740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/688: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 19—4:15 p.m.]
269. It was decided at yesterday’s Cabinet meeting that, although the British Government is prepared to send Lord Halifax to Berlin for a conference with Hitler, in the given circumstances no useful purpose would be served by such a visit now. In his recent conversation with Ambassador Phipps, Hitler, in effect, put [aside?] the British questionnaire with the statement that he was not prepared to set a date for an answer until after the new French Government had taken office and made known its attitude to the Franco-Soviet pact, which date would presumably also be after the next League meeting. Hitler did inform Phipps, however, that he thought the question regarding Germany’s return to the League was futile until England could define to what League Germany was being asked to return, and he referred to Baldwin’s statement of last week that at “the autumn meeting of the League the members of the League will have to consider among other things what, if any, changes are necessary”. This attitude, evaluated in the light of events since 1933, has contributed to apprehension in official circles here that Hitler does not really wish to effect appeasement through negotiation.
At the same time Phipps continues to reiterate his view that any deterrent to an aggressor through League collective action is discounted by Hitler and that the only method which would be an effective restraint is a reconstruction of the Stresa Front;56 English participation in this is realized in Berlin to be dependent on the Mediterranean situation. He emphasizes also the power and forcefulness of that Nazi element within Germany which insisted that rearmament could be undertaken in 1935 without penalty and which again in 1936 insisted that the reoccupation of the Rhineland could be undertaken also without penalty, had its way and proved its point.
The time element factor as analyzed in my 228, April 27, 5 p.m., is regarded as increasingly important and the British Cabinet is now face to face with the immediate problem of whether and how Italy can be brought back into the Stresa Front as indicated in item numbered (3) of my telegram under reference. The menace of Germany is not so preeminent in the eyes of British public opinion as to transcend all other considerations and various groups for various different reasons are still antagonistic to an Anglo-Italian rapprochement. Although [Page 305] many doubt it, outstandingly Neville Chamberlain and Simon favor abolition of sanctions, others are at this moment advocating caution or inaction.
The question of the British fleet in the Mediterranean is involved and Sir Samuel Hoare has been offered the Admiralty but has made known his unwillingness to do so unless the Cabinet are prepared to give him authority to withdraw in his discretion the home fleet from the Mediterranean. These considerations have an important bearing on the British attitude to a Mediterranean pact (see Gilbert’s 180, May 16, 6 p.m.57) since the pact would involve the Abyssinian question in a larger issue, under cover of which the British might be able to extract themselves from a portion [from their position?] vis-à-vis the public and vis-à-vis Italy.
- The alignment effected April 11–14, 1935, at Stresa, by France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.↩
- Vol. iii, p. 138.↩