724.3415/4373: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Brazil (Gordon)
176. In accordance with recommendations adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations, this Government has received two invitations transmitted by the Secretary General of the League through the American Consul in Geneva, the first requesting the United States to participate in the deliberations of an Advisory Committee whose seat shall be at Geneva, and the second requesting the United States to appoint a representative to take part in the duties of a so-called “Neutral Supervisory Commission” to deal with the purely military aspects involved in the proposed cessation of hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay and in the taking of measures necessary to assure [Page 115] the neutrality of a security zone between the military forces of the two belligerents.
After very careful consideration this Government contemplates sending the following replies to these two invitations:
[Here follow texts of replies transmitted to the Consul at Geneva in (1) telegram No. 126, December 6, 6 p.m., printed on page 125; (2) telegram No. 125, December 6, 5 p.m., printed on page 124.]
The reference made in the second of these replies to the peace conference at Buenos Aires has to do with that portion of the recommendation of the League which provides for the holding of a conference of representative[s] of American States to meet at Buenos Aires within 1 month of the date of cessation of hostilities for the purpose of assisting the belligerents in concluding a treaty of peace based upon (a) “the final delimitation of the frontier between the two countries; (b) security clauses; and (c) economic clauses.” The conference would be limited to the American republics and would be invited by the Argentine President; the period fixed for its labors would be limited to a period not to exceed 2 months and in the event that the conference should not succeed, the two belligerents would be bound to call upon the Permanent Court of International Justice to give judgment in accordance with the provisions which they shall previously have agreed upon in accordance with the terms of the report of the League.
At the earliest opportunity after receipt of this cable you should obtain an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and say to him orally on behalf of your Government that the United States, which deeply appreciates the very close and friendly cooperation between our two Governments, does not desire to send these replies to the League without first communicating their contents to the Brazilian Government and being afforded an opportunity of discussing the policy therein envisaged in the frankest manner with the Government of Brazil. You should thereupon read to him the texts of the proposed replies.
You should further state that in the judgment of this Government, while it would unquestionably be desirable that all inter-American disputes be adjusted by purely American peace agencies, the time has not yet come when efficient machinery is functioning nor have the peace agencies created by common agreement between the American nations so far acquired sufficient prestige to prove their usefulness at this juncture. Frequently the peace efforts of the American nations during the years of the continuation of the Chaco dispute have broken down as the result of disagreement between the American mediating nations. Except for Brazil and the United States, the present report of the League provides the first occasion upon which all of the American republics have officially agreed upon a formal recommendation for [Page 116] the settlement of the dispute. Because of the special circumstances existing, this Government believes that were the United States to appear to adopt an attitude of passive opposition and refuse its cooperation so far as it is able to offer it in view of its non-membership in the League, the blame for the possible failure of the League efforts or for the refusal of Bolivia or Paraguay to agree to the terms of the report would in certain quarters be placed upon the United States.
This is a practical possibility which the United States desires to avoid. But more important than that, the United States believes that its moral support should be consistently offered as it has publicly stated to all peace movements on this continent which appear to hold the promise of achieving their objective. While the United States is not willing to take part in any committee which is constituted to sit in Geneva and which is responsive solely to the necessities of the League organization, it nevertheless believes that by participating in the manner indicated in the Neutral Supervisory Commission and in the proposed peace conference in Buenos Aires, it might be of assistance in the common peace objective of the American nations, particularly since both the Neutral Supervisory Commission and the peace conference in Buenos Aires would be composed exclusively of American States operating on American territory.
In conclusion you should state that were the Brazilian Government to share the views expressed by the United States and to take similar or parallel action, it is believed that should this present effort fail, both Brazil and the United States would be in a stronger position subsequently to exert their efforts for peace and at an appropriate moment to lead the way together with other American nations in proposing the formulation of peace machinery on this continent which would always be adequate in the event that the peace of this hemisphere was threatened.
Similar views to those expressed above have been made in full detail to the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington who is communicating with his Government.
It is of the utmost importance that the views of the Brazilian Government be communicated to the Department at the earliest possible opportunity in order that our official and public reply to the League invitations may not be unduly delayed. It is the earnest hope of this Government that the views of Brazil and of the United States may coincide on this occasion as they have to such great common advantage throughout the Chaco negotiations.