Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, The American Republics, Volume IV

724.34119/288: Telegram

The Ambassador in Argentina (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

Buenos Aires, November 23, 1935—4 p.m.
[Received 8 p.m.]

283. From Braden. Our 279 November 15, 8 p.m.

1. Formula embodying plan outlined in paragraph 2 (including maintenance of lines of separation as part of non-aggression pledge) and last sentence of paragraph number 3 of telegram under reference accepted ad referendum by Paraguayan delegation last Wednesday.

2. In conversations Thursday and yesterday Bolivian delegation expressed fundamental and unyielding opposition to formula. They have been instructed that prisoners question should be treated apart without being linked to any other matters, although they continue to express willingness to make a “reasonable” net payment to Paraguay for maintenance, et cetera, of prisoners. In private talks they characterize this as “necessary blackmail.”

3. Bolivians insist they could consider a declaration continuing effectiveness of security measures of the June 12th protocol, only if it were embodied in an additional protocol ratified by the Bolivian and Paraguayan Congresses, which would also fill lacuna in the June 12th Protocol as to the drawing up of the arbitral compromise on the territorial question in case a direct agreement is not reached. While they have not defined their ideas clearly they contemplate a provision fixing a limiting date for agreement on the arbitral compromise, failing which the question of sovereignty over the entire Chaco would automatically go to arbitration.

4. In our conversations without Paraguayans they refused categorically to include in the formula any clarification of the territorial arbitration provisions of the June 12th Protocol, or even their restatement.

5. Elío yesterday advanced the thesis that direct agreement had been proved impossible, and that the Conference should so declare, and proceed to the attempt to draw up the arbitral compromise. He recognized that the latter would be impossible of accomplishment, but reiterated the previous Bolivian position that in this event they would unilaterally request a decision by The Hague Court.

6. I took exception to Elío’s stand and with the support of the other mediators expressed the opinion that possibilities of direct agreement were far from exhausted and that patience and time were essential.

7. The present Paraguayan attitude toward the prisoners question seems merely a camouflaged extension of their previous efforts to use the prisoners to obtain a favorable territorial settlement: with an agreement such as they desire, maintenance of present lines of separation would be guaranteed until conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace; Paraguay could thus in effect indefinitely secure the territorial aspirations expressed in its reply to the Conference proposal of October 15th by merely refusing to make direct agreement or draw up an arbitral compromise.

8. The Bolivians of course realize the implications of the Paraguayan position and therefore insist on provisions insuring arbitration within a definite time limit in exchange for agreeing on extension of security measures.

9. One possible course open to us might be limiting the extension of the security measures to a set period, say 2 years, and linking it with the question of policing the lines of separation (which is still under discussion) in a document separate from but to be signed at the same time as the proposed agreement for the return of prisoners. This would in every particular merely postpone the real problem rather than solve it.

10. A fear which may prove helpful, mentioned in previous telegrams, is that Paraguay is beginning to find the Bolivian prisoners a burden. It may be that with the passage of time Paraguay will realize that Bolivia cannot be induced in return for the prisoners to agree to what would be in effect the settlement of the Chaco question desired by Paraguay.

11. On the other hand Elío now unqualifiedly insists that as Bolivia has waited this long for a solution of the prisoners question it can continue to do so. He appreciates the embarrassment which the retention of the prisoners may cause Paraguay and is also undoubtedly influenced in his attitude by the political and unemployment problems inherent in their return to Bolivia.

12. I wish to stress once more that the internal political situation in both countries with particular regard to the forthcoming Presidential campaigns is a dominating factor in the present state of the Chaco negotiations. [Braden.]

Weddell