500.A15A4/2641
The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) to the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Atherton)
Dear Ray: I am very glad indeed to have your letter of January 29 containing further information in regard to the British view of the Japanese question.
We have welcomed heartily your thoughtful reports on this matter, and in relation to a subject as important as is this I think you need have no fear either that you, are sending us too much or that what you send may not be of definite value. I can assure you that it is a source of constant gratification to all of us who are interested in the situation in the Far East—and I think that category includes an ever-widening group—to have an officer at London who, as do you, thoroughly understands British policy in general and can see the Far Eastern aspect of that policy in its proper perspective and relationship to British policy as a whole.
I think that we have gained—from your reports and from our observation of the action and attitude of the British Government in various situations relating to the Far East that have occurred during the last few years—a substantial understanding of the British position. I think also that we appreciate the difficulties which the British face and the considerations that mould their views and motivate their action. In last analysis Britain’s decision in any given situation will rest upon her conception of how best to protect and advance British interests. The same thing holds true—or should—for the United States. Insofar as the Far East is concerned, I think that American and British objectives are fundamentally the same. When we differ in views with regard to the method best calculated to attain those objectives, we cannot expect that the British will accept in all instances and in all circumstances our point of view. We should, however, be able to expect that they will endeavor to appreciate our point of view just as we endeavor to appreciate theirs.
You state that “Great Britain does not feel she can afford to permit a Far Eastern crisis to develop”. We also, of course, desire that such a development be avoided; but there may be some difference in the British and the American point of view in regard to the implications of the word “afford”. I do not think that either country wishes to sacrifice anything that is derogatory of sovereign rights. You state further that Great Britain “likes to feel that the threat in the Pacific is rather evenly divided between the British Empire and the United States”. At times this seems to us something like “wishful thinking”, although I am free to admit that, notwithstanding Great [Page 60] Britain’s proportionately larger share, as compared with the United States, of tangible interests in the Far East, there are in the situation intangible and psychological factors which tend to make the threat to the United States as great—ultimately but not immediately—as the threat to the British Empire.
Turning to the article quoted by you from the Economist, the writer thereof suggests that economic nationalism be curtailed and that Japanese trade be granted access to the world market. By such means, the writer envisages a development whereby Japan would not extend “her own national domain over the rest of the Far East”. I think that you are familiar with the Secretary’s views in regard to the subject of economic nationalism and to the efforts that he is putting forward directed against the further development of it. Progress in that endeavor must, I think, be necessarily slow. I think also that we must recognize that the trend in the world today is definitely toward economic nationalism. Whether that trend can be stopped and the movement be changed to a contrary course before economic nationalism is carried to such an extreme as to cause a general revulsion (by natural processes) from it, remains to be seen.
It seems to me that in the present situation in the Far East there is little that the United States can do other than what it is doing. When confronted with common problems and common dangers, we expect as heretofore to confer with the British to the end that there may be, whenever and wherever practicable and appropriate, cooperation. With American thought and American political machinery what they are, alliance—defensive or offensive—between the United States and Great Britain is out of the question. But I think we can expect to give and to obtain from Great Britain cooperation along a good many lines. The thing most needed, however, throughout Anglo-Saxondom is “education”, a bringing about of more widespread consciousness of our essential community of interests and objectives. Cooperation cannot, in my opinion, be forced. The desire to cooperate must grow and must be widespread among the peoples concerned. The development of it takes a long time.
With all best wishes,
Yours sincerely,