740.00/251: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 23—8:58 p.m.]
1771. I had brief conversations today with Delbos and Chautemps. Both expressed themselves as pleased by the results of Delbos’ trip but added little to the information already conveyed to the Department in my No. 1737, December 16, 11 a.m.5
Delbos said that he had stated to Neurath that France would be glad to enter into conversations immediately for the “humanization of warfare,” notably the elimination of bombing. Neurath had said that in principle the German Government also favored this. There had been no further conversations on this subject.
Delbos stated that his conversations in Poland had been most satisfactory from the point of view of the Franco-Polish alliance. There was now the fullest and most cordial cooperation between the French and Polish general staffs. He hoped that he has been able to do something to ameliorate relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia but could not point to any specific progress.
With regard to Rumania, Delbos said that the situation was still somewhat obscure as the results of the elections were not known definitely. [Page 207] In any event he felt certain that the King would continue to dominate the situation. He added that the King had been most profuse in his expressions of friendship for France and in his promises of future collaboration.
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In commenting on the general situation Delbos said that the great difficulty was that Great Britain’s interests in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Far East could not be defended at one and the same time by the force now at the disposal of the British Government. The engagement of that force in any one of the three areas might lead to fatal attack in one of the other. The British were still paralyzed, and without the British, the French could not act. In the immediate future he feared two things. First, a German movement against Austria, which would meet with little resistance either within Austria or from outside powers. Second, an Italian reinforcement of Franco on a great scale. He had no constructive plans for the future but felt compelled to follow a policy of wait and see.
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- Not printed.↩