Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/6847

The War Department to the Department of State⁵

Washington, January 7, 1935.

1. Recent reports from Peiping and from consular officers in China and Manchuria indicate that the Chinese have agreed to move the provincial capital from Tientsin to Paotingfu, and that General Yu Hsueh-chung’s provincial troops will be withdrawn south of the Peiping-Tientsin Railway. In effect, this means a withdrawal of Natioixal Government control from Peiping and from Tientsin. Further, this action appears to have been taken at the instance of the Japanese, whether as an extension of the demilitarized area of North China, or under some other guise is not apparent. It is also stated that there is no apparent Japanese payment for this concession except a Japanese guarantee that it will not encourage any independence movement in North China hereafter. Another note indicates that Japan will secure the right to extend through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway to the Peiping-Suiyuan line in Inner Mongolia.

2. While the information at hand is very limited, the entire procedure appears to be an extension of Japanese military control in North China to the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway. Mongolia is a possible “jump off” line for a Japanese attack on Russia. For reasons too lengthy for discussion here Japan may choose to launch a serious attack across Mongolia towards Urga and Lake Baikal and thus turn the entire Russian prepared position in the Far East.

3. It is believed that the renunciation of the Washington Naval Treaty⁶ brings Japan much nearer a crisis with Russia. Japan cannot risk conflict with any power in the Pacific until her situation vis-à-vis Russia has become stabilized either through a war or by treaty. Therefore, almost continuously during 1933 and 1934 Japan has been consolidating her position in Manchuria, in Mongolia, and in China while she prepared for war against Russia. As Japan’s rearmament program nears completion her need for decisive action becomes imperative—(a) while she believes she has the advantage, (b) to justify her huge war expenditures, and (c) to secure her Asiatic continental position before the final termination of the naval treaty brings a real Pacific crisis.

4. One factor to be considered is Russian preparations to resist. Japanese regard a conflict with Russia as inevitable. The Araki⁷ group advocate an immediate war before Russia becomes stronger; the older more conservative group does not believe that Russian preparations will increase Russian ability to resist in the same proportion as Japan’s power to attack will increase with the completion of the rearmament program. We cannot know when the Japanese rearmament program will be completed, but assuming that 500 tanks have been constructed during the past year Japan should be nearly ready. Japan may expect a quick victory over Russia to make her position secure by the end of 1936. To delay attacking until after 1935 would probably compel a further postponement until after 1936.

5. This movement into North China, then, must be regarded with the greatest suspicion and as the possible forerunner of a 1935 attack on Russia.

Note: By rearmament we include motorization, mechanization and modernization of weapons and organization.

5. Copy handed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4, to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs on January 7.
6. Signed February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 247; for Japan’s notice of denunciation of the treaty, see note No. 250, December 29, 1934, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 274.
7. Gen. Sadao Araki, Japanese Minister of War, 1932–34.