Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume III

890.00/47

Memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis⁸³

London, April 23, 1937.

Yoshida, the Japanese Ambassador, who had asked to see me, came by appointment at 10 o’clock this morning. He began by referring to a conversation which he had had with me in New York last year on his way to London. He said that while he had not made the headway in arriving at some tentative understanding with the British with regard to economic cooperation which he had hoped for, he wanted to tell me just what the situation is.⁸⁴

In substance he said that he was working for the demilitarization of Japan and for a closer economic cooperation and friendship between Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. Although he had been away from Japan for some time, he felt certain that the militarists are losing ground primarily because of the increase in taxes and of the fact that they had only caused trouble and suspicion with other countries, from which no benefits had been derived.

As a result of the Japanese policy in China, they had destroyed their trade and friendship with China and had been infringing on British interests there, which had caused tension with Great Britain. In order to seek an outlet for trade which they had lost with China, they had been taking trade away from England in India and other places and embargoes had been established against them. Yoshida said that while it was vitally necessary for Japan to increase her trade, the only practicable way to do so was through economic international collaboration, particularly with Great Britain and the United States and China. He believed that the militarists were beginning to realize the only practicable way to achieve this would be through a reversal of their policy in China and the development of a program of collaboration for the economic rehabilitation of China and the consequent development of that great potential market, which must be done for the benefit of China and in a way to increase the friendship and confidence of China in regard to Japan.

Yoshida said it was necessary to demilitarize Japan through industrialization and commercialization, and now that militarism is losing ground because of taxes, etc., is the time to bring this about. He expressed the hope, therefore, that the United States might call an economic conference and thus help to free the economic forces which, in turn, would help to demilitarize Japan and lighten the burden of armaments and reduce the tension between nations. He said he had finally induced the British to allow him to invite his Government to make suggestions as to possible economic collaboration in China and that if anything definite should result from this, they would naturally take it up with the United States because he was satisfied that Great Britain would not make any kind of an agreement which is not acceptable or agreeable to the United States, and also that it is most important that the three countries should cooperate in efforts to achieve economic recovery.

I told him that while I was sure the United States would be sympathetic with any practicable efforts at economic recovery in China and elsewhere, it would not be possible to express any definite opinion until the plans which he has in view become more crystallized. I told him we were most desirous of collaborating economically in every practicable way and that it would, in my opinion, be futile to call a world economic conference at least without considerable advance preparation. I told him we were having discussions with the British as to a possible commercial agreement, the principal purpose of which would be to improve the whole world situation and not just to negotiate an agreement that merely improved trade between Great Britain and the United States.^84a

Yoshida then referred to the internal and external situation of Japan. He repeated that it was necessary to demilitarize Japan in order to reduce taxes and the burden of armaments and to abate social unrest, and it was also necessary to do so in order to foster the confidence and friendship of other nations, particularly Great Britain and the United States. I told him that while I could understand that the Japanese Government might have deemed it politically unwise at the time, to become a party to the naval treaty, I was surprised that even the militarists had refused to agree to accept the fourteen-inch guns for battleships,⁸⁵ particularly since they have always advocated a reduction in the caliber of guns. Also, since his Government had repeatedly expressed a desire to avoid a naval race, from which it was evident it could gain nothing whatever, I wondered if they realized that the only practicable way to avoid a naval race is to avoid suspicion and to adhere to accepted types of naval armament.

He said he fully realized this and had done all he could to get his Government to accept at least the fourteen-inch gun; that while he had not so far succeeded, he was hopeful that when the new Diet meets after the elections, it would be possible to get somewhere on this. He said that after the new Diet and Government is formed, he thought it would be advisable for Great Britain and the United States to take this matter up again, but that it would be better to wait until then because the present Government, which is only a temporary one, wishes to postpone all possible decisions.

He felt that although Mr. Sato might not continue in the new Government, he had already been able to exercise a good influence, and the mere fact that he had been invited to be Foreign Secretary was a hopeful indication of a definite, liberal trend.

In concluding, he said he wished to express the hope that Great Britain and the United States would be patient and through economic cooperation would help Japan to attempt a policy of friendly cooperation.

83. Copy transmitted to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs by Mr. Davis from London, April 27. Mr. Davis was Chairman of the American delegation to the International Sugar Conference.
84. For Mr. Yoshida’s conversations with the British, see memorandum of April 22 by Mr. Davis, p. 975.
85. See vol. ii, pp. 1 ff.
85. See telegram No. 178, March 30, 1 p.m., from the Ambassador In the United Kingdom, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 299; see also Foreign Relations, 1937, vol. i, pp. 618 ff.