741.51/256

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

No. 3649

Sir: I have the honor to refer to telegram No. 751 of December 3, 8 p.m., conveying the accounts which the Foreign Secretary and the Permanent Under-Secretary gave me of Lord Halifax’s discussions in Germany and the subsequent related conversations in London with Messieurs Chautemps and Delbos. In transcribing below the communiqué which was issued after the final meeting between the British and French Ministers, I venture to point out that both Mr. Eden and Sir Robert Vansittart indicated that their remarks should be read in connection with this exceptionally full and frank public statement:

“M. Chautemps and M. Delbos had a number of conversations with the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and other British Ministers during their stay in London on 29th and 30th November.

The French Ministers heard from Lord Halifax himself a statement on his recent conversations in Germany. They were glad to recognise that while Lord Halifax’s visit, being of a private and unofficial character, was not expected to lead to any immediate results, it had helped to remove causes of international misunderstanding and was well calculated to improve the atmosphere.

The problems of Europe as a whole and the future prospects of appeasement and disarmament came under review. On these important subjects the French and British Ministers found fresh evidence of that community of attitude and outlook which so happily characterises the relations between France and the United Kingdom.

A preliminary examination was made of the colonial question in all its aspects. It was recognised that this question was not one that could be considered in isolation, and moreover would involve a number of other countries. It was agreed that the subject would require much more extended study.

The French Ministers in their turn spoke of the forthcoming visit of M. Delbos to certain countries in Central and Eastern Europe. They were happy to note the common interest of the two Governments in the maintenance of peaceful conditions in those parts of Europe.

[Page 192]

The situation arising out of the Spanish conflict and Mediterranean questions generally came under review. It was agreed that despite all difficulties the policy of non-intervention in Spain had been fully justified and had contributed materially to diminish the international repercussions of the conflict. It was resolved to continue to pursue the efforts of the two Governments in this direction in order to give full effect to this policy.

The French and British Ministers examined the Far Eastern situation, the gravity of which they fully recognised. They were agreed as to their readiness to co-operate, with other Powers similarly placed, to protect the rights and interests and to meet the obligations arising from international treaties relating to that part of the world.

The French and British Ministers went on to review in a spirit of mutual confidence the other aspects of international affairs of common interest to the two countries. While in no way departing from their previously expressed conception of international collaboration, they reaffirmed the desire of their Governments to co-operate with all countries in the common task of promoting international appeasement by the methods of free and peaceful negotiation.”

The above communiqué was read to the House of Commons by the Prime Minister and in answer to a question by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Chamberlain stated that “the ultimate hope we have in view is what he has described as a general settlement. It is quite obvious that no general settlement can be arrived at merely by conversations between two or three countries, and, therefore, we must ultimately contemplate that other countries will be brought into these conversations. At the same time, I must make it clear that I do not think we have got as far as the advisability of an immediate extension of the conversations, although that may come at a later stage.”

In telegram No. 741, November 29, 4 p.m.,96 there was set forth the comment of the London Press on the communiqué in particular and the conversations in general. Furthermore, as mentioned in my No. 751 of December 3, 8 p.m., the Foreign Secretary stated that he intended to send to the British Embassy in Washington for communication to the Department of State in memorandum form a detailed account of these discussions. Nevertheless, I venture to call attention to one aspect of these talks which has not previously been touched upon.

Less than three years ago—in February 1935—another French Premier and Foreign Secretary came to London on a similar mission. The communiqué issued at the close of the visit of Messieurs Flandin and Laval, if compared with that issued last week, clearly shows how far European diplomacy has been forced off the course which Great Britain and France had so hopefully set for it three years ago.

Details regarding the communiqué of February 3, 1935 can be obtained [Page 193] from the Embassy’s despatches No. 1200 of February 5, 193597 and No. 1218 of February 12, 1935,98 but it is perhaps only necessary to recall that the first joint communiqué warned Germany that no rearmament by unilateral action in contravention of the Peace Treaties could be permitted, and in the following month Germany publicly embraced universal military service, announced the creation of an army of thirty-six divisions, and thus repudiated Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. That communiqué also gave its blessing to the Franco-Italian Agreements then just concluded in Rome—today the Rome-Berlin axis is not only a vital factor in European power diplomacy, but its progeny, the Anti-Comintern Pact, is assuming increased importance as an instrument of policy. It also made much of an air pact and even of replacing Part V of the Treaty of Versailles by a general arms agreement—while the communiqué of today vaguely mentions disarmament as a possible objective. Likewise, there was an insistence then on the necessity of an Eastern Pact; however, in today’s document it is not found expedient to mention such a pact by name. Furthermore, Great Britain and France at that time maintained in confident tones that Germany’s return to the League was a condition precedent to the concluding of the projected general settlement; today the League is not even mentioned as having any bearing on immediate plans for a similar attempted settlement. Lastly and by no means least in significance is the fact that in the former communiqué no mention was made of colonies, while in the latter “the colonial question in all its aspects” occupies a key position, as indeed it should, for it has become the most controversial single factor in present Anglo-German relations and constituted the leitmotiv of the German case as represented to Lord Halifax.

Perhaps the manner in which during these thirty-four months the focal points of European diplomacy and power have been shifting can be briefly but vividly illustrated by listing below pertinent incidents in the history of that period:

[Page 194]
Institution by Germany of universal military service and announcement of an Army of 36 divisions (Repudiation of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles) March, 1935
“Stresa Front” Conference April, 1935
Condemnation of Germany by the League April, 1935
Anglo-German Naval Agreement June, 1935
Sir Samuel Hoare’s Sanctionist Speech September, 1935
Opening of Italo-Abyssinian War October, 1935
Sanctions against Italy invoked October, 1935
Hoare–Laval Plan December, 1935
Resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare December, 1935
Period of tension in the Mediterranean Winter, 1935–36
Re-occupation by Germany of Rhineland in violation of Treaty of Locarno (Repudiation of Articles 42 and 43 of Versailles Treaty) March, 1936
Anglo-French staff talks April, 1936
Abortive negotiations for new Locarno Pact terminating in unanswered British questionnaire May, 1936
Sanctions against Italy lifted July, 1936
Spanish War begins July, 1936
Spanish Non-intervention Committee organized August, 1936
Rome–Berlin Axis called into being October, 1936
Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan November, 1936
Franco recognized by Germany and Italy November, 1936
Germany seizes control of the rivers November, 1936
Germany withdraws signature from Treaty of Versailles and declares Treaty ended January, 1937
Anglo-Italian rapprochement attempted January, 1937
Tension arising out of Spanish War mounts as incidents increase January, 1937
Von Neurath’s visit to London cancelled by Germany June, 1937
Outbreak of Sino-Japanese conflict July, 1937
Nyon Conference September, 1937
Anti-Comintern Pact extended to Italy November, 1937

This rough chronology of events of the last three years, while showing the unmistakable trend, does not, however, adequately reflect the principal cause of these happenings, namely, the extraordinary growth in the military power and prestige of Germany, which, despite the much vaunted British rearmament program, continues to gain in relative strength. Great Britain and France, who spoke so confidently in February 1935, have been forced continuously to yield ground to an extent which seems incredible in the light of the communiqué of that year—and, incidentally, there is no sure sign that this process has yet terminated and that the communiqué of 1937 will not in due course become correspondingly obsolete.

Yours respectfully,

Herschel V. Johnson
  1. Not printed.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed, but see enclosure to this despatch, memorandum by the Chargé in the United Kingdom, February 5, 1935, Foreign Relations, 1935, Vol. i, p. 188.