851.00/1698: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 2—7:53 p.m.]
908–912. I had a conversation with Chautemps22 this afternoon…
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We went on to discuss the international situation and Chautemps expressed opinions very similar to those which Delbos expressed to me last night which I reported in my No. 900 to 902, July 2, 10 a.m.23 He added, however, that his latest information from London was that Neville Chamberlain24 would not consider attempting to establish a patrol of the coasts of Spain by French and British ships with neutral observers against the will of Italy and Germany.
The meeting of the full Non-intervention Committee in London on Monday would be called for the purpose of showing the world that 24 nations were in favor of continuing the control and only 3 nations opposed it. However, after that meeting he believed that the British would inform the French that they considered it impossible to maintain any control and each nation must return to complete liberty of action.
Chautemps added that France positively would not recognize Franco as a belligerent and he felt certain that Great Britain would not either. He said that as soon as the nations had resumed their freedom of action he expected Italy and Germany to send vast quantities of supplies and probably Italian reinforcements to Franco. The French Government would not send supplies or reinforcements to the Valencia Government but would permit the passage through France of supplies or reinforcements which any nation might wish [Page 348] to send. He believed that the Soviet Union would not attempt to assist the Valencia Government on a great scale. The Russians were too much occupied with their own internal difficulties and Soviet Russia had come to realize that their intervention in Spain might lead to serious consequences.
I asked Chautemps if he thought that this meant a speedy triumph of Franco. He said that he was not certain; that the Valencia Government appeared to be confident.
If France should permit it the establishment of a Fascist state in Spain hostile to France would place France in an extraordinarily dangerous position. The communications of France with her North African colonies could be cut at once. In case of war with Germany France might have to face war with Spain and Italy as well. The situation for England was extremely serious as Italy and Spain would be in a position to cut British communications through the Mediterranean. However, all his information from London indicated that Chamberlain was still inclined to adopt a policy of “wait and see” coupled with a policy of attempting to detach Germany from Italy. France could not act without the full support of Great Britain and he had small hope that such support would be forthcoming.