793.94/8662
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 15.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a Japanese Domei news telegram dated Tokyo, May 4, 1937,99 quoting a remarkable statement attributed to Mr. Sato, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The Department will note that Minister Sato made the rather startling revelation that
“about a decade ago, when anti-British sentiment prevailed in that country (i. e. China), Great Britain asked Japan to send a joint expedition to China. Japan at that time, he said, declined to comply with this request.
“Similarly,” he added. “I fear that Great Britain would possibly hesitate to accept Japan’s offer of co-operation in China, if such an offer were made now, especially since China would naturally look with disfavor upon Anglo-Japanese co-operation in China”.
The news despatch does not so state, but obviously Mr. Sato’s remarks were elicited by queries concerning the reliability of numerous reports now current to the effect that conversations are in progress in London between Japanese and British statesmen having in view “Anglo-Japanese co-operation” in China.
To indicate the nature of press reports current here regarding the conversations now being conducted in London concerning Anglo-Japanese co-operation in China I enclose a copy of a Reuter despatch dated London, May 61 which reports a reply made by the Under [Page 94] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to a Parliamentary interpellation, in which he said that a number of informal conversations had occurred in recent months with the Japanese Ambassador with the object of improving Anglo-Japanese relations generally, but no concrete suggestions had hitherto been made by either side on their interests in China, or on any other matter; the desirability of keeping other interested governments informed had not been overlooked.
On May 7 a Chinese official of some rank in the Foreign Office stated to the Counselor of the Embassy at a social affair that he regarded the statement of Minister Sato quoted in the second paragraph of this despatch as extremely stupid, and most surprising as coming from a seasoned diplomat like Mr. Sato. He said that it was quite evident that in asserting that there had been a British proposal for a joint Anglo-Japanese military expedition into China in 1927, or thereabouts, Mr. Sato had wished to drive a wedge between Great Britain and China just when their relations showed signs of becoming very intimate and friendly and that, obviously, such an attempt could end only in failure. The point of the informant’s remarks was, however, that such an ill-considered attack on Sino-British relations by the Japanese Foreign Minister could proceed only from a feeling of desperation on his part over the hopelessness of the relations between Japan and China and he feared that if Japanese civilian officials took such desperate measures to relieve a hopeless situation, Japanese military officers might be in a frame of mind to adopt even more desperate expedients, in complete disregard of the possibly fatal effect on the future of Japan and on the peace of the world. The informant had in mind, quite evidently, a large-scale Japanese military invasion of North China. He expressed the opinion that Japan would ruin itself if it attempted to conquer China by military force, partly because of the intrinsic difficulty of the undertaking, and partly because the Japanese people, after the first burst of patriotic enthusiasm, would revolt against the sacrifices entailed, but he did not think the possible peril to Japan would deter Japanese militarists.
On the evening of May 7, at another social affair, I chanced to be in conversation with the Minister of Railways and he expressed somewhat similar forebodings over the probability of imminent Japanese pressure on China, but what he feared was an attempt to dominate China in economic, not military, ways. He did not believe Japan would try to conquer China by force of arms. Both to me and to a member of my staff on the same evening he said that he anticipated that the Japanese military authorities in North China would try to compel General Sung Che-yuan to sign a contract for construction by the Japanese of the Tientsin-Shihchiachwang Railway, a line which, masquerading as an economic enterprise, is really desired by the Japanese for its strategic and military usefulness.
[Page 95]The Chinese reading public seems to be following with close attention the three-cornered struggle now in progress in Japan between the major political parties and the Cabinet and between the Cabinet and the military faction. While some Chinese take consolation in the theory that these internal perplexities will divert Japanese attention from the China adventure, others find in them reason for increased anxiety, on the ground that the internal dissensions may goad the Japanese militarists to such a state of exasperation that they will take the reins into their own hands, abruptly break off all attempts to settle Sino-Japanese problems through negotiation and take steps to carry out their “continental policy” by the Use of armed force.
In this relation, the Embassy has received reliable information to the effect that the German chief military adviser to the National Military Affairs Committee has confidentially informed the Committee that the Chinese army has now reached a state of high efficiency and that it need not seriously fear the outcome of a test of strength with Japanese troops.
Respectfully yours,