740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/625
The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 17.]
Sir: With reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the situation created in Europe by Hitler’s proposals of March 7, I have the honor to observe that the general opinion here is that no decisions will likely be taken until after the French elections, ending May 3. This view is subject of course to any upset by some unforeseen circumstance, or more especially by efforts which the French Government may make to press for action by the Locarno Powers before this date, whether in connection with electioneering or otherwise. In any event, it appears to us a suitable moment to submit a brief review of German relations with respect to certain other European Powers.
In this connection I beg to suggest that before reading this despatch the Department may find it useful to refer to a large-scale map of Europe in order to recall Germany’s geographical position on the Continent, which, along with the extent of her territory, the mass of her population, the special features of her domestic economy and the configuration of her boundaries, is of the greatest importance in the present analysis.
I. The Danubian region: this is mentioned first as constituting the critical area of Germany’s interest, both, it is believed, from the long term and the near future. Especially correlated with Germany’s policy of cultivating nearby markets, for economic, political and strategic reasons, this is the region in Europe seemingly best fitted for German exploitation whether through economic domination alone or in conjunction with some form of political control or suzerainty. Incidentally the present régime does not seem disposed to repeat the ex-Kaiser’s mistake of “Berlin to Bagdad,” thus antagonizing Turkey, but will limit itself, say, to “Berlin to Bulgaria,” varying the form of connection in each of the Danubian states concerned according to the particular possibilities and necessities.
II. Italy: Across this picture is Italy whose Danubian policy, whether for protection against Germany or for the development of the Italian position in Europe, or both, competes with Germany’s political as well as economic aims in this area unless a compromise can be effected. The recent Italo-Austro-Hungarian discussions in Rome38 followed by the announcement of conscription in Austria,39 which the Foreign Office here somewhat contemptuously describes as “made in Italy,” demonstrate Italy’s continued and increasing interest in this [Page 280] German field of development despite Italy’s activity in Abyssinia and possibly because of her success there which flouts the British Empire, confirms the strength of French dependence on Italy, and supports the imperium romanum idea with which Mussolini seems obsessed. German and Italian lines of closest European interests therefore cross and are in opposition in the Danubian region, with Austria the pivot.
III. France: The above analysis throws into relief the importance of the resumption of complete German sovereignty in the Rhineland and the consequent obstacle to continued French supremacy in the Danubian-Balkan area. Germany has no designs on France or Belgium in the present or discernible future. Somewhat naively, Germany only asks of France that she remain on the side-lines and let Germany work out her eastern “necessities” without interference. This implies, however, the substitution of Germany for France as the dominant influence on the Continent, which France must naturally resent from the point of view of prestige and economic position, and must fear politically for the future, if not for the present. While even the French in their press and otherwise recognize frankly the implication of the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in the sense described above, and realize clearly the threat to their post-war hegemony, with special reference to the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, the Embassy does not wish to exaggerate this point. Even should France and possibly also Belgium be blocked off by German fortifications in the Rhineland, the French people are too intelligent, courageous and active, as well as too experienced politically, economically and financially, to be excluded from exercising a very great influence in Europe, even under the handicap just described.
IV. Great Britain: Germany’s relations with and to Great Britain appear to have increased in importance and to have been complicated by the development of the Italo-Abyssinian affair. When France, on the understandable basis of her conception of her own protection through Italian support against Germany, abandoned collectivity, as marshalled by the British last September at the League, Germany increased in importance to England as a possible checkmate to Italy regarding vital empire lines in Egypt and “Cape to Cairo”, domination of the Mediterranean, and its corollary of the sea route to India. At the same time, Germany has ideas of European settlement closely akin to British thought on this subject. England is therefore in a dilemma. On the one hand she has found her natural geographical ally and closest European associate since 1904, France, one of the principal reasons, if not the principal one, for her loss of prestige and threatened Empire communications and position. Likewise, this same country, France, has proven an obstacle since 1918 to a practical settlement of European problems and the return of a Peace which has existed in name only since the War. On the other hand, the [Page 281] alternative is a virtual abandonment of this old ally and the establishment of a close relationship with Nazi Germany as an European Power which is capable of taking, and in certain circumstances doubtless willing to take, a strong position with Italy both for Germany’s own aims and, for a price, to help the British with respect to Abyssinia. But this would mean the British contributing to establish Germany as the dominant force on the Continent and so in opposition to the old British maxim of a balance of power. From conversations at the Foreign Office here, we have the impression that such ideas are now being given attention in Berlin. No doubt England will try to compromise the dilemma.
Disputes even as antagonistic as Anglo-Italian relations today have a way of speedily being arranged. In the past few years we have seen many seemingly insoluble and dangerous problems rapidly elucidated. Therefore it is dangerous to treat anything too categorically in European relations. This sketch of the Anglo-German position is set forth with all this in mind, and more especially to try to indicate the possibilities rather than the certainties. Indeed we recall the statement of two experienced British observers at Geneva in September when the Italo-Abyssinian question was before the League and Great Britain was furiously marshalling the world against Italy’s action in Africa. Quite independently these two Englishmen said, in almost identical colloquial phrases, that, when the smoke blew over and the Abyssinian affair was concluded, it would be found that, despite the brave words of the British Delegation at Geneva, the British Empire would emerge with more territory, i. e., the Lake Tsana district in Abyssinia.
V. Russia: Despite considerable talk it is believed that the strain of Russo-German relations is due primarily to the anti-Communist ideas of Hitler and certain of his henchmen and not to practicable plans for conquest, since Poland, the always uncertain quantity, lies in between. The present suspension of Russo-German credit discussions may dampen some of the local emotional ardor against the Soviets and bring a sharper realization of the natural complementary trade situation between Russia and Germany, supported as this is by the pro-Soviet attitude of the Army and of the Foreign Office.
VI. Poland: Good relations with Poland are made necessary for Germany by ambitions in the Danubian region. Bearing the unexpected, for example, a sudden marshalling of active encirclement by France against Germany, the Polish-German position should remain about as at present, with the Poles balancing between Germany, Russia and France, really influenced principally by England, and an unstable but important factor in the general European picture.
This subject of Germany’s position with regard to certain European Powers could be expanded almost indefinitely. The purpose [Page 282] of the present report, as indicated in the opening paragraph, is merely the assembling, for the Department’s convenience, at this critical moment, the principal features involved, as viewed from Berlin.
Respectfully yours,