740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/708
Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt)62
In the course of a conversation, I asked Mr. Léger, Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, what constructive plan for French foreign policy and the preservation of peace in Europe he had devised.
After a long statement which consisted largely of criticisms of the British for unwillingness to support France in resorting to force [Page 309] because of the infractions of the Treaty of Versailles by Germany, Léger said that completion by Germany of the line of fortifications on the French and Belgium frontiers would place a Chinese wall across Europe. France and England would be barred from Central and Eastern Europe and all the states of Central and Eastern Europe would be at the mercy of Germany. He said that the British were cherishing the illusion that by cultivating intimate relations with Greece and Turkey they could prevent Germany from reaching the Mediterranean. He said that he knew Germany was having even more success in cultivating the Turks than England.
There could be only one future for Central Europe if the German fortifications should be completed,—domination by Germany. It was, therefore, absolutely essential that those fortifications should not be completed. The Government of France had accepted the occupation of the Rhineland because it knew that the French Army today was so much stronger than the German Army that, even if the Rhine should be occupied by German troops, the way into Germany would not be closed. The matter of the fortifications was so much more serious that it was on a different plane altogether. The French Government had made it clear to the British Government that France would be ready to prevent the construction of the fortifications by force. He said that if the British Government should refuse to cooperate with France in this, the French Army would march alone.
I replied that from everything that I knew about French public opinion, it would be totally impossible to persuade the people of France to make war on Germany because of the construction of the fortifications. I asked Léger at what moment he intended to ask for armed intervention, what trench or pill-box would be the straw which would break the camel’s back of peace. Léger replied that he entirely understood this difficulty and, after a long discussion, finally admitted that if the Germans during the period while they were constructing the fortifications should refrain from hostile acts and statements, it would be impossible for the French Foreign Office to arouse the French people to prevent the building of the fortifications.
I then asked Mr. Léger what hope he had. He said that he could see no hope except that the Germans would conduct themselves so arrogantly and foolishly that they would arouse the people of France to a realization of the need for armed intervention and also perhaps the people of England.
I derived the impression from this conversation with Mr. Léger that the French Foreign Office has in fact no constructive ideas whatsoever.
Paris, May 21, 1936.
- The Ambassador was en route to the United States. Apparently this memorandum was brought with him to the Department.↩