700.0011 Pacific/18
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)
Sir: Officers of the Department have read and have given careful consideration to the statements made in the memorandum of Mr. Atherton’s conversation on June 16 with Sir Alexander Cadogan in regard to a non-aggression pact for the Pacific area, forwarded to the Department under cover of the Embassy’s confidential despatch No. 3134 of June 17, 1937.20 The Department notes that the Imperial Conference passed no resolution on the matter but reached a confidential conclusion that “such a pact was a worthy objective to work towards over a period of time, but that the furtherance of the matter and all discussions in connection with it should be left in the hands of the British Government.”
The first paragraph of the Embassy’s telegram No. 356, June 8, noon, outlines the concepts which Sir Alexander Cadogan contemplated would form the basis of the proposed pact of non-aggression. [Page 991] These concepts envisage a provision varying somewhat between a nine-power pact of non-aggression in the Pacific containing a consultative provision and providing for outlawing war, and an extension of the present four-power treaty between the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, relating to their insular possessions in the Pacific. In the absence of information to the contrary, the Department assumes that these concepts still form the basis of the pact which the British Government has under consideration.
With regard to the statement made by Sir Alexander Cadogan that he was interested in ascertaining what the view of the American Government would be toward such a pact, the Department concurs in the view expressed by Sir Alexander Cadogan to the effect that in reference to any pact of non-aggression in the Pacific the attitude of the Japanese Government constitutes the most vital factor. The Department is therefore of the opinion that inasmuch as the British Government has the matter in hand and inasmuch as the British Government and the Japanese Government are discussing various problems and possibilities, it would seem advantageous to let those two Governments continue their discussions until they shall have come to their own conclusions, without any expression by the American Government of views on the subject. By such a course there would be avoided the giving to the Japanese of an impression that there is any form of collusion between the American Government and the British Government in regard to the matter. The attitude of the American Government on the subject of peace and on the subject of political and economic stabilization is well known, and it seems reasonable to believe that if the idea of concluding at this time a pact such as is under consideration is deemed a practicable and desirable objective, a course of watchful waiting on the part of the American Government, without expression of an opinion either favorable or unfavorable, would be helpful. When the British shall have ascertained from the Japanese what is the attitude of the Japanese Government toward the proposal and shall have informed the Department in regard thereto, the Department will expect to be in position to give the British Government an appropriate indication of its attitude in the matter.
You are authorized in such further conversations as you may have with Sir Alexander Cadogan or other appropriate officials of the British Foreign Office to express views in accord with the foregoing statements. You may, in your discretion, point out that the views of the Department as outlined hereinabove are based on a desire not to obstruct and to be as helpful as practicable toward furthering principles of policy in which this Government believes and which we constantly seek to have translated into practice.
Very truly yours,
- Despatch not printed.↩