761.93/1542
Report by the Military Attaché in China (Drysdale)34
The relatively unproductive or desert areas of Central Asia have in the past and are possibly even now acting as a deterrent to any startling imperialist expansion by either Russia or Great Britain into the remote regions of Western China. While these desert areas will continue to act as a barrier or a buffer between the expansionist forces of both the Soviets and the British and China Proper, the situation in Sinkiang is causing considerable concern to the Nanking Government. In the case of this province the desert or barren area lies, unfortunately for the Chinese, along its central and southern part, which fact leaves the economically productive part of the province bordering on Soviet Russia and detached to a remarkable degree from Chinese influence or control.
Last year Mr. Lo Wen-kan, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, made an extensive visit to Sinkiang, ostensibly to investigate its economic condition and the judicial system in the Northwest. What he and his superiors in Nanking were probably after was to find a formula to cope with the increasing Red influence in that area. Shortly after Minister Lo Wen-kan’s return, a commission on Sinkiang affairs was set up, whose function was to devise ways and means to consolidate Nanking’s political power in Sinkiang and to map out plans for its economic development.
A few months ago this special commission recommended to the Nanking Government a number of reforms, one of which was that the New Dominion, as the Chinese call it, should be converted into and administered as a regular province. With more than two-thirds of its frontiers facing Soviet Russia and without any railway connection with China Proper, Sinkiang cannot but find it more expedient to cooperate with the Soviets than to keep aloof from them.
The present Governor of Sinkiang, General Sheng Shih-tsai, realizes this point well. Press despatches indicate that he already has no less than five Soviet advisers in his government, including two military experts. By virtue of the secret agreement made in 1932 with the former governor, Chin Shu-jen, Soviet citizens have not only obtained access to many important trade routes and commercial centers but have also obtained a “right” to investigate and exploit the mineral resources in Sinkiang, an area estimated to be about one-tenth of all China. The close cooperation which the Soviet Government leaders have been giving General Sheng Shih-tsai and vice versa constitutes [Page 32] a further indication that Soviet Russia has already developed a “special position” in Sinkiang. The Soviet Military Attaché to China assured me that the provincial chairman was persona grata to the Russian government and that Soviet policy was based on a desire for orderly government along this frontier in order that trade might be developed. Because of the Turksib railway running to the provincial boundary, Sinkiang has become almost wholly dependent upon Soviet Russia as the chief outlet for raw materials and the main source of supply for manufactured goods.
The Chinese Government is aware of this situation and is attempting to cope with it by establishing a system of communications connecting the Yangtze River and the Lung-Hai Railway with the Northwest. The Economic Council has allocated funds for the construction of roads from Kansu to Sinkiang and work is proceeding in Shensi and Kansu provinces on this system. While the Chinese have established radio communication and an air route to the Northwest, Sinkiang still remains so difficult of access from Central China and the intervening area so barren and extensive that it seems unlikely that the Chinese will be able to meet Soviet competition for years to come. Temporarily at least the Soviets are practically in control and Russian commerce will continue as Sinkiang’s most important trade.
Ambassador Bullitt, when passing through Peiping recently, stated that the Soviets were paying special attention toward improving conditions along their border areas to impress neighboring peoples with the permanency, prosperity and desirability of the Soviet regime, and expressed a belief that Soviet influence would penetrate border states as a result of this policy. But fortunately for China the great barren areas lying between Sinkiang and Central China are an almost insurmountable barrier to any considerable Soviet penetration into the heart of China where Soviet influence is visibly diminishing and where the government’s present policy is winning over Soviet ideology. Any great Soviet penetration into the heart of China via the Northwest seems at present extremely improbable.
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the War Department about March 6.↩