorities to initiate and sustain any given policy in their relations with this country.
As the Department knows, Japanese policy with regard to China has vacillated during the past several decades between an extreme of conciliation as exemplified by the so-called Shidehara policy and an extreme of aggression as evidenced by the so-called Twenty-one Demands of 1915 and the seizure of Manchuria in 1931. These vacillations have been the outcome of differing points of view among the authorities in Japan with regard to the method of solving Japan’s population and economic problems. The one view, which has had as its principal supporters Japanese militarists, regards political domination of China in part or in entirety as the solution; the other, which has had as its principal supporters certain modern-minded liberals, sees friendship with China as the solution. The liberals have believed that a friendly China would result for Japan in the opening up of sources of supply of raw materials and the development of markets for Japanese manufactures and that these would make possible the industrialization of Japan to a degree which would solve the problems of population and economy. The militaristic group, still influenced by European theories of the latter part of the 19th century, has believed that these problems could best be solved by empire.
Following the Twenty-one Demands and the immediate years thereafter which were characterized by efforts to ensnare the Chinese through unsound loans, the Japanese military went into an eclipse for a period and liberal civilian statesmen came into prominence. A policy of friendship for China was followed. This failed however to rouse sufficiently reciprocal friendliness on the part of the Chinese, in part because this policy of friendship had characteristics of the aggressive policy. The Chinese failed to realize the wisdom of being satisfied with a part of what they wanted from Japan; so, holding out for all, the Chinese lost the four northeastern provinces.
Although one has sympathy for China, in the long view (and the Chinese think in decades and centuries instead of in years as do the [Page 276] Japanese), it seems inevitable that China will eventually become a great nation, though decades may pass before that is accomplished. The real tragedy, however, is Japan. Rising in a few decades from feudalism to a position of first rank among the nations, Japan now seems embarked definitely on a course which can end—though it may be decades hence—in a decline into unimportance. Brought to astonishing heights by its rapid adoption of Western methods, it has begun a descent from those heights by a continued employment of those methods which within a few years of their adoption had become obsolete.
It is, in my opinion, essential that Japan, if she is to continue to be a great power, must solve satisfactorily her relations with China in order to solve her own problems of population and economy. These relations can be solved satisfactorily only through gaining the friendship of China. It is possible that, given opportunity for a few more years, the liberals who were in power in Japan prior to the Manchurian incident might have brought about a situation through which Japan would have found in China great sources of materials for her factories and great markets for the produce of her factories, thereby industrializing Japan to the point of solving her population and economic problems. Japan, after all, had little to lose by adhering to a policy of trying to be friends with China. There was no military expense involved; anti-Japanese feeling in China would have gradually died away, notwithstanding temporary setbacks because of the inability of the Chinese to treat with any country with consistency and honesty. Until September, 1931, Japan had a chance to attain the role of China’s paramount buyer and seller, a position which no other power could have assailed because of geographical proximity.
The Japanese military, or a part of them, for various reasons already well-known, decided that a policy of conciliation had too many disadvantages, both for Japan and for themselves. So they began on September 18, 1931, an action which resulted in the wresting from China of the four northeastern provinces.
This seizure was completed in the spring of 1933. Since that time there have been indications that the pendulum was swinging again, this time away from military aggression toward a kind of conciliation. It appeared that some of the Japanese in authority were in favor of establishing a policy through which their ends in China (limited on the surface at least to economic penetration) would be gained by “diplomacy”. This was said to be a policy of support of General Chiang Kai-shek (or the National Government), as a result of which China would achieve greater unity and increased stability and Japan would obtain greater markets and increased sources of raw materials. [Page 277] The resignation of General Araki from the post of Minister of War and the appointment of Mr. Hirota as Minister for Foreign Affairs were two of the developments which were regarded as earnests of change in the direction of an enlightened policy, although it seemed inevitable that the new policy must fall far short of that policy which was followed by Shidehara. The successful establishment of such a policy depended (1) on Chinese acquiescence and (2) on the conviction of the reactionary Japanese elements that such a policy would succeed and would be best for Japan’s interests. The institution on July 1, 1934, of through traffic on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway without embarrassment to the National Government from any part of China indicated that the first point had, for the time being at least, been attained. That the second point may not have been attained is indicated by the recent report (my despatch No. 2972 of September 13, 1934) that the military have succeeded in obtaining the acceptance of the Japanese authorities of a policy of dealing regionally with China and of non-support of General Chiang Kai-shek outside of the Yangtze Valley.
Whether or not this report of a policy of conciliation again being quashed is true, I doubt whether it is a fundamentally vital factor in the situation. I cannot but feel that the Japanese have committed during the past three years so many wrongs against China that these, when added to the wrongs committed prior to the Manchurian incident, have created a situation which makes it impossible for Japan to gain the friendship of China through any policy, regardless of its degree of liberality. It is perhaps possible that a complete reversal of Japanese policy, including a return of Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty, might have its effect, but it is doubtful if a situation will develop within Japan whereby a Japanese government could do this and survive.
In other words, Japan seems now to have reached a point in its relations with China where there is no policy which Japan can adopt which holds out promise of bringing to Japan what is requisite if she is to continue as a first class power. So it scarcely matters whether the reactionary military forms Japan’s policy toward China or whether the so-called liberals do.
It is easy to understand the opposition of the Japanese military to a policy of conciliation of China. During recent months the Japanese have seen indications of an extension of the power of General Chiang Kai-shek, of efforts toward economic rehabilitation, of effective increases in military strength. The Japanese have reason to believe that if these developments are allowed to continue, China will eventually attempt to liquidate her problems in foreign relations, primarily the problem of Japanese aggression. It is not surprising, therefore, [Page 278] that at least a part of the Japanese military would prefer a disunited and militarily weak China, even though Japanese liberals may point out that this will mean disturbed conditions which will adversely affect Japan’s economic future. A Japanese military, which thought the seizure of Manchuria would solve Japan’s population and economic problems, now sees that they were mistaken. This does not prevent them from believing that the solution lies in sinister activities in China south of the Great Wall. During the past few months they have apparently given “diplomacy” its chance, and the results have been few.
When the military took Manchuria they created a situation from which there seems to be little possibility of turning back without dire consequences to Japan and from which there seems to be little possibility of going forward without dire consequences to Japan. There was only one policy which could have solved Japan’s internal problems, and that was friendship with China. The action of the Japanese military in Manchuria brought that policy to an end and has made impossible a genuine and effective return to it.
Respectfully yours,
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