793.94/9509
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of Legation in Canada (Key)97
| [Present:] | Sir Robert Craigie (British Ambassador to Tokyo) |
| Mr. Armour (Minister) | |
| Mr. Key (Second Secretary of Legation) |
Following an informal luncheon given for Sir Robert and Lady Craigie at the Legation on August 13, 1937, Sir Robert, the Minister and Mr. Key, Second Secretary of Legation, retired to the library where the following conversation ensued.
At the outset, Sir Robert expressed his regret that he had been unable to go to Washington for a talk with State Department officials en route to his new post, but explained that there had been two reasons for this.
In the first place, he was somewhat pressed for time. In the second place, he felt that his presence in Washington at this particular time would probably have given rise to misapprehension on the part of the Japanese: the latter might think that his purpose in coming to Washington was to hatch some scheme for concerted Anglo-American action against the Japanese. It was particularly in order to avoid creating any such unwarranted suspicions, on the part of the Japanese, that he had decided against proceeding to Washington. He added that he would be grateful if the reasons for his failure to come to Washington were made known to the Department should the Minister shortly be communicating to Washington. The Minister stated that he shared Sir Robert’s views about the desirability of not stirring up Japanese susceptibilities unnecessarily and would be glad to inform the Department of what Sir Robert had told him.
[Page 402]Turning to the general outlook in the Far East, Sir Robert felt that it was indeed gloomy. Until recently, his government had felt that, what he termed, the “civilian” and moderate groups in Japan had been making steady progress and that a more tolerant attitude towards China was being created: Japanese public opinion was more and more coming around to the view that peaceful methods of composing Sino-Japanese differences must be sought. Notwithstanding the ever present danger of assassination, civilian leaders had become increasingly bold in their utterances and actions. This changed situation had so alarmed Japanese military groups that they had felt impelled to put a stop to it, hence the present military adventures in China. The present war fever in Japan and the strong public support now being given the militarists showed that, for the present at least, the latter had regained the upper hand. The possibility of large scale military operations by Japanese groups in China was now unfortunately very real: civilian and moderate groups in Japan were apparently powerless to stem the rising tide of feeling against China. The only hope was that the general situation would soon improve and that the Chinese would have the good sense not further to provoke the Japanese.
Meanwhile, it was more important than ever before to do everything possible to strengthen the hands of the civilian and moderate groups in Japan. Undoubtedly there were large and influential groups in Japan which were out of sympathy with present Japanese policy towards China. The present military adventure was costing a lot of money: soon it would be reflected in increased taxation. When you touch a man’s pocketbook you touch him in a sensitive spot: further taxes piled on top of the already exhorbitant taxes now levied in Japan eventually could create only further unfavorable reaction to the Japanese military. Although the outlook was grave and no one could foretell what would be the outcome of the present military operations in China it was not unlikely that, in the long run, the intransigeance of the Japanese military would serve in the end to weaken them further politically.
Sir Robert expressed the view that one sure way of strengthening the hands of the civilian and moderate groups in Japan was for Great Britain and the United States to refrain from exerting any joint or concerted action against the Japanese Government. The moment that the Japanese military could rightly claim that joint Anglo-American pressure was being brought to bear on Japan, Japanese public opinion would solidify in support of the military. It was therefore of the utmost importance that the British and American Governments avoid the possibility of giving the Japanese military even the pretext for asserting such a claim. He felt it unnecessary to say that the British and Americans should keep each [Page 403] other fully informed as to what policies they would pursue and were pursuing in the Far East, but whatever action might result from these policies should be taken independently. Probably any steps taken would be more or less identical since both Governments view the situation along the same general lines, but under no conditions should the Japanese be given grounds for the belief that the British and American Governments were in league against them.
On the other hand, in Sir Robert’s opinion, it was extremely important that the Japanese Government and more particularly the Japanese military, be made to understand, beyond any doubt, that the British and American Governments hold common views on Far Eastern policies. Let there be nothing to make the Japanese militarists think that there was even the possibility of a rift in Anglo-American relations. Sir Robert stated that in the Foreign Office there had been an important and influential group which held the view that the chief hope of curbing the Japanese lay in joint Anglo-American action. He had not subscribed to this belief himself and felt therefore that the attitude of the American Government in discouraging joint action had been most “wise”: the Japanese knew perfectly well that neither in Great Britain nor the United States was there any considerable group which was willing to say to Japan “you may go thus far, but no further”. This had been the fundamental weakness of the so-called Stimson policy. Furthermore, threats, whether or not they contained an element of bluff, would only weaken the hands of the civilian and moderate groups in Japan. He remarked laughingly that perhaps he should not have expressed his views so frankly, as some of them ran somewhat contrary to those held at the Foreign Office.
Sir Robert then went on to say that it ought to be comparatively easy to adjust Sino-Japanese economic relations: strictly from an economic viewpoint, conditions were nearly ideal for a rapprochement. Japan was primarily industrial while China was essentially agricultural, thus making the economics of the two countries complementary. Each was dependent on the other and if only a peaceful era in their political relations could be ushered in it would be to their great mutual advantage.
Furthermore, even the Japanese militarists recognized Japan’s dependence on China. They admitted that if Japan were to become embroiled in a war with Russia it was vital for the former that China remain neutral. Nevertheless the military elements in Japan were so shortsighted as constantly to aggravate the Chinese and thus to make it almost certain that China would cast in her lot with the U.S.S.R. in the event of a Russo-Japanese war.
The Minister asked Sir Robert for his opinion as to how real was the fear in Japan of the Soviet air force and particularly the important Soviet aviation elements said to be concentrated in and near [Page 404] Vladivostok, which it has been claimed could, if required, easily fly to Japan, bomb many of the leading Japanese industrial centres and return to their base. Sir Robert stated that in his opinion the Japanese believed it inevitable that sooner or later they would have to square their accounts with the U.S.S.R. There had been considerable uneasiness in Japan about the Soviet air force, but the recent purges in the U.S.S.R. had considerably lessened this fear, at least among the Japanese military. The latter apparently felt that the wholesale executions which had been taking place in Russia during recent months had more or less disrupted the Soviet Army because so many of their leading generals had been put to death. This situation was no doubt one of the contributing factors to the decision of the Japanese military to undertake the present adventure in China.
In closing, Sir Robert stated that he was looking forward with pleasure to renewing his acquaintance with Mr. Grew, with whom he had been en poste in Berne during the World War and of whom he entertained a very high opinion. The Minister stated that he felt sure that Sir Robert would find Mr. Grew unusually well informed on current affairs in Japan and that he was equally sure that he would find him at all times ready and willing to cooperate fully.
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Canada in his despatch No. 1553, August 17; received August 19.↩