Office of the Historian

724.34119/264: Telegram

The Ambassador in Argentina (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

Buenos Aires, October 30, 1935—9 p.m.
[Received 11:50 p.m.]

267. From Gibson.

1.
The Bolivian and Paraguayan delegations have received instructions as to the replies which they should make to the neutral proposal of October 15, and are expected to present them Saturday. Our information is that both answers will for all practical purposes constitute rejection and that the stand of both parties to the territorial question will be so irreconcilable as to show clearly that there is no possibility at the present time of direct agreement.
2.
We consequently expect to be faced with the necessity of deciding whether, (1) to postpone consideration of the territorial problem until conditions are more propitious for its solution or, (2) to go on to the next step, the attempt to formulate the terms of arbitration.
3.
The second course is open to serious difficulties. Under the June 12th Protocol, a formal declaration that direct agreement is impossible is a necessary preliminary before the arbitral compromise can be taken up; this would close the door to renewal of efforts for such an agreement. The soundings which we have made show that the chances that the parties will agree to the terms of an arbitral comprise [compromise?] are even less than those of direct agreement. We would, therefore, either have to continue in session indefinitely in compliance with the terms of the Protocol but with no hope of success or eventually bring the labors of the Conference to an end on the ground that the intransigence of the parties released the mediators from their undertaking to continue in session.
4.
The mediators have given careful consideration to the course to be pursued. All, even the Peruvian, are now of the opinion that if we are to avoid complete failure or endless stagnation we must shortly adjourn the Conference in the hope that time will alter the Bolivian and Paraguayan attitudes. Adjournment for a short period would only result in our being again faced with the same situation with nothing new to do about it. The consensus of opinion therefore, is that we should adjourn until after the beginning of the next Presidential period in both countries which is scheduled to take place on August 15, 1936. There seems to be no possibility of more favorable conditions before then.
5.
It is not intended that the territorial problem should be allowed to drift during the period of adjournment. As a matter of fact, much could be done toward bringing the parties into a more reasonable [Page 172] frame of mind. Informal preparatory work in the capitals and such conversations as those contemplated by Macedo Soares with Estigarribia and Elío could be carried out with much more chance of success than if competing with the Conference.
6.
The mediators agree further that the prisoners of war problem must be solved before adjournment can be taken. The Paraguayans have recently made informal overtures to various of the neutrals and have suggested that they would be willing to agree to the mutual return of all prisoners provided they received additional guarantees as to the maintenance of the present line of separation and/or compensation for the cost of maintaining them. The first of these desiderata would be met in part by the maintenance of the Uruguayan police in the neutral zone until after the renewal of the Conference’s activities next year when the whole question would again be reopened. We have under consideration several methods for solving the prisoners question and are favored by the facts that they are becoming something of a burden to the Paraguayans and that the latter cannot fail to see that their efforts to use the prisoners as a club to ensure Bolivian acceptance of extreme Paraguayan territorial aspirations are fruitless.
7.
Should the prisoners of war question be solved the Conference could adjourn with some public credit by pointing to its considerable achievements in securing (a) the termination of the war; (b) demobilization of the armies; (c) reduction of standing forces to 5,000 men; (d) obligations not to acquire arms or, (e) commit acts of aggression; (f) release of prisoners of war; (g) providing for the War Responsibility Tribunal, and stressing the fact that the only remaining outstanding question would be the territorial one; that several months of effort had shown that a considerable amount of preparatory work remains to be done before the Conference could again attack this final problem with prospects of success.
8.
There is general agreement among the mediators that if adjournment is decided upon, action should be taken as expeditiously as possible after the receipt of the replies of the parties. We are consequently making every effort on the prisoners question.
9.
I shall be glad to have your views. [Gibson.]
Weddell