852.00/6661: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:05 p.m.]
1424. I was told at the Foreign Office this morning that their impression of the Italian reply is distinctly unfavorable. They had, of course, expected that the note would be evasive and unsatisfactory but they had not expected that it would be so definitely negative. For instance, they attach particular importance to the phrase towards the end of the note in which the Italian Government declines even “preliminary” conversations outside the London Committee. It had been the hope of the French Government that if the Italian Government declined a triangular conference or conversation at least it would be possible to have a rapid exchange of views by diplomatic channels between the three Governments which would enable them to come to some sort of an understanding among themselves before engaging in discussion in the London Committee. This possibility the Foreign Office feels has now been ruled out by the terms of the Italian reply.
I remarked that things seemed to be back where they were when the British presented their plan to the London Committee last July, namely, that progress seemed to hinge upon whether withdrawal of volunteers should take place prior to the granting of limited belligerent rights or whether the procedure should be the other way around. The official with whom I was speaking said that this was about the case. He added that as was stated in the Franco-British note of October 2 the two Governments were prepared to discuss the recognition of belligerent rights once the withdrawal of volunteers had been effected. He said that the difficulty is that the recognition of belligerent rights is granted by a simple decision of the governments and takes effect immediately while the withdrawal of volunteers is a far more complicated matter; delay in actually withdrawing would nullify the value of any agreement to withdraw.
[Page 416]My informant said that the French Ministers were meeting this afternoon with the Minister of National Defense to consider the situation and reach a decision as to the course to follow. The one thing which they were all keeping in mind was the necessity of acting in complete agreement with the British Government. As the British Foreign Office was closed over the week end and Eden was still at Balmoral, it had been impossible to obtain any indication of the British viewpoint. The decision reached by the French Government as to the course it feels advisable to follow will be communicated to the British either tonight or tomorrow and the French views will be considered at the meeting of the British Cabinet on Wednesday. By the end of the week, therefore, the two Governments should have reached agreement on a common course of action.
The views of the French Ministers are running along the line of possible opening of the frontier or at least permitting transit of shipments to Spain over French territory. In this regard the Foreign Office is keeping two ideas very much in mind: First, that if such action is taken it must be with the full approval and support of Great Britain and be not an unilateral act by France alone but a Franco-British act; and second, the reaction which such a move might cause in Italy. Regarding this latter point the French Government has been advised by the Valencia Government that the problem of servicing and supplying an expeditionary force of 60,000 men in Spain is already requiring a maximum effort on the part of the Italian Government and that it is not likely Italy would be in a position to retaliate against opening the French frontier by sending additional troops in important numbers to Spain. It was also the view of the Valencia Government that opening the frontier would have a beneficial effect on Franco.
My informant said that it was possible a decision might be reached to “suspend” the application of the Non-Intervention Agreement temporarily pending the adoption of measures by all concerned to render it really effective.
I inquired whether Labonne, Assistant Director of Political and Commercial Affairs at the Foreign Office who has just been appointed Ambassador to Spain, would go to his post soon. My informant said that he would proceed soon and that he would go to Valencia and not to St. Jean de Luz where his predecessor, Herbette, has been residing. He said that the French Government realized that this appointment at the present moment and the fact that Labonne was going to Valencia might appear “to engage the responsibility” of the French Government further in the Spanish problem but he said that Germany and Italy had Ambassadors at Burgos and why after all should not France have its Ambassador at Valencia? He said that it had become impossible for the French Government to [Page 417] continue longer to sit back and allow the Italians to have their own way completely in Spain. The French and British Governments either had to adopt a firmer attitude in the protection of their own interests or else “abdicate”.
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