741.62/208: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

751. Mr. Eden sent for me this morning for the purpose, he said, of giving for the information of my Government an outline of Lord Halifax’s visit to Germany and the subsequent talks in London with the French Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Mr. Eden said at the outset that the conversations of Lord Halifax with Hitler and [Page 184] other leading German personalities were general in nature and that no concrete proposals were made on either side nor were any definite understanding[s] reached as a result of the talks. During Lord Halifax’s conversations with Hitler the latter continually reiterated the German demand for colonies. Lord Halifax in return informed him that the British Government was not disposed to exclude consideration of this subject in favor of Germany but that if it were ever to be considered it must be as a part of a general settlement of European difficulties to which Germany must make an effective contribution. Herr Hitler brought this subject up more than once, always with the attitude that colonies for Germany were matter of right, that Germany had no proposals to make and was waiting for concrete and direct propositions from Great Britain. Although Lord Halifax reiterated the position of Great Britain each time the matter was brought up, at no time did Hitler give any intimation that Germany had any contribution to make or would consider making any. The other German leaders, Goering, Goebbels, et al., took the same line as Hitler in emphasizing the primary importance from their point of view of a new colonial settlement to meet German views. The Germans did not lay a claim to physical restitution of the actual colonies taken from Germany after the World War but plainly suggested that if restitution did not take place, equivalent restitution was expected, the intimation being that Great Britain and France might relinquish to Germany other colonies of their own of equivalent importance to those lost by Germany, or that other powers, such as Belgium and Portugal, might supply the German demand and Great Britain and France in turn compensate them for what they lost. It was emphasized that none of the foregoing was made as concrete proposals by Germany. They were rather suggestions made with folded arms and the implied question, “Well, what are you going to do about it?[”] Blomberg was the only one of the highly placed Germans who admitted to Halifax that it was not the colonial question that was of vital importance to Germany but Central Europe. In connection with Central Europe, Hitler boasted that he had his agreement with Austria and that he had every reason to believe that Czechoslovakia would make internal readjustments in favor of the Sudeten Deutsch which would be satisfactory.

During the Chautemps visit the British Government, Mr. Eden said, were unusually impressed by the reasonableness and frankness of the French Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. The French representatives were fully informed of the conversations of Lord Halifax in Germany and the British and French reached an agreement that consideration should be seriously given to a colonial settlement in favor of Germany. This question, however, would necessarily [Page 185] require detailed and careful study over a considerable period of time, as it was not one of which final decisions could be taken by Great Britain and France alone. The British Dominions, particularly South Africa, were concerned and also Belgium and Portugal. During their separate studies of this question the British and the French would undoubtedly exchange information confidentially through diplomatic channels and after their studies were completed if the conclusion could be reached that a definite proposal might be formulated, the British and French would make a joint approach to Germany in the matter, at the same time making it completely clear at Berlin that their only course stood on the condition that it should be a part of a general settlement of European difficulties and that Germany herself must make some effective contribution in return toward the peace of Europe, including disarmament and other agreements. It was emphasized that on this colonial matter the French and British would present a really united front.

Following the Anglo-French meeting, the British, in order to avoid a possibility that Rome might think they were endeavoring to detach Germany and to drive a wedge in the Rome–Berlin Axis, instructed the British Ambassador in Rome to approach Count Ciano and tell him that the British were quite ready to undertake conversation[s] with Italy with a view to establishing more friendly relations but that before those conversations could begin certain preliminary matters must be settled, in particular the widespread Italian anti-British propaganda throughout the Near East. In this connection the activities of the Bari Broadcasting Station were mentioned.

The British and French likewise discussed their position in the Far East and what possibilities there might be to protect their interests.

Sir Robert Vansittart, whom I saw later in the day, informed me that the subject of Russia did not enter into the discussions with the French and that there was no discussion or consideration of the Franco-Soviet pact or bilateral French commitments in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere. Sir Robert likewise informed me that he had a memorandum embodying the above information in somewhat greater detail and had recommended that it be sent to Washington for the information of my Government. He also said that if there were any further questions that my Government might like to ask in regard to these conversation[s] as now reported, he would be glad if I would come to see him again and he would try to elucidate any point that was not clear. He said that the Foreign Office had every desire to keep the United States fully informed.

Johnson